Mobile Application Security
Android and iOS application security testing — static and dynamic analysis, APK/IPA inspection, OWASP MASVS/MASTG verification, secure-storage and transport review, and mobile malware triage for authorized assessments
Masriyan · 已有 AI 审核记录
安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill Mobile Application Security技能说明
name: Mobile Application Security description: Android and iOS application security testing — static and dynamic analysis, APK/IPA inspection, OWASP MASVS/MASTG verification, secure-storage and transport review, and mobile malware triage for authorized assessments version: 3.0.0 author: Masriyan tags: [cybersecurity, mobile-security, android, ios, masvs, mastg, apk, ipa, frida, reverse-engineering]
Mobile Application Security
Purpose
Enable Claude to assess Android and iOS application security against the OWASP MASVS (Mobile Application Security Verification Standard) and execute tests from the OWASP MASTG (Mobile Application Security Testing Guide). Claude performs static analysis on APK/IPA artifacts, guides dynamic instrumentation (Frida/objection), reviews secure storage, transport, and platform-interaction controls, and triages potentially malicious mobile apps.
Authorization Required: Only test applications you own or are explicitly authorized to assess. Decompiling and modifying third-party apps may violate licenses and law. Confirm written scope before proceeding.
Activation Triggers
This skill activates when the user asks about:
- Android (APK/AAB) or iOS (IPA) application security testing
- OWASP MASVS / MASTG verification or a mobile pentest checklist
- Decompiling, reversing, or static analysis of a mobile app
- Insecure data storage, hardcoded secrets, or keystore/keychain review
- Certificate pinning, SSL bypass, or mobile TLS/transport security
- Frida / objection dynamic instrumentation or runtime hooking
AndroidManifest.xml, exported components, deep links, orInfo.plistreview- Mobile malware analysis or suspicious APK triage
- Root/jailbreak detection, tampering, or anti-RE controls
Prerequisites
pip install requests pyaxmlparser
Optional enhanced capabilities:
apktool— APK decode/rebuildjadx— Dalvik → Java decompilerapkid— packer/obfuscator/compiler fingerprintingfrida/objection— dynamic instrumentationmobsf(MobSF) — automated static+dynamic analysis platform- Android SDK platform-tools (
adb),unzip,openssl
Core Capabilities
1. APK Static Analysis
When asked to analyze an APK:
- Unpack & decode —
apktool d app.apk; extractAndroidManifest.xml,classes*.dex,resources.arsc, native libs (lib/), and assets. - Manifest review — flag:
android:debuggable="true",android:allowBackup="true"- Exported components (
activity/service/receiver/providerwithexported="true"or implicit via intent-filter) lacking permissions usesCleartextTraffic="true"/ permissivenetwork_security_config- Dangerous/excessive permissions; custom permissions with weak
protectionLevel - Deep links /
android:autoVerify(app-link hijack), exportedContentProviderpaths
- Secret hunting — scan decompiled sources/resources/assets for API keys, tokens, private keys, cloud creds, hardcoded crypto keys/IVs, and backend URLs.
- Decompile —
jadxto Java; review auth, crypto, WebView (addJavascriptInterface,setJavaScriptEnabled,loadUrlwith untrusted input), and SQL. - Native & packing —
apkidfor packers/obfuscators; inspectlib/*/*.sofor JNI entry points and hardcoded data. - Signature — verify signing scheme (v1/v2/v3), debug-cert use, and integrity.
Use scripts/apk_analyzer.py for an automated first pass.
2. iOS (IPA) Static Analysis
When asked to analyze an IPA:
- Unzip the IPA; locate
Payload/<App>.app/. Info.plist—NSAppTransportSecurityexceptions (NSAllowsArbitraryLoads), URL schemes,UIFileSharingEnabled, permission usage strings.- Binary checks — encryption (
cryptid), PIE, stack canaries, ARC; detect missing hardening viaotool/class-dump. - Secret hunting —
stringsand resource scan for keys, endpoints, tokens. - Data storage —
NSUserDefaults, Core Data, Keychain accessibility classes (avoidkSecAttrAccessibleAlways), plist data at rest. - Embedded provisioning profile — entitlements, ad-hoc vs. enterprise distribution.
3. Insecure Data Storage (MASVS-STORAGE)
Review where sensitive data lands at rest:
- Android: SharedPreferences, SQLite, internal/external files, logs, WebView cache, clipboard. Verify Keystore-backed keys for sensitive material.
- iOS: Keychain (correct accessibility), no secrets in NSUserDefaults/plists, no sensitive data in app snapshots/backups.
- Flag any PII, tokens, or credentials stored plaintext or with app-derived keys.
4. Network & Transport (MASVS-NETWORK)
- Confirm TLS everywhere; no cleartext fallback.
- Certificate/public-key pinning present and validated; document bypass via objection/Frida for testing.
- Inspect API traffic with an intercepting proxy (Burp/mitmproxy); test for the same API flaws as web (→ Skill 09): IDOR, broken auth, mass assignment.
5. Dynamic Analysis & Instrumentation
Guide runtime testing on a rooted/jailbroken test device or emulator:
- objection quick wins:
android sslpinning disable,android root disable, keystore/keychain dump, list activities, start exported components. - Frida hooks for crypto APIs, auth checks, root/jailbreak detection bypass, and tracing sensitive method calls.
- Observe filesystem and logcat for data leakage during use.
6. Platform Interaction & Anti-Tampering (MASVS-PLATFORM / RESILIENCE)
- IPC: validate exported components, intent handling,
ContentProviderpermissions, custom URL schemes / deep-link validation. - WebView: disable JS where not needed; never expose privileged JS interfaces to untrusted content.
- Resilience (defense-in-depth, not a vuln by itself): root/jailbreak detection, anti-debug, anti-hook, code obfuscation, integrity checks.
7. Mobile Malware Triage
For suspicious APKs: apkid packing, requested permissions vs. stated function, accessibility-service abuse, SMS/d