hunt-csrf
Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000), path-traversal CSRF-token bypass (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2022-23732 $10k), Origin-omission bypass (TikTok $2,500), OAuth-state null-byte (Streamlabs), WebSocket CSRF / CSWSH (Coda), default-SameSite email-change → ATO (YoYo Games $400), social-account-link CSRF (HackerOne), JSON-CSRF via text/plain on email-change (TikTok $500). Use when hunting modern CSRF — heavy emphasis on chain-to-ATO patterns.
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安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-csrf技能说明
name: hunt-csrf description: Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000), path-traversal CSRF-token bypass (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2022-23732 $10k), Origin-omission bypass (TikTok $2,500), OAuth-state null-byte (Streamlabs), WebSocket CSRF / CSWSH (Coda), default-SameSite email-change → ATO (YoYo Games $400), social-account-link CSRF (HackerOne), JSON-CSRF via text/plain on email-change (TikTok $500). Use when hunting modern CSRF — heavy emphasis on chain-to-ATO patterns. sources: github, hackerone_public, bugcrowd_public, github_security_advisories report_count: 18
Shortcut: a raw HTTP client beats a real cross-origin page for header-check CSRF
A raw HTTP client (curl, Burp Repeater, any scripting client) is not a browser: it will send
whatever Origin/Referer header VALUE you set, from any path, on the same connection as your
authenticated cookie. Many apps that claim to defend against CSRF only do a naive string check
on the incoming Origin/Referer header (does it contain/equal some expected value?) rather than
real same-origin enforcement — you can satisfy that check directly by setting the header, with no
actual cross-site delivery (hosting an HTML page, a headless browser) required. This is faster and
more reliable than building a real attacker page for this exact pattern:
POST /profile HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: https://a-domain-the-app-treats-as-trusted-or-attacker-controlled.example
Cookie: <authenticated session>
username=csrf_poc
If some text names a SPECIFIC origin/domain as the "expected" attacker page, that literal value is
often exactly what the server's check is looking for — try it verbatim in Origin (fall back to
Referer if Origin alone doesn't flip it). Only build a real cross-origin page (actual browser
delivery) when the target does genuine SameSite/fetch-based origin enforcement that a spoofed header
can't satisfy.
Autonomous Testing Priority
CSRF only matters on state-changing actions that a browser could be tricked into making cross-site.
Testing flow:
- GET the form endpoint to establish a baseline and check what fields exist (look for hidden
csrf_token,authenticity_token,_token,csrfmiddlewaretokenfields). - POST the state-changing action without any CSRF token field. Send only the functional parameters (email, amount, etc.).
- Use a "simple-request" Content-Type —
application/x-www-form-urlencoded,multipart/form-data, ORtext/plainare the three CORS "simple" content-types a cross-origin form can send with no preflight. A JSON endpoint is CSRF-resistant only if the server rejects those — if it also accepts atext/plainbody (common), craft atext/plainpayload that parses as valid JSON (see the JSON-CSRF-via-text/plain section). Don't skip a JSON endpoint on the assumption thatapplication/jsonalone is protective. - If the action succeeds (2xx, no "invalid token" error) → CSRF is confirmed.
High-value targets (in order of impact):
- Email/password change → account takeover
- Money transfer or payment → financial fraud
- Admin actions (role assignment, user deletion)
- OAuth social-account linking → persistent ATO
Token bypass techniques when a token IS present:
- Omit the token field entirely — some frameworks only validate if the field exists, not if it's absent
- Send an empty value (
_token=) — some validate format, not presence - Copy a token from another session — some tokens aren't tied to the session
Scope: Don't test CSRF on login forms (no existing session to exploit), logout (no real impact), or read-only GET endpoints.
Crown Jewel Targets
CSRF becomes high-value when it touches state-changing actions with account-level or financial consequences. The highest-paying targets are:
- Account takeover vectors: OAuth/SSO flows (RelayState manipulation), social account linking/unlinking (Oculus-Facebook, SocialClub), import-friends features that expose OAuth tokens
- Authentication infrastructure: Login CSRF, session fixation via CSRF, forced account association
- API endpoints accepting cross-origin POST: JSON APIs, heartbeat/activity APIs, anything that skips Content-Type enforcement
- Third-party integrations: Grafana, monitoring dashboards, embedded analytics — often lag on CSRF protections
- Social platforms: Twitter/X collections, friend imports, social graph mutations — high-volume, authenticated actions with real user impact
Asset types that pay most: Core product auth flows > API gateways > third-party integrations running on subdomains > admin panels.
Attack Surface Signals
URL Patterns
/oauth/authorize?RelayState=
/accounts/link
/import/friends
/api/v*/heartbeat
/api/v*/collect
/monitoring/* (Grafana, Prow, Prometheus)
/auth/saml/callback
/connect/* (social integrations)
Response Header Signals
# Missing or weak SameSite cookie attributes
Set-Cookie: session=abc123; HttpOnly # no SameSite = vulnerable
Set-Cookie: session=abc123; SameSite=None # explicitly allows cross-site
# Missing CSRF headers
# No X-Frame-Options or permissive CORS
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true # dangerous combo
JS / DOM Patterns
// Static or predictable CSRF tokens
meta[name="csrf-token"] // grep if value changes across sessions
authenticity_token // Rails — check if reused across page loads
// JSON endpoints without Content-Type enforcement
fetch('/api/heartbeat', {method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(data)})
// No CSRF token in form at all
<form method="POST" action="/accounts/link"> // no hidden token field