http-request-smuggling
Detect HTTP request smuggling by desynchronising front-end and back-end request parsing, using raw-socket timing and differential probes. Use when testing for HTTP desync (CL.TE, TE.CL).
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安装与使用
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npx skills add forefy/.context --skill http-request-smuggling技能说明
name: http-request-smuggling description: Detect HTTP request smuggling by desynchronising front-end and back-end request parsing, using raw-socket timing and differential probes. Use when testing for HTTP desync (CL.TE, TE.CL).
Contents
- Scope & authorization
- Why raw sockets
- Methodology (timing probes then differential confirmation)
- Payloads (CL.TE and TE.CL, exact bytes)
- Runnable snippet
- Output
Scope & authorization
Request smuggling is an ACTIVE, potentially disruptive check. A successful desync poisons the shared front-end-to-back-end connection: the smuggled prefix can attach to the next request on that socket, which in a real deployment may belong to another user. Run this only against hosts you own or are contractually engaged to test, and prefer a low-traffic window. The timing probes (Steps 2-3) are the safest first pass because they never leave a dangling prefix; the differential confirmations (Steps 4-5) do smuggle a real prefix and should follow only once timing suggests a desync.
The vulnerability exists when a request traverses two servers (CDN/load-balancer/reverse-proxy front-end, then an origin back-end) that disagree on where one request ends and the next begins. That disagreement comes from sending both a Content-Length (CL) and a Transfer-Encoding: chunked (TE) header: if the front-end honors one and the back-end the other, the leftover bytes are "smuggled." A single server with no proxy in front cannot desync, so a negative result on a direct-to-origin host is expected, not a clean bill.
Everything below sends bytes on a raw socket - you cannot craft these requests with curl, because clients and libraries normalize the conflicting headers and fix the framing. Send the exact bytes, including CRLF line endings.
Why raw sockets
- The two framing headers (
Content-LengthandTransfer-Encoding) must both be present and must reach the server unmodified. HTTP libraries strip or reconcile them. - Line endings must be real CRLF (
\r\n). Author the payload with plain\nfor readability, then convert every\nto\r\nbefore sending - matching the source templates exactly. - Detection is per-connection and stateful: you open a fresh TLS socket, send one crafted request, read the response, and compare across two identical sends. The desync shows up on the second request.
Methodology (run in order; each step is a check with a done/result state)
- Confirm a proxy chain exists. Look for
Via,X-Cache,Server,X-Served-By, or CDN fingerprints in a normalcurl -I. A fronted host (Cloudflare/Akamai/Fastly/ALB/nginx) is the interesting case. Note the target and confirm port 443. - CL.TE timing probe. Send a request the front-end frames by
Content-Lengthand the back-end byTransfer-Encoding, arranged so the back-end waits for a chunk that never completes. A response delay near the socket timeout indicates the back-end is stuck reading chunked data - i.e. CL.TE. - TE.CL timing probe. Mirror image: front-end frames by TE and finishes early on the
0chunk, back-end frames by CL and waits for bytes that never arrive. A delay indicates TE.CL. (Send these against/with a method the app accepts; a normal fast baseline request first tells you what "no delay" looks like.) - CL.TE differential confirmation. Send the CL.TE smuggle payload below twice on two fresh connections. The front-end (CL) forwards the whole body; the back-end (TE) stops at the
0chunk, leavingGET /404 ...buffered as the prefix of the next request. Report a finding when the SECOND response's status line is404 Not Foundwhile the FIRST is not - the smuggled prefix rewrote the follow-up request's path. - TE.CL differential confirmation. Send the TE.CL smuggle payload below twice. The front-end (TE) reads the
5c-sized chunk and terminates on0; the back-end (CL: 4) consumes only5c\r\nand leaves theGPOST / HTTP/1.1 ...block buffered as the next request's prefix. Report a finding when the SECOND response's status line is403 Forbiddenwhile the FIRST is not - the smuggled invalid method poisoned the follow-up. - Attribute and stop. As soon as one variant confirms, record which one (CL.TE vs TE.CL) and the exact payload. Do not keep smuggling; each confirmed send may have poisoned one real connection. Re-run once to verify reproducibility, then report.
Payloads (exact bytes; author with \n, send as \r\n)
CL.TE timing probe (Step 2) - back-end blocks waiting for the next chunk:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 4
1
A
X
TE.CL timing probe (Step 3) - back-end blocks waiting for Content-Length bytes past the 0 chunk:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 6
0
X
CL.TE differential smuggle (Step 4) - Content-Length: 35 spans the whole body; the 0 chunk ends the request for a TE back-end, leaving the GET /404 prefix:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 35
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
GET /404 HTTP/1.1
X-Ignore: X
TE.CL differential smuggle (Step 5) - Content-length: 4 stops the CL back-end after 5c\r\n, leaving the GPOST block; the 5c (92-byte) chunk keeps a TE front-end happy through to the 0 terminator:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
5c
GPOST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 15
x=1
0
Runnable snippet
Self-contained; no third-party libraries. Set TARGET, run once per variant. It opens a fresh TLS socket per send, normalizes line endings to CRLF, sends twice, and applies the differential test on the response status line.
import socket, ssl, time
TARGET =
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