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OpenAgentSkill
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constant-time-secret-compare

Compare bearer tokens, API secrets, signatures, and password-equivalents with a constant-time comparison (hash both sides, then crypto.timingSafeEqual) — never == or short-circuiting string equality. Triggers when writing any code that checks a secret against a stored or expected value. Does not fire on comparing non-secret identifiers.

randommonicle · 已有 AI 审核记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add randommonicle/claude-skills --skill constant-time-secret-compare

技能说明


name: constant-time-secret-compare description: Compare bearer tokens, API secrets, signatures, and password-equivalents with a constant-time comparison (hash both sides, then crypto.timingSafeEqual) — never == or short-circuiting string equality. Triggers when writing any code that checks a secret against a stored or expected value. Does not fire on comparing non-secret identifiers.

Constant-time secret compare

String equality short-circuits on the first differing byte, so token == expected leaks how many leading bytes matched through response timing — an oracle an attacker can walk.

The rule

Hash both sides to fixed length, then compare constant-time:

import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
const h = (s) => createHash('sha256').update(s).digest();
const ok = timingSafeEqual(h(provided), h(expected));

Hashing first makes the buffers equal-length (timingSafeEqual throws on length mismatch — itself a leak) and keeps the comparison constant-time regardless of input size. Apply to bearer tokens, admin tokens, webhook signatures, and any password-equivalent. HMAC verification uses the same pattern on the computed and received MACs.

Why

It costs two lines and removes a whole attack class; equality comparison on secrets is the kind of defect that passes every functional test forever. Evidence: ICC CLAUDE.md known-issues (admin token compare, shipped fix).