Incident Response & Digital Forensics
IR playbook execution, evidence collection, forensic timeline analysis, memory forensics, and post-incident reporting following NIST SP 800-61 and SANS PICERL methodology
Masriyan · 已有 AI 审核记录
安装与使用
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npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill Incident Response & Digital Forensics技能说明
name: Incident Response & Digital Forensics description: IR playbook execution, evidence collection, forensic timeline analysis, memory forensics, and post-incident reporting following NIST SP 800-61 and SANS PICERL methodology version: 3.0.0 author: Masriyan tags: [cybersecurity, incident-response, forensics, dfir, evidence, timeline, picerl, nist]
Incident Response & Digital Forensics
Purpose
Enable Claude to assist with structured incident response operations following NIST SP 800-61 and the SANS PICERL framework. Claude generates IR playbooks, guides evidence collection with chain of custody, constructs forensic timelines, interprets memory forensics output, and produces post-incident reports.
Activation Triggers
This skill activates when the user asks about:
- Creating an incident response playbook (ransomware, phishing, breach, etc.)
- Evidence collection and chain of custody procedures
- Forensic timeline construction from logs or artifacts
- Memory forensics using Volatility
- Post-incident report generation
- DFIR (Digital Forensics and Incident Response) procedures
- Containment and eradication strategies
- Root cause analysis for security incidents
- IR metrics, SLA tracking, or reporting for management
Prerequisites
pip install pyyaml jinja2 pandas python-dateutil
Recommended DFIR tools:
Volatility 3— Memory forensics frameworkAutopsy / Sleuth Kit— Disk forensicsplaso / log2timeline— Supertimeline generationKAPE— Evidence collection (Windows)Velociraptor— Enterprise-scale endpoint forensicsFTK Imager— Forensic imaging (Windows)dd / dcfldd / dc3dd— Disk imaging (Linux)
PICERL Framework Overview
Every IR engagement follows the PICERL lifecycle:
| Phase | Key Actions | Skill Outputs |
|---|---|---|
| Preparation | Verify tools, comms, access | Readiness checklist |
| Identification | Confirm incident, scope, severity | Incident classification |
| Containment | Isolate systems, stop spread | Containment actions list |
| Eradication | Remove threat, close access | Eradication checklist |
| Recovery | Restore systems, verify integrity | Recovery runbook |
| Lessons Learned | Post-incident review | IR report + improvements |
Core Capabilities
1. IR Playbook Creation
When the user asks to create a playbook for a specific incident type:
Claude generates detailed, role-assigned playbooks in this structure:
Ransomware Response Playbook (Example):
# IR Playbook: Ransomware Attack
Version: 2.0 | Owner: SOC Manager | Review: Quarterly
## Trigger Conditions
- Multiple encrypted files discovered (ransom extension detected)
- Ransom note found on file shares or desktop
- EDR alert for mass file modification activity
- User reports files inaccessible with unfamiliar extensions
## Severity Classification
- CRITICAL: Domain controller / backup infrastructure affected
- HIGH: Production servers / business-critical data affected
- MEDIUM: Isolated workstation, contained environment
---
## Phase 1: Identification (Target: 15 minutes)
**IR Lead:**
- [ ] Confirm incident is ransomware (verify encrypted files + ransom note)
- [ ] Determine initial infection vector (phishing? RDP? Supply chain?)
- [ ] Identify Patient Zero — first encrypted system
- [ ] Assess scope: How many systems? Which business units?
- [ ] Declare incident severity and notify stakeholders
- [ ] Open incident ticket and begin documentation
**Forensics:**
- [ ] DO NOT REBOOT infected systems (preserve volatile evidence)
- [ ] Capture memory dump: `winpmem_mini_x64_rc2.exe output.raw`
- [ ] Collect running processes: `tasklist /v > processes.txt`
- [ ] Collect network connections: `netstat -ano > netstat.txt`
## Phase 2: Containment (Target: 30 minutes)
**Network Team:**
- [ ] Isolate affected systems (pull network cable or quarantine in VLAN)
- [ ] Block identified C2 IPs/domains at perimeter firewall
- [ ] Disable RDP externally if RDP was the initial vector
- [ ] Preserve network capture if encryption is still occurring
**Active Directory:**
- [ ] Identify all accounts used by the ransomware (service accounts, domain accounts)
- [ ] Reset passwords for all potentially compromised accounts
- [ ] Revoke active sessions for affected accounts
- [ ] Check for newly created privileged accounts
## Phase 3: Eradication
- [ ] Identify all persistence mechanisms (registry, services, scheduled tasks)
- [ ] Remove all malicious artifacts
- [ ] Verify no backdoors remain (check with Autoruns, process scanning)
- [ ] Patch the exploited vulnerability if one was used
## Phase 4: Recovery
- [ ] Restore from clean backup (verified pre-infection)
- [ ] Validate backup integrity before restoration
- [ ] Rebuild from gold image if backup compromised
- [ ] Verify data integrity after restoration
- [ ] Phased return to production
## Phase 5: Lessons Learned (Within 2 weeks)
- [ ] Full incident timeline documented
- [ ] Root cause identified and remediated
- [ ] Detection gaps addressed
- [ ] CSOC playbook updated
- [ ] Management report delivered
Other supported playbook types:
- Phishing Campaign Response
- Data Breach / Exfiltration
- Business Email Compromise (BEC)
- Insider Threat
- DDoS Attack
- Account Compromise / Credential Stuffing
- Supply Chain Compromise
- Cloud Misconfiguration / Breach
2. Evidence Collection & Chain of Custody
When the user asks to collect forensic evidence:
Order of Volatility (most volatile → least volatile):
1. CPU registers and cache
2. Routing tables, ARP cache, process table
3. Memory (RAM) — ALWAYS capture first
4. Temporary file systems, swap space
5. Running processes and open files
6. Network connections and open ports
7. Disk images
8. Log files (local + remote SIEM)
9. Physical media
Evidence Collection Commands:
# Windows — Live acquisition
winpmem_mini_x64_rc2.exe
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