hunt-cors
Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDENTIALED cross-origin read of sensitive data and you have proven it in a browser. Use when testing API endpoints, SPAs, or any app emitting Access-Control-* headers.
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安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cors技能说明
name: hunt-cors description: "Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDENTIALED cross-origin read of sensitive data and you have proven it in a browser. Use when testing API endpoints, SPAs, or any app emitting Access-Control-* headers." report_count: 19 sources: hackerone_public
HUNT-CORS — Cross-Origin Resource Sharing Misconfiguration
What actually pays (and what does not)
CORS pays High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a
credentialed cross-origin read of sensitive authenticated data, and you
have a browser PoC proving the response body is readable from evil.com.
Two hard browser rules that kill most "findings" — check these FIRST:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *CANNOT be combined with credentials. If the server returnsACAO: *, the browser refuses to send/expose the response for acredentials: includerequest. A wildcard-only endpoint is not credential-exploitable. It is only interesting if the data it serves is sensitive without a session (rare) — usually this is Informational/Low.Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: trueis meaningless on its own. It matters only ifACAOreflects/allows your specific attacker origin AND a cross-origin credentialedfetchactually returns a readable body. ACAC on a response that does not reflect your origin proves nothing.
If you cannot demonstrate a readable cross-origin authed body in a real browser, you do not have a High. Do not submit header-diffing alone.
Crown Jewel Targets
- Reflect-any-origin + credentials — server echoes the
Originheader AND setsACAC: true→ any site reads authed API responses. The classic High. - Null-origin trust —
ACAO: null+ACAC: true. Asandboxiframe (or adata:/redirect chain) emitsOrigin: null, so any page can read authed data. - Subdomain-regex bypass — trusted-origin regex with a parsing flaw. The correct payload depends on which flaw (see Phase 3 — this is where most skills get it wrong).
- Subdomain takeover → trusted origin — a dangling subdomain that the CORS policy trusts; take it over, host the PoC there (see hunt-subdomain).
- postMessage missing/loose origin check — handler that processes
event.datawithout strictly validatingevent.origin.
Attack Surface Signals
Any endpoint returning an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header
API endpoints: /api/*, /v1/*, /graphql
Profile/account: /api/me, /api/profile, /api/user, /api/session
Secrets/tokens: /api/tokens, /api/keys, /api/csrf, /api/account/settings
Financial: /api/balance, /api/transactions
Admin/internal: /api/admin/*, /api/internal/*
Prioritize endpoints that (a) require a session cookie and (b) return PII, tokens, CSRF tokens, or other secrets in the body.
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
Phase 1 — Discover CORS endpoints
# Probe API endpoints. Use GET (not -I): some servers only emit CORS on GET,
# and -I sends HEAD which may be handled differently.
while read url; do
result=$(curl -s -D - -o /dev/null "$url" \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
-H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control")
[ -n "$result" ] && echo "=== $url ===" && echo "$result"
done < recon/$TARGET/api-endpoints.txt
# httpx bulk check
cat recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt | awk '{print $1}' | \
httpx -H "Origin: https://evil.com" -match-string "access-control-allow-origin"
Phase 2 — Reflect-any-origin + null origin
# Does the server reflect an arbitrary Origin back?
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null https://$TARGET/api/me \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
-H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control"
# Vulnerable (the High case):
# Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com <- reflects attacker origin
# Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true <- + credentials => readable
#
# NOT exploitable for credentialed theft:
# Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * <- browser blocks creds read
# (no ACAC, or ACAC absent) <- not credentialed
# Null-origin trust
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null https://$TARGET/api/me \
-H "Origin: null" \
-H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control"
# Looking for: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null + ACAC: true
Phase 3 — Subdomain / trusted-origin regex bypass
The right payload depends on which regex flaw the server has. Identify the class first, then send the matching payload. Getting this wrong wastes the test and produces false negatives.
Server regex (intended: trust *.target.com) | Flaw | Bypass origin that matches | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
^https?://.*\.target\.com$ | None — escaped dot + end-anchor. Correct. | (no simple bypass) | evil.target.com is in-scope by design; x.target.com.evil.com ENDS in .evil.com, fails $. Move on or look for subdomain-takeover. |
^https?://.*target\.com$ | Missing dot separator (no \. before target) | https://eviltarget.com | .*target\.com$ matches eviltarget.com — attacker registers eviltarget.com. |
^https?://.*\.target\.com | Missing end-anchor $ | https://x.target.com.evil.com | regex matches a prefix; .target.com appears, then .evil.com is ignored (no $). |
^https?://target\.com | Prefix-only, no $ | https://target.com.evil.com | matches the target.com prefix; the rest is unconstrained. |
^https?://.*\.target\.com$ but dot in regex is unescaped (.*.target.com$) | Unescaped dot = "any char" | https://xtargetXcom... style, or https://evilZtargetZcom where Z is any single char | . matches any character, widening the match. |
| Any of the above | **Special chars browsers send in |