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OT / ICS / SCADA Security

Operational Technology and industrial control system security — Purdue model segmentation, industrial protocol analysis (Modbus, DNP3, S7, EtherNet/IP), PLC/HMI exposure, IEC 62443 alignment, and MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, for authorized and safety-conscious assessments

Masriyan · 已有 AI 审核记录

安装与使用

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npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill OT / ICS / SCADA Security

技能说明


name: OT / ICS / SCADA Security description: Operational Technology and industrial control system security — Purdue model segmentation, industrial protocol analysis (Modbus, DNP3, S7, EtherNet/IP), PLC/HMI exposure, IEC 62443 alignment, and MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, for authorized and safety-conscious assessments version: 3.0.0 author: Masriyan tags: [cybersecurity, ot-security, ics, scada, modbus, dnp3, plc, iec62443, attack-ics, purdue-model]

OT / ICS / SCADA Security

Purpose

Enable Claude to assess Operational Technology (OT) and Industrial Control System (ICS) environments — PLCs, RTUs, HMIs, SCADA servers, historians, and field devices — with safety as the first constraint. Claude reasons about the Purdue/ISA-95 model, analyzes industrial protocols passively, maps adversary behavior to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, and aligns recommendations to IEC 62443 and the NIST SP 800-82 guidance.

SAFETY & AUTHORIZATION — READ FIRST: OT systems control physical processes; a crashed PLC can mean equipment damage, environmental release, or loss of life. Default to passive, non-intrusive methods. Never send active scans, writes, or protocol fuzzing to production OT without written authorization, asset-owner sign-off, and a tested rollback/safety plan — ideally on a test bench or during a maintenance window. Confirm scope and the "do-no-harm" boundary before proceeding.


Activation Triggers

This skill activates when the user asks about:

  • ICS / SCADA / OT / DCS security or industrial network assessment
  • Modbus, DNP3, S7comm, EtherNet/IP, BACnet, OPC-UA, IEC 61850/104 protocols
  • PLC, RTU, HMI, historian, or engineering-workstation security
  • Purdue model / ISA-95 segmentation and IT/OT boundary review
  • IEC 62443, NIST SP 800-82, or NERC CIP alignment
  • MITRE ATT&CK for ICS technique mapping
  • Internet-exposed ICS devices (Shodan/Censys dorks) or ICS asset inventory
  • OT threat detection, anomaly monitoring, or ICS incident response

Prerequisites

pip install requests pyyaml
# Protocol libraries (lab use): pip install pymodbus scapy

Optional enhanced capabilities:

  • Wireshark / tshark with ICS dissectors (Modbus, DNP3, S7, ENIP, GOOSE)
  • nmap ICS NSE scripts (use read-only scripts only, with care)
  • GRASSMARLIN / passive asset-discovery tooling
  • Shodan/Censys access for exposure checks (passive, external)

Core Capabilities

1. Architecture & Purdue Model Review

When asked to review OT architecture, map assets to Purdue levels and assess the boundaries:

LevelZoneAssetsKey control
4–5Enterprise / ITERP, business network, internetShould never directly reach L0–L2
3.5IDMZJump hosts, patch/AV relays, historian replicaBrokered, inspected IT↔OT traffic only
3OperationsSCADA servers, historians, engineering WSHardened, monitored
2SupervisoryHMIs, control servers
1ControlPLCs, RTUs, IEDs
0ProcessSensors, actuators, drives

Flag: missing IDMZ, flat IT/OT networks, dual-homed engineering workstations, remote vendor access bypassing the DMZ, and any direct path from L4/L5 to L0–L2.

2. Industrial Protocol Analysis (Passive-First)

Prefer reading a SPAN/TAP capture over active probing. From a PCAP, identify:

  • Modbus/TCP (502) — function codes; flag writes (FC 5/6/15/16), unauthenticated reads, exposure beyond the cell.
  • DNP3 (20000) — operate/direct-operate, lack of Secure Authentication (SAv5).
  • S7comm / S7comm-plus (102) — PLC start/stop, program upload/download.
  • EtherNet/IP + CIP (44818/2222) — forward-open, attribute writes.
  • OPC-UA (4840) — security policy None, anonymous sessions.
  • IEC 61850 GOOSE/MMS, IEC 60870-5-104 (2404), BACnet (47808) as present.

Note that most ICS protocols have no authentication or encryption by design — any reachable client can issue commands. Use scripts/ics_protocol_analyzer.py to summarize an exported PCAP and flag write/control operations and unexpected talkers.

3. Exposure & Asset Discovery

  • Passive inventory from captures (MAC/OUI → vendor, protocol → device role).
  • External exposure (read-only, external) via Shodan/Censys dorks — never expose live device details publicly:
    • port:502 product:Modbus, port:20000 source address, tag:ics, "Siemens, SIMATIC", port:47808, "Schneider Electric".
  • For any device that must be reachable, document why, the compensating controls, and whether it should be behind the IDMZ instead.
  • Active scanning, if authorized: use only read-only nmap NSE (modbus-discover, s7-info, bacnet-info, enip-info) with low rate, never against safety-instrumented systems (SIS).

4. Threat Modeling — MITRE ATT&CK for ICS

Map plausible adversary paths using the ICS matrix tactics: Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Evasion → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → Command-and-Control → Inhibit Response Function → Impair Process Control → Impact. Reference high-signal techniques (e.g., T0883 Internet-Accessible Device, T0836 Modify Parameter, T0831 Manipulation of Control, T0814 Denial of Service, T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown). Anchor scenarios to real tradecraft (Stuxnet, TRITON/TRISIS targeting SIS, Industroyer/CRASHOVERRIDE, PIPEDREAM/INCONTROLLER).

5. IEC 62443 / NIST SP 800-82 Alignment

  • Define zones and conduits; assign Security Levels (SL 1–4) per zone based on threat.
  • Review against IEC 62443-3-3 system requirements (FR1 IAC, FR2 UC, FR3 system integrity, FR4 data confidentiality, FR5 restricted data flow, FR6 timely response, FR7 resource availability).
  • Map to NIST SP 800-82r3 control overlays and NERC CIP where the asset owner is in scope (BES).

6. OT-Aware Detection & Incident Response

  • Detection: baseline normal protocol talkers and command rates; alert on unexpected write/program-download, new en
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