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solana-vulnerability-scanner

Scans Solana programs for 6 critical vulnerabilities including arbitrary CPI, improper PDA validation, missing signer/ownership checks, and sysvar spoofing. Use when auditing Solana/Anchor programs.

trailofbits · 已有 AI 审核记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add trailofbits/skills --skill solana-vulnerability-scanner

技能说明


name: solana-vulnerability-scanner description: Scans Solana programs for 6 critical vulnerabilities including arbitrary CPI, improper PDA validation, missing signer/ownership checks, and sysvar spoofing. Use when auditing Solana/Anchor programs.

Solana Vulnerability Scanner

1. Purpose

Systematically scan Solana programs (native and Anchor framework) for platform-specific security vulnerabilities related to cross-program invocations, account validation, and program-derived addresses. This skill encodes 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Solana's account model.

2. When to Use This Skill

  • Auditing Solana programs (native Rust or Anchor)
  • Reviewing cross-program invocation (CPI) logic
  • Validating program-derived address (PDA) implementations
  • Pre-launch security assessment of Solana protocols
  • Reviewing account validation patterns
  • Assessing instruction introspection logic

3. Platform Detection

File Extensions & Indicators

  • Rust files: .rs

Language/Framework Markers

// Native Solana program indicators
use solana_program::{
    account_info::AccountInfo,
    entrypoint,
    entrypoint::ProgramResult,
    pubkey::Pubkey,
    program::invoke,
    program::invoke_signed,
};

entrypoint!(process_instruction);

// Anchor framework indicators
use anchor_lang::prelude::*;

#[program]
pub mod my_program {
    pub fn initialize(ctx: Context<Initialize>) -> Result<()> {
        // Program logic
    }
}

#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct Initialize<'info> {
    #[account(mut)]
    pub authority: Signer<'info>,
}

// Common patterns
AccountInfo, Pubkey
invoke(), invoke_signed()
Signer<'info>, Account<'info>
#[account(...)] with constraints
seeds, bump

Project Structure

  • programs/*/src/lib.rs - Program implementation
  • Anchor.toml - Anchor configuration
  • Cargo.toml with solana-program or anchor-lang
  • tests/ - Program tests

Tool Support

  • Trail of Bits Solana Lints: Rust linters for Solana
  • Installation: Add to Cargo.toml
  • anchor test: Built-in testing framework
  • Solana Test Validator: Local testing environment

4. How This Skill Works

When invoked, I will:

  1. Search your codebase for Solana/Anchor programs
  2. Analyze each program for the 6 vulnerability patterns
  3. Report findings with file references and severity
  4. Provide fixes for each identified issue
  5. Check account validation and CPI security

5. Example Output


6. Vulnerability Patterns (6 Patterns)

I check for 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Solana. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.

Pattern Summary:

  1. Arbitrary CPI ⚠️ CRITICAL - User-controlled program IDs in CPI calls
  2. Improper PDA Validation ⚠️ CRITICAL - Using create_program_address without canonical bump
  3. Missing Ownership Check ⚠️ HIGH - Deserializing accounts without owner validation
  4. Missing Signer Check ⚠️ CRITICAL - Authority operations without is_signer check
  5. Sysvar Account Check ⚠️ HIGH - Spoofed sysvar accounts (pre-Solana 1.8.1)
  6. Improper Instruction Introspection ⚠️ MEDIUM - Absolute indexes allowing reuse

For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.

7. Scanning Workflow

Step 1: Platform Identification

  1. Verify Solana program (native or Anchor)
  2. Check Solana version (1.8.1+ for sysvar security)
  3. Locate program source (programs/*/src/lib.rs)
  4. Identify framework (native vs Anchor)

Step 2: CPI Security Review

# Find all CPI calls
rg "invoke\(|invoke_signed\(" programs/

# Check for program ID validation before each
# Should see program ID checks immediately before invoke

For each CPI:

  • Program ID validated before invocation
  • Cannot pass user-controlled program accounts
  • Anchor: Uses Program<'info, T> type

Step 3: PDA Validation Check

# Find PDA usage
rg "find_program_address|create_program_address" programs/
rg "seeds.*bump" programs/

# Anchor: Check for seeds constraints
rg "#\[account.*seeds" programs/

For each PDA:

  • Uses find_program_address() or Anchor seeds constraint
  • Bump seed stored and reused
  • Not using user-provided bump

Step 4: Account Validation Sweep

# Find account deserialization
rg "try_from_slice|try_deserialize" programs/

# Should see owner checks before deserialization
rg "\.owner\s*==|\.owner\s*!=" programs/

For each account used:

  • Owner validated before deserialization
  • Signer check for authority accounts
  • Anchor: Uses Account<'info, T> and Signer<'info>

Step 5: Instruction Introspection Review

# Find instruction introspection usage
rg "load_instruction_at|load_current_index|get_instruction_relative" programs/

# Check for checked versions
rg "load_instruction_at_checked|load_current_index_checked" programs/
  • Using checked functions (Solana 1.8.1+)
  • Using relative indexing
  • Proper correlation validation

Step 6: Trail of Bits Solana Lints

# Add to Cargo.toml
[dependencies]
solana-program = "1.17"  # Use latest version

[lints.clippy]
# Enable Solana-specific lints
# (Trail of Bits solana-lints if available)

8. Reporting Format

Finding Template

## [CRITICAL] Arbitrary CPI - Unchecked Program ID

**Location**: `programs/vault/src/lib.rs:145-160` (withdraw function)

**Description**:
The `withdraw` function performs a CPI to transfer SPL tokens without validating that the provided `token_program` account is actually the SPL Token program. An attacker can provide a malicious program that appears to perform a transfer but actually steals tokens or performs unauthorized actions.

**Vulnerable Code**:
```rust
// lib.rs, line 145
pub fn withdraw(ctx: Context<Withdraw>,
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