azure-bgp
Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments). Detect preference cycles, identify valley-free violations, and propose allowed policy-level mitigations while rejecting prohibited fixes.
xuansenpa1 · 已有静态检查记录
安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add xuansenpa1/skillrevise --skill azure-bgp技能说明
name: azure-bgp description: "Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments). Detect preference cycles, identify valley-free violations, and propose allowed policy-level mitigations while rejecting prohibited fixes."
Azure BGP Oscillation & Route Leak Analysis
Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments).
This skill trains an agent to:
- Detect preference cycles that cause BGP oscillation
- Identify valley-free violations that constitute route leaks
- Propose allowed, policy-level mitigations (routing intent, export policy, communities, UDR, ingress filtering)
- Reject prohibited fixes (disabling BGP, shutting down peering, removing connectivity)
The focus is cloud-correct reasoning, not on-prem router manipulation.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when a task involves:
- Azure Virtual WAN, hub-and-spoke BGP, ExpressRoute, or VPN gateways
- Repeated route flapping or unstable path selection
- Unexpected transit, leaked prefixes, or valley-free violations
- Choosing between routing intent, UDRs, or BGP policy fixes
- Evaluating whether a proposed "fix" is valid in Azure
Core Invariants (Must Never Be Violated)
An agent must internalize these constraints before reasoning:
- ❌ BGP sessions between hubs cannot be administratively disabled by customers as it's owned by azure
- ❌ Peering connections cannot be shut down as a fix as it break all other traffic running on the connections
- ❌ Removing connectivity is not a valid solution as it break all other traffic running
- ✅ Problems must be fixed using routing policy, not topology destruction
Any solution violating these rules is invalid.
Expected Inputs
Tasks using this skill typically provide small JSON files:
| File | Meaning |
|---|---|
topology.json | Directed BGP adjacency graph |
relationships.json | Economic relationship per edge (provider, customer, peer) |
preferences.json | Per-ASN preferred next hop (may cause oscillation) |
route.json | Prefix and origin ASN |
route_leaks.json | Evidence of invalid propagation |
possible_solutions.json | Candidate fixes to classify |
Reasoning Workflow (Executable Checklist)
Step 1 — Sanity-Check Inputs
- Every ASN referenced must exist in
topology.json - Relationship symmetry must hold:
provider(A→B)⇔customer(B→A)peermust be symmetric
- If this fails, the input is invalid.
Step 2 — Detect BGP Oscillation (Preference Cycle)
Definition
BGP oscillation exists if ASes form a preference cycle, often between peers.
Detection Rule
- Build a directed graph:
ASN → preferred next-hop ASN - If the graph contains a cycle, oscillation is possible
- A 2-node cycle is sufficient to conclude oscillation.
Example pseudocode:
pref = {asn: prefer_via_asn, ...}
def find_cycle(start):
path = []
seen = {}
cur = start
while cur in pref:
if cur in seen:
return path[seen[cur]:] # cycle found
seen[cur] = len(path)
path.append(cur)
cur = pref[cur]
return None
Step 3 — Detect BGP Route Leak (Valley-Free Violation)
Valley-Free Rule
| Learned from | May export to |
|---|---|
| Customer | Anyone |
| Peer | Customers only |
| Provider | Customers only |
Leak Conditions
A route leak exists if either is true:
- Route learned from a provider is exported to a peer or provider
- Route learned from a peer is exported to a peer or provider
Fix Selection Logic (Ranked)
Tier 1 — Virtual WAN Routing Intent (Preferred)
Applies to:
- ✔ Oscillation
- ✔ Route leaks
Why it works:
- Routing intent operates above BGP — BGP still learns routes, but does not decide forwarding
- Forwarding becomes deterministic and policy-driven — Intent policy overrides BGP path selection
- Decouples forwarding correctness from BGP stability — Even if BGP oscillates, forwarding is stable
For oscillation:
- Breaks preference cycles by enforcing a single forwarding hierarchy
- Even if both hubs prefer each other's routes, intent policy ensures traffic follows one path
For route leaks:
- Prevents leaked peer routes from being used as transit
- When intent mandates hub-to-hub traffic goes through Virtual WAN (ASN 65001), leaked routes cannot be used
- Enforces valley-free routing by keeping provider routes in proper hierarchy
Agent reasoning: If routing intent is available, recommend it first.
Tier 2 — Export / Route Policy (Protocol-Correct)
For oscillation:
- Filter routes learned from a peer before re-advertising — Removes one edge of the preference cycle
- Why this works: In a cycle where Hub A prefers routes via Hub B and vice versa, filtering breaks one "leg":
- If Hub A filters routes learned from Hub B before re-announcing, Hub B stops receiving routes via Hub A
- Hub B can no longer prefer the path through Hub A because it no longer exists
- The cycle collapses, routing stabilizes
Example: If vhubvnet1 (ASN 65002) filters routes learned from vhubvnet2 (ASN 65003) before re-advertising, vhubvnet2 stops receiving routes via vhubvnet1, breaking the oscillation cycle.
For route leaks:
- Enforce valley-free export rules — Prevent announcing provider/peer-learned routes to peers/providers
- Use communities (e.g.,
no-export) where applicable - Ingress filtering — Reject routes with invalid AS_PATH from peers
- RPKI origin validation — Cryptographically rejects BGP announcements from ASes that are not authorized to originate a given prefix, preventing many accidental and sub-prefix leaks from propagating
Limitation: Does not control forwarding if multiple valid paths r
阅读完整来源 ↗