agent-safety
Use when bounding an LLM agent that already runs — scoping its task domain, gating tools to least privilege, defending against prompt injection in untrusted web/email/RAG text, requiring human approval on irreversible actions, capping runtime and cost, or triaging what it already did. NOT building the loop, tools, or RAG (that is `building-agents`).
ericrisco · 已有 AI 审核记录
安装与使用
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npx skills add ericrisco/rsc-harness --skill agent-safety技能说明
name: agent-safety
description: "Use when bounding an LLM agent that already runs — scoping its task domain, gating tools to least privilege, defending against prompt injection in untrusted web/email/RAG text, requiring human approval on irreversible actions, capping runtime and cost, or triaging what it already did. NOT building the loop, tools, or RAG (that is building-agents)."
tags: [agent-security, guardrails, prompt-injection, least-privilege, owasp-agentic]
recommends: [building-agents, secure-coding, agent-eval]
origin: risco
Agent safety
You are the security review for an agent's agency, not for its code. The loop works,
tools are wired, memory persists — your job is to make that autonomy bounded. If you
want to review ordinary endpoints, auth, or secrets handling, that is
../secure-coding/SKILL.md — this skill is the Agentic Top 10, the risks that exist only
because a model has tools and autonomy. If the loop or tools do not exist yet, that is
../building-agents/SKILL.md. You arrive after both.
references/threat-model.md carries the OWASP Agentic Top 10 2026 risks mapped to the
controls below, the pre-ship guardrail checklist, and the incident-triage flow for "the
agent did X" — open it when you are reviewing before ship or reconstructing an incident.
The ownership split
Agent security splits into four layers — Model · Harness · Tools · Environment. The model provider owns only the Model layer (alignment, refusals). Everything else is yours: the Harness (loop, memory, context assembly), the Tools (what the agent can do), and the Environment (creds, network, blast radius). Do not outsource a layer you own to "the model is aligned."
Three excesses cause almost every agentic incident. Cut all three:
- Excessive functionality — tools the task never needs.
- Excessive permissions — broader scopes/creds than the tool needs.
- Excessive autonomy — acting without checking back when it should.
The operating principle is least agency: autonomy is earned per task, not defaulted.
Scope limits
- Declare the allowed task domain as a hard boundary in the system prompt. Why: an undeclared scope is an infinite scope; "you are a refund assistant; you do not touch payroll" is a constraint a reviewer can check.
- Deny by default — the agent starts with zero tools. Each tool earns its place by a task justification. Why: an opt-out tool list grows; an opt-in list stays minimal.
- Segregate the instruction channel from the data channel. System/developer prompt = trusted instructions. Everything the agent reads at runtime = data, never instructions. Why: this single boundary is what stops indirect injection (LLM01).
Tool gating / least agency
Give every tool a profile: read / write / exec / send, the exact resources it may touch, and an allowlist (never a wildcard). Block destructive flags and secret paths at the tool boundary, not in the prompt — the prompt is advisory, the boundary is enforced.
# Bad: one wildcard tool = unbounded blast radius, runs anything the loop emits
def run_shell(cmd: str) -> str:
return subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout
# Good: narrow tool, allowlisted root, denied patterns, no shell
ALLOWED_ROOT = pathlib.Path("/srv/agent/workspace").resolve()
DENY = ("*.key", "*.pem", "*secret*", "*.env", "id_rsa*")
def read_file(path: str) -> str:
p = (ALLOWED_ROOT / path).resolve()
if not p.is_relative_to(ALLOWED_ROOT): # no traversal out of scope
raise PermissionError("path outside workspace")
if any(p.match(g) for g in DENY): # never read secrets
raise PermissionError("denied pattern")
return p.read_text()
- Issue task-scoped, short-lived tokens — not the session's broad creds. A credential should be valid only for the specific tool and the duration of one task. Why: a hijacked loop cannot reuse a session-wide token it never held.
- Prefer read-only by default; writes/sends/exec are separate, gated tools. Why: most steps only need to read, so most steps should be unable to mutate anything.
Injection defense
Treat all external data as untrusted: user messages, retrieved documents, API responses, emails, web pages, other agents' output. Sanitize and delimit before it enters context, and never let external text reach a privileged tool unmediated.
| Source | Trust level | Required mediation before it can act |
|---|---|---|
| System / developer prompt | Trusted | none (this is the only instruction channel) |
| End-user chat message | Untrusted | delimit; treat as data, not commands |
| Retrieved RAG / KB document | Untrusted | delimit; strip instruction-like spans |
| Fetched web page / API JSON | Untrusted | parse to schema; no raw text → tool args |
| Inbound email / ticket body | Untrusted | delimit; HITL on any action it requests |
| Another agent's message | Untrusted | same as external user input |
# Bad: retrieved chunk flows straight into a privileged action
chunk = retriever.search(q)[0].text # attacker-controlled doc
agent.call_tool("send_email", to=extract_to(chunk), body=chunk)
# Good: external content is quarantined data; the action is schema-validated + gated
chunk = retriever.search(q)[0].text
ctx = f"<retrieved untrusted>\n{chunk}\n</retrieved untrusted>" # delimited, labeled
proposal = agent.draft("send_email", context=ctx) # model proposes
args = SendEmail.model_validate(proposal.args) # schema or reject
if args.to_domain not in ALLOWED_DOMAINS: # exfil guard
raise PermissionError("recipient outside allowlist")
require_human_approval(
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