Awarexone
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web3-hunt-foundation
Hunter mindset, recon setup, and target scoring for Web3 bug bounty. Use at the START of any new protocol hunt - scoring targets, setting up environment, understanding architecture.
Registry indexed
Hunter mindset, recon setup, and target scoring for Web3 bug bounty. Use at the START of any new protocol hunt - scoring targets, setting up environment, understanding architecture.
Hunter mindset, recon setup, and target scoring for Web3 bug bounty. Use at the START of any new protocol hunt - scoring targets, setting up environment, understanding architecture.
Source documentation, not instructions for this website. Review permissions before running any commands.
Mindset + Recon + Setup. Read this before touching any new target's code. Replaces: 01-mindset, 02-recon-setup, 20-chain-complete
You are NOT looking for "vulnerabilities" in the abstract. You are looking for specific actions an attacker can take TODAY that result in profit.
Everything flows from one question: "What can I STEAL, FREEZE, or DESTROY — and what do I END UP WITH?"
Apply to every finding before writing a single line:
I am an attacker. I will:
1. SETUP: What do I need? (wallet, capital, any whitelisted permissions?)
2. CALL: Exact transactions, exact order, exact function names
3. RESULT: What do I end up with that I didn't start with?
4. COST: Gas + capital + flash loan fee + any other expense
5. DETECT: Can anyone stop or reverse this?
6. NET ROI: I gained X at cost of Y. Is Y << X?
If you can't fill in steps 2 and 3 with specific function calls → it's not a real bug. Stop. Move on.
amount = 0? Does anything revert or silently pass?initialize() is called?amount received ≠ amount sent?address(0) or a malicious contract as an address param?type(uint256).max as a numeric param?Question #10 explains 19% of all Critical findings. If
vote()hasonlyRole(VOTER), checkpoke(),reset(),harvest()— the missing modifier on the sibling IS the bug.
Before spending time on a PoC, try to KILL the finding:
One YES = KILL. Move on.
If you've been on the same function for 5 minutes with no clear attack path → STOP. Add it to a low-priority list. Move to the next function. Top hunters: 95% fast-reject + 5% deep dives on confirmed leads.
Don't review 10 protocols in one week. Pick ONE. Spend 3-5 days becoming the expert. Protocol-specific knowledge compounds. The Curve expert found 5 bugs. The 10-protocol tourist found 0.
If functionA() has a security check, and functionB() doesn't — that IS the report.
You don't need to fully understand why. The inconsistency proves the developer intended the check.
Before touching any code: score the target. Score < 6 → skip.
| Criterion | Points | How to Check |
|---|---|---|
| Max bounty ≥ $50K | +2 | Immunefi program page |
| TVL > $1M | +2 | DeFiLlama |
| Program launched < 30 days ago | +2 | Immunefi "new" filter |
| Custom math (AMM/vault/lending) | +1 | Read scope contracts |
| Recent code changes | +1 | git log --oneline -20 |
| Prior audits available | +1 | Program page / GitHub |
| In-scope includes smart contracts | +1 | Scope section |
| Protocol type you know well | +1 | Your specialization |
| Source code public/readable | +1 | GitHub / Etherscan verified |
< 4: Skip — too small, too audited, wrong fit 4-5: Only if nothing better available 6-8: Good — spend 1-3 days ≥ 9: Excellent — spend up to 1 week
Note:
- All in-scope contract addresses + GitHub links
- Out-of-scope list (DO NOT report these)
- Primacy of Impact: YES/NO (YES = more forgiving on novel impacts)
- Max bounty amounts by severity
- Time on Immunefi (newer = fewer duplicates)
git clone <target-repo>
cd <target-repo>
git log --oneline -20 # Recent changes = freshest bugs here
forge build # Must compile clean (fix if not)
forge test # Note failures — may indicate known issues
forge coverage # Untested code = priority review target
For each finding, note its status:
Find audits: GitHub repo, protocol docs, Immunefi page, Google "[protocol] audit report"
Ask: "Worst thing an attacker could do to users of this protocol?"
Work backward from impact to code:
Draw the money flow (even mentally):
User USDC
↓ deposit()
[Protocol Vault] ──→ External Protocol (Aave/Compound/Uniswap)
↓ yield accumulates
[Reward Distributor] ──→ Users via claim/harvest
Find WHERE VALUE ACCUMULATES. That contract = highest priority.
Key state variables to map:
# Slither — 93 detectors, fast
slither . --exclude-low --filter-paths "test|lib|node_modules"
slither . --detect reentrancy-eth,unprotected-upgrade,arbitrary-send-eth
# Aderyn — Rust-based, Foundry-native
aderyn . --output report.md
# Read output → note HIGH/CRITICAL only
# Tools catch ~30-40% of bugs. Human review finds the rest.
Run through this before any deep review:
PROGRAM:
[ ] Max bounty noted per severity
[ ] ALL in-scope contracts listed (name + address)
[ ] Out-of-scope list read — nothing to falsely report
[ ] Primacy of Impact: YES/NO noted
[ ] Program launch date noted (new = good)
PRIOR AUDITS:
[ ] All audit PDFs downloaded and scanned
[ ] Each finding: status noted (Fixed/Ack/Risk Accepted)
[ ] Acknowledged items in notes as starting points
CODEBASE:
[ ] git clone + forge build passes
[ ] git log checked — recent commits noted
[ ] forge coverage run — untested functions noted
[ ] Slither + Aderyn run — high/critical noted
ARCHITECTURE:
[ ] Fund flow drawn
[ ] Crown jewels identified (where value lives)
[ ] External dependencies mapped (Chainlink, Uniswap, Aave, etc.)
[ ] ALL privileged roles found (onlyOwner, onlyRole, etc.)
[ ] Proxy/upgradeable pattern identified (if any)
ATTACK SURFACE:
[ ] All external/public non-view functions listed
[ ] Mint/burn functions located
[ ] Withdraw/emergencyWithdraw functions located
[ ] Upgrade/migration functions located
[ ] Oracle dependencies found
[ ] Signature/permit usage found
[ ] Cross-contract interactions mapped
DEX / AMM:
- Oracle manipulation (getReserves, slot0 = flash-loan manipulable)
- Rounding in pool math (1-wei attacks × flash swap)
- Missing slippage protection (sandwich vector)
- Fee-on-transfer token handling
LENDING / BORROWING:
- Collateral valuation (oracle → overborrow)
- Liquidation logic (bad debt creation, self-liquidation)
- Interest accrual rounding (favors borrower or protocol?)
- Flash loan → inflate collateral → borrow → repay
VAULT / YIELD:
- First depositor share inflation (ERC4626)
- Donation attack via direct balanceOf transfer
- Strategy rug (malicious strategy contract)
- Reward accounting timing (enter/exit attacks)
BRIDGE / CROSS-CHAIN:
- Message replay (missing nonce/nullifier)
- Signature replay (no chainId)
- Validator set manipulation
- Destination execution reentrancy
STAKING / RESTAKING:
- Reward distribution timing attacks
- Slashing logic errors
- Role never granted → permanent lock
- Withdrawal queue multi-field desync
| Situation | File to Read |
|---|---|
| Starting new hunt | This file |
| Need specific grep commands | 03-grep-arsenal |
| Found a bug, building PoC | 04-poc-and-foundry |
| Ready to validate + submit | 05-triage-report |
| Need all bug class patterns | 02-bug-classes |
| Want external research depth | 06-methodology |
| Hunting Ern protocol | 07-live-hunt-ern |
| Want AI tool automation | 08-ai-tools |
→ NEXT: 02-bug-classes.md
name: web3-hunt-foundation description: Hunter mindset, recon setup, and target scoring for Web3 bug bounty. Use at the START of any new protocol hunt - scoring targets, setting up environment, understanding architecture. Contains: attack/triage mental models, 10-point scorecard (score ≥6 to proceed), crown jewels approach, static analysis setup, recon checklist.
--- name: web3-hunt-foundation description: Hunter mindset, recon setup, and target scoring for Web3 bug bounty. Use at the START of any new protocol hunt - scoring targets, setting up environment, understanding architecture. Contains: attack/triage mental models, 10-point scorecard (score ≥6 to proceed), crown jewels approach, static analysis setup, recon checklist. --- # WEB3 HUNT FOUNDATION > Mindset + Recon + Setup. Read this before touching any new target's code. > Replaces: 01-mindset, 02-recon-setup, 20-chain-complete --- ## PART 1: THE HUNTER MINDSET ### The Core Mental Shift You are NOT looking for "vulnerabilities" in the abstract. You are looking for **specific actions an attacker can take TODAY that result in profit**. Everything flows from one question: **"What can I STEAL, FREEZE, or DESTROY — and what do I END UP WITH?"** ### The Bug Validation Template Apply to every finding before writing a single line: ``` I am an attacker. I will: 1. SETUP: What do I need? (wallet, capital, any whitelisted permissions?) 2. CALL: Exact transactions, exact order, exact function names 3. RESULT: What do I end up with that I didn't start with? 4. COST: Gas + capital + flash loan fee + any other expense 5. DETECT: Can anyone stop or reverse this? 6. NET ROI: I gained X at cost of Y. Is Y << X? ``` If you can't fill in steps 2 and 3 with specific function calls → **it's not a real bug. Stop. Move on.** ### 10 Attacker Questions (Ask For Every External Function) 1. What if `amount = 0`? Does anything revert or silently pass? 2. What if I call this function twice in the same block? 3. What if I call this before `initialize()` is called? 4. What if I front-run this transaction? 5. What if the external call fails? Does state get half-updated? 6. What if the token has fee-on-transfer? Does `amount received ≠ amount sent`? 7. What if I pass `address(0)` or a malicious contract as an address param? 8. What if I pass `type(uint256).max` as a numeric param? 9. Can I combine this with a flash loan? (zero-cost capital changes the math) 10. **Does a sibling function lack the same modifier this function has?** > Question #10 explains 19% of all Critical findings. If `vote()` has `onlyRole(VOTER)`, check `poke()`, `reset()`, `harvest()` — the missing modifier on the sibling IS the bug. ### 6 Triager Counter-Questions (Disprove Your Own Finding) Before spending time on a PoC, try to KILL the finding: 1. Is there an upstream check I missed that actually prevents this? 2. Is this documented intended behavior (whitepaper, NatSpec, design decision)? 3. Does exploitation require admin/privileged access? (Usually invalid if yes) 4. Is the economic cost to exploit greater than the gain? (Not viable if yes) 5. Was this flagged in a prior audit as "acknowledged" or "risk accepted"? 6. Is the "sensitive" data already publicly visible to anyone in the web UI? **One YES = KILL. Move on.** ### 5-Minute Rule If you've been on the same function for 5 minutes with no clear attack path → **STOP.** Add it to a low-priority list. Move to the next function. Top hunters: 95% fast-reject + 5% deep dives on confirmed leads. ### Depth Over Breadth Don't review 10 protocols in one week. Pick ONE. Spend 3-5 days becoming the expert. Protocol-specific knowledge compounds. The Curve expert found 5 bugs. The 10-protocol tourist found 0. ### Inconsistency Is Proof If `functionA()` has a security check, and `functionB()` doesn't — **that IS the report.** You don't need to fully understand why. The inconsistency proves the developer intended the check. --- ## PART 2: TARGET SCORING — GO / NO-GO Before touching any code: score the target. **Score < 6 → skip.** ### Target Scorecard | Criterion | Points | How to Check | |-----------|--------|-------------| | Max bounty ≥ $50K | +2 | Immunefi program page | | TVL > $1M | +2 | DeFiLlama | | Program launched < 30 days ago | +2 | Immunefi "new" filter | | Custom math (AMM/vault/lending) | +1 | Read scope contracts | | Recent code changes | +1 | `git log --oneline -20` | | Prior audits available | +1 | Program page / GitHub | | In-scope includes smart contracts | +1 | Scope section | | Protocol type you know well | +1 | Your specialization | | Source code public/readable | +1 | GitHub / Etherscan verified | **< 4:** Skip — too small, too audited, wrong fit **4-5:** Only if nothing better available **6-8:** Good — spend 1-3 days **≥ 9:** Excellent — spend up to 1 week --- ## PART 3: RECON METHODOLOGY (30-Minute Protocol) ### Step 1 — Read Immunefi Page (5 min) ``` Note: - All in-scope contract addresses + GitHub links - Out-of-scope list (DO NOT report these) - Primacy of Impact: YES/NO (YES = more forgiving on novel impacts) - Max bounty amounts by severity - Time on Immunefi (newer = fewer duplicates) ``` ### Step 2 — Clone + Setup (5 min) ```bash git clone <target-repo> cd <target-repo> git log --oneline -20 # Recent changes = freshest bugs here forge build # Must compile clean (fix if not) forge test # Note failures — may indicate known issues forge coverage # Untested code = priority review target ``` ### Step 3 — Read ALL Prior Audit Reports (15 min) For each finding, note its status: - **Fixed:** Skip - **Acknowledged / Risk Accepted:** ⚡ **START HERE** ⚡ - Developer knows about it but chose not to fix it - Variants, escalations, related attack paths = in-scope and uncovered - **Partially Fixed:** Verify fix actually closes ALL attack paths Find audits: GitHub repo, protocol docs, Immunefi page, Google "[protocol] audit report" ### Step 4 — Crown Jewels (2 min) Ask: **"Worst thing an attacker could do to users of this protocol?"** Work backward from impact to code: - "Steal deposits" → find: withdrawal functions, access control on transfer - "Mint infinite tokens" → find: mint functions, who calls them, what checks - "Freeze all funds" → find: emergency functions, time locks, role assignments - "Steal all rewards" → find: reward distribution, distributor role, harvest functions ### Step 5 — Architecture + Fund Flow (3 min) Draw the money flow (even mentally): ``` User USDC ↓ deposit() [Protocol Vault] ──→ External Protocol (Aave/Compound/Uniswap) ↓ yield accumulates [Reward Distributor] ──→ Users via claim/harvest ``` Find WHERE VALUE ACCUMULATES. That contract = highest priority. Key state variables to map: - Total deposited / total assets / total shares - Per-user balance tracking (how is it updated?) - Reward accumulator (index, per-share, per-second?) - Role assignments (owner, admin, governance, distributor) - Time locks (timestamps, epochs, cooldowns) ### Step 6 — Static Analysis (5 min) ```bash # Slither — 93 detectors, fast slither . --exclude-low --filter-paths "test|lib|node_modules" slither . --detect reentrancy-eth,unprotected-upgrade,arbitrary-send-eth # Aderyn — Rust-based, Foundry-native aderyn . --output report.md # Read output → note HIGH/CRITICAL only # Tools catch ~30-40% of bugs. Human review finds the rest. ``` --- ## PART 4: RECON CHECKLIST Run through this before any deep review: ``` PROGRAM: [ ] Max bounty noted per severity [ ] ALL in-scope contracts listed (name + address) [ ] Out-of-scope list read — nothing to falsely report [ ] Primacy of Impact: YES/NO noted [ ] Program launch date noted (new = good) PRIOR AUDITS: [ ] All audit PDFs downloaded and scanned [ ] Each finding: status noted (Fixed/Ack/Risk Accepted) [ ] Acknowledged items in notes as starting points CODEBASE: [ ] git clone + forge build passes [ ] git log checked — recent commits noted [ ] forge coverage run — untested functions noted [ ] Slither + Aderyn run — high/critical noted ARCHITECTURE: [ ] Fund flow drawn [ ] Crown jewels identified (where value lives) [ ] External dependencies mapped (Chainlink, Uniswap, Aave, etc.) [ ] ALL privileged roles found (onlyOwner, onlyRole, etc.) [ ] Proxy/upgradeable pattern identified (if any) ATTACK SURFACE: [ ] All external/public non-view functions listed [ ] Mint/burn functions located [ ] Withdraw/emergencyWithdraw functions located [ ] Upgrade/migration functions located [ ] Oracle dependencies found [ ] Signature/permit usage found [ ] Cross-contract interactions mapped ``` --- ## ATTACK SURFACE BY PROTOCOL TYPE ``` DEX / AMM: - Oracle manipulation (getReserves, slot0 = flash-loan manipulable) - Rounding in pool math (1-wei attacks × flash swap) - Missing slippage protection (sandwich vector) - Fee-on-transfer token handling LENDING / BORROWING: - Collateral valuation (oracle → overborrow) - Liquidation logic (bad debt creation, self-liquidation) - Interest accrual rounding (favors borrower or protocol?) - Flash loan → inflate collateral → borrow → repay VAULT / YIELD: - First depositor share inflation (ERC4626) - Donation attack via direct balanceOf transfer - Strategy rug (malicious strategy contract) - Reward accounting timing (enter/exit attacks) BRIDGE / CROSS-CHAIN: - Message replay (missing nonce/nullifier) - Signature replay (no chainId) - Validator set manipulation - Destination execution reentrancy STAKING / RESTAKING: - Reward distribution timing attacks - Slashing logic errors - Role never granted → permanent lock - Withdrawal queue multi-field desync ``` --- ## WHEN TO RE-READ THIS CHAIN | Situation | File to Read | |-----------|-------------| | Starting new hunt | **This file** | | Need specific grep commands | 03-grep-arsenal | | Found a bug, building PoC | 04-poc-and-foundry | | Ready to validate + submit | 05-triage-report | | Need all bug class patterns | 02-bug-classes | | Want external research depth | 06-methodology | | Hunting Ern protocol | 07-live-hunt-ern | | Want AI tool automation | 08-ai-tools | --- → NEXT: [02-bug-classes.md](02-bug-classes.md)
Skill source recorded
Skill instructions are recorded. This is not a runtime test, safety guarantee or compatibility certification.
Review before install: Avoid automatic install
License: MIT
Listed tools are metadata hints, not tested compatibility. Agent prompts are suggested handoffs.
Repository metadata and review signals are advisory. Popularity, source discovery and successful execution are different facts.
Version reported in registry metadata; check source releases before relying on it.
Quality
68/100
Promising
Trust
65/100
This page exposes the same decision, trust, audit, use-case, and install signals through the Registry API, so agents can rank this skill without scraping the UI.
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},
"alternative_skills": [],
"do_not_use_when": [
"teams that need a vendor-supported SLA",
"high-compliance environments without internal security review",
"No major risk signals from current metadata",
"Audit risk risky exceeds max_risk=medium",
"High-risk permission hints: Shell or command execution, Secrets or environment access",
"Dependency or permission surface needs review",
"Permission surface may require sandboxing",
"Financial research output is not financial advice; require human review before any live investment decision"
],
"agent_contract": {
"task_input": "Use web3-hunt-foundation in an agent workflow",
"recommended_action": "Do not auto-install. Inspect the source, dependencies, and permission surface first.",
"install_policy": "block",
"minimum_review_before_use": [
"Trust: 73/100 Strong shortlist",
"Audit: 78/100 Risky",
"Safety: 34/100 Avoid automatic install",
"Review repository, license, install command, and permission surface before production use."
],
"expected_agent_output": {
"selected_skill": "awarexone-web3-hunt-foundation (web3-hunt-foundation)",
"install_command": "npx skills add Awarexone/web3-bug-bounty-hunting-ai-skills --skill web3-hunt-foundation",
"risk_summary": "Risky; Blocked for auto-install; Review before production",
"verification_result": "Report the smallest successful task, files touched, warnings, and any missing setup."
}
},
"outcome_feedback": {
"endpoint": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/outcome",
"method": "POST",
"requires_resolve_event_id": true,
"event_id_source": "Use install_receipt.outcome_feedback.event_id or feedback.event_id returned by /api/agent/resolve for the current task.",
"expected_outcomes": [
"success",
"failed",
"not_relevant",
"blocked_by_risk",
"setup_required"
],
"payload_template": {
"event_id": "<install_receipt.outcome_feedback.event_id or feedback.event_id from /api/agent/resolve>",
"skill_slug": "awarexone-web3-hunt-foundation",
"task": "Use web3-hunt-foundation in an agent workflow",
"agent": "codex",
"outcome": "success",
"install_used": true,
"risk_blocked": false,
"setup_required": false,
"task_success": true,
"output_quality": 4,
"error_type": null,
"human_review_required": false,
"workspace": "sandbox",
"time_to_useful_ms": 120000,
"notes": "Report the smallest successful task, setup friction, files touched, and risk notes."
}
},
"endpoints": {
"web": "https://www.openagentskill.com/skills/awarexone-web3-hunt-foundation",
"api": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/skills/awarexone-web3-hunt-foundation",
"audit": "https://www.openagentskill.com/skills/awarexone-web3-hunt-foundation/audit",
"eval": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/evals?slug=awarexone-web3-hunt-foundation&task=Use%20web3-hunt-foundation%20in%20an%20agent%20workflow&max_risk=medium",
"resolve": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/resolve?task=Use%20web3-hunt-foundation%20in%20an%20agent%20workflow&agent=codex&max_risk=medium",
"receipt": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/receipt?task=Use%20web3-hunt-foundation%20in%20an%20agent%20workflow&agent=codex&max_risk=medium&format=text",
"install": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/skills/awarexone-web3-hunt-foundation/install",
"manifest": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/registry/manifest/awarexone-web3-hunt-foundation"
}
}Listing source
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Audit
78/100
Risky
Copies are not installs. Installation counts require a reported successful installation; they are not a blanket quality guarantee.