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campaign-tracking

Use when documenting a named campaign across time and victims, the user asks to start or update a campaign record, or another skill identified a multi-incident cluster that warrants formal tracking. Provides the template (timeline, attribution, victimology, attack chain, Diamond Model mapping, IOC clusters) and the lifecycle from active to historical.

Liberty91LTD · 已有静态检查记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill campaign-tracking

技能说明


name: campaign-tracking description: Use when documenting a named campaign across time and victims, the user asks to start or update a campaign record, or another skill identified a multi-incident cluster that warrants formal tracking. Provides the template (timeline, attribution, victimology, attack chain, Diamond Model mapping, IOC clusters) and the lifecycle from active to historical. user-invocable: true metadata: version: 1.1.0

Campaign Tracking

A campaign is a coordinated set of malicious activities carried out by a threat actor against specific targets over a defined period.

Sourcing Before Tracking

A campaign record is built from claims, and each claim belongs to the source that originated it. Before any report feeds the record:

  1. Resolve provenance. Run /source-provenance on every ingested report or article. Record the primary, the chain and the provenance_basis (platform-resolved, script-resolved or model-judged).
  2. Dedupe by primary, not by URL. Five outlets covering one vendor report are one source and produce one timeline row, not five. List the outlets as "via". Count corroboration by independent primaries with separate access only.
  3. Grade per claim. Run /quality-of-information-check on the primary (it calls /claim-extraction). The intrusion, the vector, the attribution and the actor's own figures carry different grades.
  4. Store the grade with the entity. Every timeline row, attack chain row, attribution statement and victim count carries the primary that supports it and the grade of the supporting claim.

Actor claims about victim count or data volume are graded "adversary, unverified" until an independent primary corroborates them. Record them as actor-claimed, not as findings. Grades follow the fixed rubric in /quality-of-information-check (references/grading-rubric.md). The grade is two words, access level then claim support, for example "direct, firm". It is not an Admiralty rating. Your own telemetry and SOC alerts are primaries in their own right, name them as such.

Campaign Template

## Campaign: [Campaign ID / Name]

### Overview
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Campaign ID** | CAMP-YYYY-MM-XXX |
| **Name** | [Descriptive name if known] |
| **Status** | Active / Dormant / Concluded |
| **First observed** | YYYY-MM-DD |
| **Last observed** | YYYY-MM-DD |
| **Attribution** | [Actor — with confidence level] |
| **Motivation** | [Espionage / Financial / Destruction / Hacktivism] |
| **Independent primaries** | [Count of originating sources with separate access, and basis] |
| **Provenance basis** | [platform-resolved / script-resolved / model-judged (worst of the sources used)] |
| **Alias source** | [user / liberty91 / none] |

### Timeline
| Date | Event | Primary | Access level | Claim support |
|------|-------|---------|--------------|---------------|
| YYYY-MM-DD | Initial delivery emails sent | Internal telemetry | direct | established |
| YYYY-MM-DD | First successful compromise | [Vendor, report title] | limited | firm |
| YYYY-MM-DD | Lateral movement detected | SOC alert | direct | established |
| YYYY-MM-DD | Data exfiltration observed | Network forensics | direct | established |

### Attribution
[Assessment of who is behind this campaign, with confidence level. Reference threat actor profile if available.]

| Attribution statement | Primary | Stated confidence (verbatim) | Access level | Claim support | Independent primaries |
|-----------------------|---------|------------------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| [Campaign is linked to X] | [Org, report title, date] | ["moderate confidence" / not stated] | [e.g., limited] | [e.g., tentative] | [Count, and basis] |

### Victimology
- **Sectors targeted**: [List]
- **Geographies**: [Countries/regions]
- **Number of known victims**: [Count with confidence, primary and grade. Mark actor-claimed figures as such]
- **Selection criteria**: [How were targets chosen? Opportunistic vs targeted?]
- **Common characteristics**: [What do victims have in common?]

### Attack Chain (Kill Chain / ATT&CK)
| Phase | Technique (ATT&CK) | Details | Primary | Access level | Claim support |
|-------|-------------------|---------|---------|--------------|---------------|
| Reconnaissance | T1598 Phishing for Information | Targeted LinkedIn messages to identify employees | [Org, date] | [e.g., limited] | [e.g., firm] |
| Initial Access | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment | Malicious Word doc with macro | [Org, date] | [e.g., direct] | [e.g., firm] |
| Execution | T1059.001 PowerShell | Macro downloads PowerShell stager | [Org, date] | [e.g., direct] | [e.g., firm] |
| Persistence | T1547.001 Registry Run Keys | Run key added for backdoor | [Org, date] | [e.g., direct] | [e.g., firm] |
| C2 | T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol | HTTPS to legitimate cloud service | [Org, date] | [e.g., limited] | [e.g., firm] |
| Exfiltration | T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | Data uploaded to attacker-controlled cloud | [Org, date] | [e.g., limited] | [e.g., firm] |

### Diamond Model
| Vertex | Details |
|--------|---------|
| **Adversary** | [Threat actor / group — reference profile] |
| **Capability** | [Malware, exploits, tools, techniques used] |
| **Infrastructure** | [C2 servers, staging, delivery infrastructure, domains] |
| **Victim** | [Targeted organisations, sectors, systems] |

**Meta-features:**
- **Direction**: [Adversary-to-Victim / Victim-to-Adversary / Bidirectional]
- **Methodology**: [Attack phases and progression]
- **Resources**: [Level of investment observed]
- **Social-Political**: [Geopolitical context driving the campaign]
- **Technology**: [Technology landscape enabling the campaign]

### IOC Clusters
#### Delivery Infrastructure
| Type | Value | First Seen | Status |
|------|-------|-----------|--------|
| Domain | phishing.example.com | 2026-01-15 | Active |
| IP | 203.0.113.42 | 2026-01-15 | Active
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