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OpenAgentSkill
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数据与分析

azure-bgp

Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments). Detect preference cycles, identify valley-free violations, and propose allowed policy-level mitigations while rejecting prohibited fixes.

xuansenpa1 · 已有静态检查记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add xuansenpa1/skillrevise --skill azure-bgp

技能说明


name: azure-bgp description: "Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments). Detect preference cycles, identify valley-free violations, and propose allowed policy-level mitigations while rejecting prohibited fixes."

Azure BGP Oscillation & Route Leak Analysis

Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments).

This skill trains an agent to:

  • Detect preference cycles that cause BGP oscillation
  • Identify valley-free violations that constitute route leaks
  • Propose allowed, policy-level mitigations (routing intent, export policy, communities, UDR, ingress filtering)
  • Reject prohibited fixes (disabling BGP, shutting down peering, removing connectivity)

The focus is cloud-correct reasoning, not on-prem router manipulation.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when a task involves:

  • Azure Virtual WAN, hub-and-spoke BGP, ExpressRoute, or VPN gateways
  • Repeated route flapping or unstable path selection
  • Unexpected transit, leaked prefixes, or valley-free violations
  • Choosing between routing intent, UDRs, or BGP policy fixes
  • Evaluating whether a proposed "fix" is valid in Azure

Core Invariants (Must Never Be Violated)

An agent must internalize these constraints before reasoning:

  • ❌ BGP sessions between hubs cannot be administratively disabled by customers as it's owned by azure
  • ❌ Peering connections cannot be shut down as a fix as it break all other traffic running on the connections
  • ❌ Removing connectivity is not a valid solution as it break all other traffic running
  • ✅ Problems must be fixed using routing policy, not topology destruction

Any solution violating these rules is invalid.

Expected Inputs

Tasks using this skill typically provide small JSON files:

FileMeaning
topology.jsonDirected BGP adjacency graph
relationships.jsonEconomic relationship per edge (provider, customer, peer)
preferences.jsonPer-ASN preferred next hop (may cause oscillation)
route.jsonPrefix and origin ASN
route_leaks.jsonEvidence of invalid propagation
possible_solutions.jsonCandidate fixes to classify

Reasoning Workflow (Executable Checklist)

Step 1 — Sanity-Check Inputs

  • Every ASN referenced must exist in topology.json
  • Relationship symmetry must hold:
    • provider(A→B) ⇔ customer(B→A)
    • peer must be symmetric
  • If this fails, the input is invalid.

Step 2 — Detect BGP Oscillation (Preference Cycle)

Definition

BGP oscillation exists if ASes form a preference cycle, often between peers.

Detection Rule

  1. Build a directed graph: ASN → preferred next-hop ASN
  2. If the graph contains a cycle, oscillation is possible
  3. A 2-node cycle is sufficient to conclude oscillation.

Example pseudocode:

pref = {asn: prefer_via_asn, ...}

def find_cycle(start):
    path = []
    seen = {}
    cur = start
    while cur in pref:
        if cur in seen:
            return path[seen[cur]:]  # cycle found
        seen[cur] = len(path)
        path.append(cur)
        cur = pref[cur]
    return None

Step 3 — Detect BGP Route Leak (Valley-Free Violation)

Valley-Free Rule

Learned fromMay export to
CustomerAnyone
PeerCustomers only
ProviderCustomers only

Leak Conditions

A route leak exists if either is true:

  1. Route learned from a provider is exported to a peer or provider
  2. Route learned from a peer is exported to a peer or provider

Fix Selection Logic (Ranked)

Tier 1 — Virtual WAN Routing Intent (Preferred)

Applies to:

  • ✔ Oscillation
  • ✔ Route leaks

Why it works:

  • Routing intent operates above BGP — BGP still learns routes, but does not decide forwarding
  • Forwarding becomes deterministic and policy-driven — Intent policy overrides BGP path selection
  • Decouples forwarding correctness from BGP stability — Even if BGP oscillates, forwarding is stable

For oscillation:

  • Breaks preference cycles by enforcing a single forwarding hierarchy
  • Even if both hubs prefer each other's routes, intent policy ensures traffic follows one path

For route leaks:

  • Prevents leaked peer routes from being used as transit
  • When intent mandates hub-to-hub traffic goes through Virtual WAN (ASN 65001), leaked routes cannot be used
  • Enforces valley-free routing by keeping provider routes in proper hierarchy

Agent reasoning: If routing intent is available, recommend it first.

Tier 2 — Export / Route Policy (Protocol-Correct)

For oscillation:

  • Filter routes learned from a peer before re-advertising — Removes one edge of the preference cycle
  • Why this works: In a cycle where Hub A prefers routes via Hub B and vice versa, filtering breaks one "leg":
    • If Hub A filters routes learned from Hub B before re-announcing, Hub B stops receiving routes via Hub A
    • Hub B can no longer prefer the path through Hub A because it no longer exists
    • The cycle collapses, routing stabilizes

Example: If vhubvnet1 (ASN 65002) filters routes learned from vhubvnet2 (ASN 65003) before re-advertising, vhubvnet2 stops receiving routes via vhubvnet1, breaking the oscillation cycle.

For route leaks:

  • Enforce valley-free export rules — Prevent announcing provider/peer-learned routes to peers/providers
  • Use communities (e.g., no-export) where applicable
  • Ingress filtering — Reject routes with invalid AS_PATH from peers
  • RPKI origin validation — Cryptographically rejects BGP announcements from ASes that are not authorized to originate a given prefix, preventing many accidental and sub-prefix leaks from propagating

Limitation: Does not control forwarding if multiple valid paths r

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