electron-dev
Electron desktop apps with React, TypeScript, and Vite. Use for IPC, window/tray, PTY terminals, WebRTC, and packaging.
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安装与使用
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npx skills add jamditis/claude-skills-journalism --skill electron-dev技能说明
name: electron-dev description: Electron desktop apps with React, TypeScript, and Vite. Use for IPC, window/tray, PTY terminals, WebRTC, and packaging.
Electron desktop development
Patterns and practices for building production-quality Electron applications with React and TypeScript.
Security baseline (Electron 30+)
Electron's defaults have hardened over the past several releases. As of Electron 28+, contextIsolation: true and sandbox: true are the defaults for new BrowserWindow instances, most security advice from older guides assumed you had to opt in. You don't anymore; you have to opt OUT, and you should not.
Set explicitly anyway, so a config drift never weakens the security model:
const win = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
contextIsolation: true, // default since 12, mandatory for any prod app
sandbox: true, // default since 28; renderer runs sandboxed
nodeIntegration: false, // never enable in renderer
webSecurity: true, // never disable
preload: path.join(__dirname, 'preload.cjs')
}
});
Validate every IPC message in main. Don't trust the renderer.
Electron Fuses + ASAR integrity
Electron Fuses are package-time toggles baked into the binary. The two relevant for security distribution:
EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation, verifies the app.asar hash at runtime against a hash embedded in the binary. Defends against attackers swapping the asar contents post-install.OnlyLoadAppFromAsar, refuses to load app code from anywhere except the validated asar.
These are opt-in, not default. Enable both for production. Requires @electron/asar 3.1.0+ to generate the asar with embeddable integrity. electron-builder configures this via electronFuses in the build config; @electron/fuses does it programmatically.
CVE-2023-44402 (ASAR integrity bypass via filetype confusion) was the canonical motivation here, without integrity + only-load-from-asar, an attacker who can modify app files can swap behavior silently.
Common renderer-side risks
- Preload script confusion, only expose narrow, typed surfaces via
contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld. Never re-exportipcRendereritself; expose specific methods that map to specific channels. file://IPC and navigation, restrict navigation withwebContents.on('will-navigate', e => e.preventDefault())for windows that shouldn't change URL. DenysetWindowOpenHandlerrequests by default; allow-list specific origins.shell.openExternalwith user input, validate the URL scheme before opening. An attacker-controlledfile://orjavascript:URL hands them code execution.
Architecture patterns
Project structure
app/
├── electron/
│ ├── main.cjs # Main process (CommonJS required)
│ ├── preload.cjs # Context bridge for secure IPC
│ └── server.cjs # Optional: WebSocket/HTTP server
├── src/
│ ├── components/ # React components
│ ├── services/ # Business logic (API clients, Firebase)
│ ├── utils/ # Utilities (audio, formatting)
│ ├── types.ts # TypeScript interfaces
│ ├── App.tsx # Root component
│ └── index.tsx # React entry
├── assets/ # Icons, sounds, images
├── package.json
├── vite.config.ts
└── electron-builder.yml # Build configuration
IPC communication pattern
Main process (main.cjs):
const { ipcMain } = require('electron');
// Handle async requests from renderer
ipcMain.handle('action-name', async (event, args) => {
try {
const result = await someAsyncOperation(args);
return { success: true, data: result };
} catch (error) {
return { success: false, error: error.message };
}
});
// Send data to renderer
mainWindow.webContents.send('event-name', data);
Preload script (preload.cjs):
const { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } = require('electron');
contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('electron', {
actionName: (args) => ipcRenderer.invoke('action-name', args),
onEventName: (callback) => {
const handler = (event, data) => callback(data);
ipcRenderer.on('event-name', handler);
return () => ipcRenderer.removeListener('event-name', handler);
}
});
Renderer (React):
const result = await window.electron.actionName(args);
useEffect(() => {
return window.electron.onEventName((data) => {
setState(data);
});
}, []);
System tray integration
const { Tray, Menu, nativeImage } = require('electron');
let tray = null;
function createTray() {
const icon = nativeImage.createFromPath(path.join(__dirname, '../assets/tray-icon.png'));
tray = new Tray(icon.resize({ width: 16, height: 16 }));
tray.setToolTip('App Name');
tray.setContextMenu(Menu.buildFromTemplate([
{ label: 'Show', click: () => mainWindow.show() },
{ label: 'Quit', click: () => app.quit() }
]));
tray.on('click', () => {
mainWindow.isVisible() ? mainWindow.hide() : mainWindow.show();
});
}
// Hide to tray instead of closing
mainWindow.on('close', (event) => {
if (!app.isQuitting) {
event.preventDefault();
mainWindow.hide();
}
});
Global shortcuts
const { globalShortcut } = require('electron');
app.whenReady().then(() => {
// Register with conflict detection
const registered = globalShortcut.register('Alt+S', () => {
mainWindow.webContents.send('shortcut-triggered', 'toggle-recording');
});
if (!registered) {
console.error('Shortcut registration failed - conflict detected');
}
});
app.on('will-quit', () => {
globalShortcut.unregisterAll();
});
PTY terminal integration (node-pty)
const pty = require('node-pty');
const shell = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'powershell.exe' : process.env.SHELL || '/bin/bash';
const ptyProcess = pty.spawn(shell, [],
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