access-review
Conduct periodic access reviews and certifications. Implement access
devops-skills · 已有 AI 审核记录
安装与使用
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npx skills add huytran1120/vie-agentic-skills --skill access-review技能说明
name: access-review description: Conduct periodic access reviews and certifications. Implement access governance and recertification workflows. Use when managing access compliance. category: security risk: critical source: https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills source_repo: BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills source_type: community date_added: '2026-09-20' license: MIT license_source: https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills/blob/main/LICENSE compatibility: Checklist and framework guidance; no privileged tooling required. Apply controls through your own change process. metadata: author: devops-skills version: '1.0'
Access Review
Implement periodic access review processes for AWS IAM, GitHub, Okta, and other identity providers, including automated reporting, certification workflows, and unused permission detection.
Access Review Process
access_review_workflow:
1_scope:
actions:
- Define systems in scope for the review cycle
- Identify review owners (managers, system owners)
- Set review timeline and deadlines
- Generate access inventory from all identity sources
frequency:
privileged_access: Quarterly
standard_access: Semi-annually
service_accounts: Quarterly
api_keys: Monthly
2_extract:
actions:
- Pull current access data from all systems
- Correlate identities across platforms (SSO mapping)
- Enrich with last login and activity data
- Flag accounts for review (inactive, over-privileged, orphaned)
3_review:
actions:
- Assign review items to appropriate managers
- Manager certifies each user's access (approve/revoke/modify)
- Risk-based prioritization (privileged users reviewed first)
- Escalate non-responses after deadline
decisions:
approve: "Access is appropriate for current role"
modify: "Access needs adjustment (reduce/change scope)"
revoke: "Access is no longer needed"
4_remediate:
actions:
- Revoke access flagged for removal
- Modify access as directed by reviewers
- Document exceptions with justification
- Confirm changes with system owners
sla:
revocations: "Complete within 5 business days of decision"
modifications: "Complete within 10 business days"
exceptions: "Approved by security team, documented, time-limited"
5_report:
actions:
- Generate completion metrics (% reviewed, % on time)
- Document all decisions and actions taken
- Archive evidence for compliance audits
- Identify process improvements for next cycle
Review boundaries
Confirm exact tenant/accounts, read-only credentials, review period and authorized reviewers. Store reports privately with defined retention; proposed cadence/SLA numbers are examples, not compliance certification. Identity joins need verified immutable IDs, not matching display names. Owner approval and a recovery/break-glass plan are required before modifying access; inactivity heuristics never authorize revoking production service accounts automatically.
AWS IAM Access Review Scripts
Obtain the IAM credential report through a read-only scoped client, poll boundedly until complete, and decode it once into a private file. Failure/unsupported values are unknown, never zero/inactive. Use named CSV columns, not positional awk fields:
import csv
def review_console_mfa(report_path):
candidates = []
with open(report_path, newline="", encoding="utf-8") as source:
for row in csv.DictReader(source):
if row.get("password_enabled") == "true" and row.get("mfa_active") == "false":
candidates.append({"user": row["user"], "finding": "review_console_mfa"})
return candidates # Private review data, not automatic disable actions.
Compare timezone-aware last-use/creation times and both access-key slots with an agreed threshold; missing history may mean never-used, unsupported or unavailable. Password last-use alone is not overall account inactivity. Effective privilege requires user/group/role/inline policies, boundaries, SCPs and resource policies; policy-name matching is only a hint. Cross-account trust needs structured principal and condition analysis, not grep or an AWS-account substring. No key or access is revoked solely because a report marks it stale.
GitHub Access Review
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# github-access-review.sh - Partial organization inventory
set -euo pipefail
umask 077
ORG="your-org"
OUTPUT_DIR="./access-review/github/$(date +%Y-%m)"
mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR"
echo "=== GitHub Organization Access Review ==="
echo "--- Organization Members ---"
gh api orgs/$ORG/members --paginate \
--jq '.[] | [.login, .site_admin] | @csv' \
> "$OUTPUT_DIR/org-members.csv"
echo "--- Organization Owners ---"
gh api "orgs/$ORG/members?role=admin" --paginate \
--jq '.[] | .login' \
> "$OUTPUT_DIR/org-owners.txt"
echo "--- Outside Collaborators ---"
gh api orgs/$ORG/outside_collaborators --paginate \
--jq '.[] | .login' \
> "$OUTPUT_DIR/outside-collaborators.txt"
echo "--- Repository Access Per Repo ---"
for repo in $(gh api "orgs/$ORG/repos" --paginate --jq '.[].name'); do
echo "Repo: $repo"
gh api "repos/$ORG/$repo/collaborators" --paginate \
--jq '.[] | [.login, .role_name] | @csv' \
> "$OUTPUT_DIR/repo-$repo-access.csv"
done
echo "--- Team Memberships ---"
for team in $(gh api orgs/$ORG/teams --paginate --jq '.[].slug'); do
echo "Team: $team"
gh api "orgs/$ORG/teams/$team/members" --paginate \
--jq '.[] | .login' \
> "$OUTPUT_DIR/team-$team-members.txt"
done
echo "--- Pending Invitations ---"
gh api orgs/$ORG/invitations --paginate \
--jq '.[] | [.login, .email, .role, .created_at] | @csv' \
> "$OUTPUT_DIR/pending-invitations.csv"
echo "--- Deploy Keys ---"
for repo in $(gh api "orgs/$ORG/repos" --paginate --jq '.[].name'); do
keys=$(gh api
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