Threat Hunting & IOC Analysis
IOC extraction, threat intelligence correlation, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, hunt hypothesis generation, and detection rule creation
Masriyan · 已有 AI 审核记录
安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill Threat Hunting & IOC Analysis技能说明
name: Threat Hunting & IOC Analysis description: IOC extraction, threat intelligence correlation, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, hunt hypothesis generation, and detection rule creation version: 3.0.0 author: Masriyan tags: [cybersecurity, threat-hunting, ioc, mitre-attack, threat-intelligence, sigma, detection, siem]
Threat Hunting & IOC Analysis
Purpose
Enable Claude to assist threat hunters with proactive threat detection, IOC extraction and normalization, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, hunt hypothesis generation, and converting threat intelligence into actionable detection rules across all major SIEM platforms.
Activation Triggers
This skill activates when the user asks about:
- Extracting IOCs from threat reports, emails, or security advisories
- Mapping behaviors or TTPs to MITRE ATT&CK framework
- Generating hunt hypotheses for a specific threat actor or technique
- Creating Sigma rules, Splunk SPL queries, KQL, or EQL
- Converting threat intelligence into SIEM detection queries
- STIX/TAXII or MISP-compatible indicator formatting
- ATT&CK Navigator layer creation
- Threat intelligence correlation across multiple sources
- Proactive threat hunting in a SIEM or EDR
Prerequisites
pip install requests pyyaml stix2 taxii2-client
Optional platforms:
- MISP — Threat intelligence sharing platform
- OpenCTI — Threat intelligence platform
- YARA — Pattern matching (→ Skill 05)
- Sigma CLI — Rule conversion tool
- SIEM access (Splunk, Elastic, QRadar, Microsoft Sentinel)
Core Capabilities
1. IOC Extraction & Normalization
When the user provides a threat report, article, email, or log snippet:
Claude performs these extraction steps:
- Parse all text for indicators using pattern matching:
| IOC Type | Pattern Examples |
|---|---|
| IPv4 | 192.0.2.1, defanged: 192[.]0[.]2[.]1 |
| IPv6 | 2001:db8::1 |
| Domain | evil.example.com, evil[.]example[.]com |
| URL | hxxp://evil.com/path, https://malicious[.]io/c2 |
attacker@evil.com, phish[at]evil.com | |
| MD5 | 32 hex chars |
| SHA1 | 40 hex chars |
| SHA256 | 64 hex chars |
| CVE | CVE-2024-XXXXX |
| ATT&CK ID | T1059.001, TA0001 |
| Registry Key | HKCU\Software\... |
| File path | C:\Windows\Temp\..., /tmp/... |
| Mutex | Named mutex patterns |
-
Defang extracted indicators — refang before use:
hxxp://→http://[.]→.[at]→@[:]→:
-
Categorize by type: Network / File / Host / Identity / Vulnerability
-
Score by confidence: High (specific, sourced), Medium (inferred), Low (generic)
-
Output in multiple formats:
python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input threat_report.txt --output iocs.json
python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input report.pdf --format stix --output iocs.stix.json
python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input email.eml --defang --output iocs.csv
STIX 2.1 output template:
{
"type": "indicator",
"id": "indicator--[uuid]",
"created": "2025-05-28T00:00:00.000Z",
"name": "Malicious IP — C2 Infrastructure",
"pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '192.0.2.10']",
"pattern_type": "stix",
"valid_from": "2025-05-28T00:00:00Z",
"labels": ["malicious-activity", "c2"],
"confidence": 85
}
2. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
When the user provides TTPs, behaviors, or a malware report:
python scripts/mitre_mapper.py --input techniques.txt --output attack_map.json
python scripts/mitre_mapper.py --technique T1059.001 --detection-query splunk
Mapping process:
- Analyze each behavior against ATT&CK technique descriptions
- Map to specific Tactic → Technique → Sub-technique (T1059 → T1059.001)
- Assign confidence level based on evidence quality
ATT&CK Tactics Reference:
| Tactic | ID | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | TA0043 | Pre-attack information gathering |
| Resource Development | TA0042 | Establishing attack resources |
| Initial Access | TA0001 | Entry into target environment |
| Execution | TA0002 | Running malicious code |
| Persistence | TA0003 | Maintaining foothold |
| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 | Gaining higher permissions |
| Defense Evasion | TA0005 | Avoiding detection |
| Credential Access | TA0006 | Stealing credentials |
| Discovery | TA0007 | Understanding environment |
| Lateral Movement | TA0008 | Moving through network |
| Collection | TA0009 | Gathering data of interest |
| Command & Control | TA0011 | Communicating with compromised hosts |
| Exfiltration | TA0010 | Stealing data |
| Impact | TA0040 | Disrupting/destroying systems |
ATT&CK Navigator Layer format (JSON for visualization):
{
"name": "Threat Hunt Layer — [Threat Actor/Campaign]",
"versions": {"attack": "14", "navigator": "4.9"},
"domain": "enterprise-attack",
"techniques": [
{
"techniqueID": "T1059.001",
"color": "#ff6666",
"comment": "Observed PowerShell download cradle",
"enabled": true,
"score": 100
}
]
}
3. Hunt Hypothesis Generation
When the user asks for hunt hypotheses:
Use this structured hypothesis template:
## Hunt Hypothesis — [ID]: [Short Name]
**Hypothesis Statement:**
"We believe [Threat Actor/TTPs] may be present in [Environment] based on
[Threat Intelligence / Recent Incidents / Industry Reports]."
**Rationale:**
[Why this threat is relevant to this organization — industry, exposure, recent news]
**ATT&CK Techniques Covered:**
- T1059.001 — PowerShell
- T1053.005 — Scheduled Task/Job
- T1021.001 — Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
**Data Sources Required:**
- Windows Event Logs (Security, System, PowerShell/4104)
- EDR process execution telemetry
- DNS query logs
- Proxy/firewall logs
**Detection Logic:**
[SIEM query or pseudocode]
**Success Criteria:**
- POSITIVE: We find evidence of the technique → escalate to IR (Skill 07)
- NEGATIVE: No evidence after thorough search → document as
阅读完整来源 ↗