solana-vulnerability-scanner
Scans Solana programs for 6 critical vulnerabilities including arbitrary CPI, improper PDA validation, missing signer/ownership checks, and sysvar spoofing. Use when auditing Solana/Anchor programs.
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安装与使用
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npx skills add trailofbits/skills --skill solana-vulnerability-scanner技能说明
name: solana-vulnerability-scanner description: Scans Solana programs for 6 critical vulnerabilities including arbitrary CPI, improper PDA validation, missing signer/ownership checks, and sysvar spoofing. Use when auditing Solana/Anchor programs.
Solana Vulnerability Scanner
1. Purpose
Systematically scan Solana programs (native and Anchor framework) for platform-specific security vulnerabilities related to cross-program invocations, account validation, and program-derived addresses. This skill encodes 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Solana's account model.
2. When to Use This Skill
- Auditing Solana programs (native Rust or Anchor)
- Reviewing cross-program invocation (CPI) logic
- Validating program-derived address (PDA) implementations
- Pre-launch security assessment of Solana protocols
- Reviewing account validation patterns
- Assessing instruction introspection logic
3. Platform Detection
File Extensions & Indicators
- Rust files:
.rs
Language/Framework Markers
// Native Solana program indicators
use solana_program::{
account_info::AccountInfo,
entrypoint,
entrypoint::ProgramResult,
pubkey::Pubkey,
program::invoke,
program::invoke_signed,
};
entrypoint!(process_instruction);
// Anchor framework indicators
use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
#[program]
pub mod my_program {
pub fn initialize(ctx: Context<Initialize>) -> Result<()> {
// Program logic
}
}
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct Initialize<'info> {
#[account(mut)]
pub authority: Signer<'info>,
}
// Common patterns
AccountInfo, Pubkey
invoke(), invoke_signed()
Signer<'info>, Account<'info>
#[account(...)] with constraints
seeds, bump
Project Structure
programs/*/src/lib.rs- Program implementationAnchor.toml- Anchor configurationCargo.tomlwithsolana-programoranchor-langtests/- Program tests
Tool Support
- Trail of Bits Solana Lints: Rust linters for Solana
- Installation: Add to Cargo.toml
- anchor test: Built-in testing framework
- Solana Test Validator: Local testing environment
4. How This Skill Works
When invoked, I will:
- Search your codebase for Solana/Anchor programs
- Analyze each program for the 6 vulnerability patterns
- Report findings with file references and severity
- Provide fixes for each identified issue
- Check account validation and CPI security
5. Example Output
6. Vulnerability Patterns (6 Patterns)
I check for 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Solana. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.
Pattern Summary:
- Arbitrary CPI ⚠️ CRITICAL - User-controlled program IDs in CPI calls
- Improper PDA Validation ⚠️ CRITICAL - Using create_program_address without canonical bump
- Missing Ownership Check ⚠️ HIGH - Deserializing accounts without owner validation
- Missing Signer Check ⚠️ CRITICAL - Authority operations without is_signer check
- Sysvar Account Check ⚠️ HIGH - Spoofed sysvar accounts (pre-Solana 1.8.1)
- Improper Instruction Introspection ⚠️ MEDIUM - Absolute indexes allowing reuse
For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.
7. Scanning Workflow
Step 1: Platform Identification
- Verify Solana program (native or Anchor)
- Check Solana version (1.8.1+ for sysvar security)
- Locate program source (
programs/*/src/lib.rs) - Identify framework (native vs Anchor)
Step 2: CPI Security Review
# Find all CPI calls
rg "invoke\(|invoke_signed\(" programs/
# Check for program ID validation before each
# Should see program ID checks immediately before invoke
For each CPI:
- Program ID validated before invocation
- Cannot pass user-controlled program accounts
- Anchor: Uses
Program<'info, T>type
Step 3: PDA Validation Check
# Find PDA usage
rg "find_program_address|create_program_address" programs/
rg "seeds.*bump" programs/
# Anchor: Check for seeds constraints
rg "#\[account.*seeds" programs/
For each PDA:
- Uses
find_program_address()or Anchorseedsconstraint - Bump seed stored and reused
- Not using user-provided bump
Step 4: Account Validation Sweep
# Find account deserialization
rg "try_from_slice|try_deserialize" programs/
# Should see owner checks before deserialization
rg "\.owner\s*==|\.owner\s*!=" programs/
For each account used:
- Owner validated before deserialization
- Signer check for authority accounts
- Anchor: Uses
Account<'info, T>andSigner<'info>
Step 5: Instruction Introspection Review
# Find instruction introspection usage
rg "load_instruction_at|load_current_index|get_instruction_relative" programs/
# Check for checked versions
rg "load_instruction_at_checked|load_current_index_checked" programs/
- Using checked functions (Solana 1.8.1+)
- Using relative indexing
- Proper correlation validation
Step 6: Trail of Bits Solana Lints
# Add to Cargo.toml
[dependencies]
solana-program = "1.17" # Use latest version
[lints.clippy]
# Enable Solana-specific lints
# (Trail of Bits solana-lints if available)
8. Reporting Format
Finding Template
## [CRITICAL] Arbitrary CPI - Unchecked Program ID
**Location**: `programs/vault/src/lib.rs:145-160` (withdraw function)
**Description**:
The `withdraw` function performs a CPI to transfer SPL tokens without validating that the provided `token_program` account is actually the SPL Token program. An attacker can provide a malicious program that appears to perform a transfer but actually steals tokens or performs unauthorized actions.
**Vulnerable Code**:
```rust
// lib.rs, line 145
pub fn withdraw(ctx: Context<Withdraw>,
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