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common-llm-security

OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) audit checklist for AI applications, agent tools, RAG pipelines, and prompt construction. Use when performing any security review touching LLM client code, prompt templates, agent tools, or vector stores.

HoangNguyen0403 · 已有 AI 审核记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add HoangNguyen0403/agent-skills-standard --skill common-llm-security

技能说明


name: common-llm-security description: OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) audit checklist for AI applications, agent tools, RAG pipelines, and prompt construction. Use when performing any security review touching LLM client code, prompt templates, agent tools, or vector stores. metadata: triggers: keywords: - LLM security - prompt injection - agent security - RAG security - AI security - openai - anthropic - langchain - LLM review

OWASP LLM Top 10 Security Checklist (2025)

Priority: P0 (CRITICAL)

Implementation Guidelines

  • Check LLM01 first: Prompt injection #1 LLM finding — any user input concatenated directly into prompt string immediate P0.
  • Check LLM06 next: Agent tools with write/delete/execute capabilities without confirmation P0.
  • Mark each item: ✅ not affected | ⚠️ needs review | 🔴 confirmed finding.
  • P0 finding caps Security score at 40/100 — not skip any item.
  • See references/owasp-llm.md for full detection signals.

OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025)

IDRiskKey Detection Signal
LLM01Prompt InjectionUser input string-concatenated into prompt. Retrieved docs inserted into system turn.
LLM02Sensitive Information DisclosurePII or credentials passed into prompt context. LLM response logged without redaction.
LLM03Supply ChainUnverified model weights or plugins. Third-party agent added without trust review.
LLM04Data & Model PoisoningUser-controlled data written to training sets or embedding stores without validation.
LLM05Improper Output HandlingLLM output used directly in DOM sink, SQL query, shell command, or redirect URL.
LLM06Excessive AgencyAgent tool with write/delete/network access — no human-in--loop confirmation.
LLM07System Prompt LeakageSystem prompt content returned via tool output, error message, or API response.
LLM08Vector & Embedding WeaknessesUser text injected into vector store without sanitization. No tenant namespace isolation.
LLM09MisinformationLLM output used for critical decisions (medical, financial, legal) without verification.
LLM10Unbounded ConsumptionNo max_tokens on LLM call. No rate limit on invocations. Agent loop without depth cap.

Anti-Patterns

  • No prompt concat: Pass user input as separate user turn, never interpolated into system prompts.
  • No raw LLM output in sinks: Sanitize LLM responses before writing to DOM, queries, or shell.
  • No uncapped agent loops: Every agentic recursion must enforce max iteration/depth limit.

References

  • OWASP LLM — Full Detection Signals — load when auditing any LLM client code

Canonical response anchors

When this skill applies, preserve the following domain terminology or equivalent concrete examples in the answer when relevant:

  • sanitize