hunt-brute-force
Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting — login brute force, OTP/2FA brute force (10^6 keyspace), password-reset-token brute, credential stuffing, username/email enumeration via error-string / status-code / timing differences, weak password policy, missing CAPTCHA (CAPTCHA token replay / single-use / concurrency-window bypass specifics → hunt-captcha-bypass), IP-based rate-limit bypass via X-Forwarded-For and friends, ReDoS. Distinguishes hard lockout vs soft IP-throttle vs CAPTCHA-injection vs silent shadow-throttling (avoids false-negative 'no rate limit' conclusions). Medium to Critical depending on what the brute reaches (OTP→ATO = Critical).
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安装与使用
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npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-brute-force技能说明
name: hunt-brute-force description: "Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting — login brute force, OTP/2FA brute force (10^6 keyspace), password-reset-token brute, credential stuffing, username/email enumeration via error-string / status-code / timing differences, weak password policy, missing CAPTCHA (CAPTCHA token replay / single-use / concurrency-window bypass specifics → hunt-captcha-bypass), IP-based rate-limit bypass via X-Forwarded-For and friends, ReDoS. Distinguishes hard lockout vs soft IP-throttle vs CAPTCHA-injection vs silent shadow-throttling (avoids false-negative 'no rate limit' conclusions). Medium to Critical depending on what the brute reaches (OTP→ATO = Critical)." sources: public_research report_count: 6
HUNT-BRUTE-FORCE — Rate Limiting / Brute Force / Enumeration
Grounding note: this skill is built from published technique classes, not from a curated set of named HackerOne reports.
report_countis intentionally0— do not cite an exact payout or report ID you cannot verify. Where a public case is well-documented (e.g. Laxman Muthiyah's Instagram password-reset OTP race/rotation research, 2019–2021), it is named below as a technique reference, not a payout claim.
Crown Jewel Targets
OTP brute force (6-digit = 1,000,000 combinations) with no effective rate limit = Critical ATO bypass.
Highest-value chains:
- OTP / 2FA brute → MFA bypass → ATO — no effective rate limit on
/verify-otp, full 000000–999999 keyspace reachable - Password-reset token brute — short/predictable/non-expiring tokens + no rate limit → ATO (the Instagram 2019 case combined a 6-digit reset code, no rate limit per request-source, and IP rotation to make 10^6 tractable)
- Username/email enumeration → targeted credential stuffing — valid/invalid distinguishable by response string, status code, or timing, then sprayed with breach corpora
- Coupon / gift-card / referral code brute — no rate limit on code validation → financial impact
- ReDoS — attacker-controlled input hits a catastrophic-backtracking regex → CPU exhaustion → DoS
Autonomous Testing Priority
Work within your turn budget — prioritize signal over volume.
You cannot brute-force millions of combinations in automated testing. Focus on two things: (1) credential spraying with the most likely candidates, and (2) detecting whether rate limiting exists at all.
Strategy:
- Identify the login endpoint and the expected parameter names (username/email, password).
- Try weak/default credentials likely for the target context — default admin credentials for the app's stack, simple passwords for test environments, credentials visible elsewhere on the app (e.g. usernames exposed in profiles, default passwords in documentation).
- After 3-5 failed attempts, check for rate-limit signals (429 status, "too many attempts" message, CAPTCHA appearance, account lockout message). Absence of these = rate limiting is missing = vulnerability.
- Use form-encoding for traditional login forms, JSON for REST API login endpoints.
What to look for as success:
- Session token or JWT in the response body or Set-Cookie header
- Redirect to authenticated dashboard
- Response body that differs from the failed-login baseline
Username enumeration (separate finding): Try a known-valid username vs a random one. If the error message differs ("Wrong password" vs "User not found") or response time differs → user enumeration vulnerability, even without a successful login.
CRITICAL: Four rate-limit states — do not collapse them
A 200/401 with no 429 does not mean "no rate limiting". A rate-limiting
skill that only checks for 429/lockout produces false negatives. Classify the
defense BEFORE concluding, by sending a burst of ~50 requests and watching the
full response (status, body, headers, latency, and downstream success):
| State | Signal | Brute still feasible? |
|---|---|---|
| Hard account lockout | account disabled after N fails; later correct creds also fail | No (but lockout itself can be a DoS finding) |
| Soft IP throttle | 429 / increasing latency keyed on source IP only | Yes — bypass via header/IP rotation (Phase 4) |
| CAPTCHA injection | 200 but body switches to a CAPTCHA challenge after N | Maybe — check if the verify endpoint enforces it server-side or if the API path skips it |
| Silent shadow-throttle | 200/401 returned for every request, but submissions are dropped — the genuinely-correct OTP/password stops being accepted, or responses become canned | This is the trap. A naive loop sees "all 200, no 429" and reports "no rate limit" — false. |
Shadow-throttle detector — inject a known-good value at a known position and confirm it still works under load:
# Seed: position 500 in the brute set is the REAL OTP for your own test account.
# If the loop reaches 500 and the correct code no longer authenticates,
# the endpoint is silently throttling/dropping — NOT unprotected.
KNOWN_GOOD="123456" # the actual current OTP for YOUR test account
for n in $(seq 0 600); do
CODE=$([ "$n" = "500" ] && echo "$KNOWN_GOOD" || printf "%06d" "$n")
CODE_RESP=$(curl -s -o /tmp/bf_body -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}" \
-X POST "https://$TARGET/api/verify-otp" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \
-d "{\"otp\":\"$CODE\"}")
echo "$n $CODE $CODE_RESP $(wc -c </tmp/bf_body)"
done
# Three columns to watch: status, time_total, body size.
# Rising time_total or a body-size change with status unchanged = shadow throttle.
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
Phase 1 — Login Rate Limit Test (classify, don't just count 429s)
# Send a burst and log status + latency + body length for EACH attempt.
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
read CODE TIME < <(curl -s -o /tmp/bf_l -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}\n" \
-X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
-H "Conte
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