hunt-auth-bypass
Hunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across SAML XSW / parser-differential (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2025-25291/25292), SAML signature stripping (Uber, Rocket.Chat, samlify CVE-2025-47949), SAML domain enforcement bypass via control characters (HackerOne 2024), partner-portal cross-IdP assertion reuse (Slack), WordPress XMLRPC bypassing SSO (Uber), JWT alg-confusion HS256/RS256 (Jitsi), JWT signature-validation skip (Linktree, Newspack), and token-audience confusion (Argo CD CVE-2023-22482). For standalone JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) see hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers JWT only inside SSO/SAML/token-trust bypass chains. SAML assertion-layer attacks (XSW, comment injection, signature stripping, XXE-in-assertion) are owned by hunt-saml; this skill owns the broader cross-protocol auth-bypass taxonomy. Use when hunting auth bypass — see the Legacy-Protocol Matrix for branded-UI vs legacy-endpoint patterns
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安装与使用
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npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-auth-bypass技能说明
name: hunt-auth-bypass description: Hunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across SAML XSW / parser-differential (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2025-25291/25292), SAML signature stripping (Uber, Rocket.Chat, samlify CVE-2025-47949), SAML domain enforcement bypass via control characters (HackerOne 2024), partner-portal cross-IdP assertion reuse (Slack), WordPress XMLRPC bypassing SSO (Uber), JWT alg-confusion HS256/RS256 (Jitsi), JWT signature-validation skip (Linktree, Newspack), and token-audience confusion (Argo CD CVE-2023-22482). For standalone JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) see hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers JWT only inside SSO/SAML/token-trust bypass chains. SAML assertion-layer attacks (XSW, comment injection, signature stripping, XXE-in-assertion) are owned by hunt-saml; this skill owns the broader cross-protocol auth-bypass taxonomy. Use when hunting auth bypass — see the Legacy-Protocol Matrix for branded-UI vs legacy-endpoint patterns. sources: github, hackerone_public, github_security_lab, projectdiscovery_research report_count: 12
Crown Jewel Targets
Auth bypass is consistently one of the highest-paying vulnerability classes in bug bounty because it directly violates the most fundamental security control. High-value targets include:
- SSO/SAML implementations at enterprise SaaS companies (Slack, Okta, OneLogin integrations) — payouts regularly in the $5K–$25K+ range
- Admin panels and partner/internal portals — subdomain-separated admin surfaces like
partners.shopify.com,admin.company.com - Third-party auth plugin integrations — WordPress plugins (OneLogin, WP-SAML-Auth), Drupal SSO modules, any CMS with pluggable auth
- XMLRPC endpoints on WordPress — often forgotten, bypasses standard WP auth flows entirely
- OAuth callback flows — state parameter mishandling, redirect_uri mismatches
- API authentication layers — especially where auth was bolted on after the fact
Asset priority: Targets with federated identity (SAML, OAuth, OIDC) connected to large user populations. Partner/reseller portals are particularly juicy because they often have elevated permissions and less security scrutiny than the main product.
SSH certificate-authority trust forgery (Git-hosting / enterprise platforms)
When an org or instance registers an SSH certificate authority, cert principals may not be bound server-side to the requesting identity — a member can mint a cert asserting another user's principal and authenticate as them (e.g. modify another user's resource given only its URL). Add SSH-CA trust to the auth-surface list on Git-hosting targets; niche/platform-specific. Disclosed: reports/1901040.
Attack Surface Signals
URL patterns to hunt:
/xmlrpc.php
/wp-login.php
/saml/
/sso/
/auth/saml/callback
/oauth/callback
/partners.*
/admin.*
/?wc-api=
/api/v*/auth
/login?redirect=
/accounts/login
Response headers signaling SSO:
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (common on SSO portals)
Set-Cookie: SAMLResponse=
Location: https://idp.company.com/saml
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="partners"
JS patterns indicating federated auth:
// Look for in page source
samlRequest
RelayState
SAMLResponse
onelogin
shibboleth
okta
passport.js authenticate
Tech stack signals:
- WordPress + any SSO plugin → check XMLRPC separately
- Shopify Partner API exposure → cross-tenant privilege escalation risk
- Any app advertising "SSO enabled" or "Login with [Enterprise IdP]"
- Separate subdomains for admin/partner that share session cookies with main domain
- Applications using
SimpleSAMLphp,ruby-saml,python-saml
Burp passive scan triggers:
SAMLResponsein any POST bodyopenid_connectorid_tokenin responses- Cookie domains set to
.company.com(wildcard)
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
-
Map all authentication entry points
- spider the target for every login surface: main login, admin login, API login, partner portal, mobile API endpoints
- check
robots.txt, JS files, and the wayback machine for forgotten endpoints like/xmlrpc.php
-
Identify the auth mechanism per entry point
- Is it forms-based, SAML, OAuth, API key, session token?
- For WordPress: always probe
/xmlrpc.phpeven if the main login is SSO-protected
-
Test XMLRPC independently of SSO
- If site uses SSO (e.g., OneLogin), manually POST to
/xmlrpc.php - XMLRPC uses WordPress-native credentials, not SSO — test with
system.listMethodsfirst, thenwp.getUsersBlogs
- If site uses SSO (e.g., OneLogin), manually POST to
-
Enumerate SAML implementation
- Capture a valid SAMLResponse via Burp
- Decode the Base64 payload, inspect the XML
- Test signature stripping, comment injection, and XML wrapping attacks
- Test if SP validates the signature at all (send unsigned assertion)
-
Test cross-portal session/token reuse
- Log into
partners.shopify.comtype portals - Attempt to use the issued token/cookie against the main admin portal
- Look for shared cookie domains, shared JWT secrets, or API tokens that work across contexts
- Log into
-
Fuzz auth parameters
- Null/empty passwords,
password[]=array, SQL in username field - Try
admin/admin,test/teston staging subdomains - Modify
role,is_admin,user_typein JWTs (none algorithm, weak secret)
- Null/empty passwords,
-
Check redirect and state parameters
- Does removing
statefrom OAuth break anything? - Can you change
redirect_urito an open redirect target? - Does the
RelayStatein SAML get validated?
- Does removing
-
Verify impact by escalating privileges
- Don't stop at login — prove you can access admin functions, other users' data, or sensitive configuration
- Screenshot the highest-privilege action you can perform
Legacy-Protocol Matrix (Probe These First on Any Custom-Branded Login)
When a target has a custom, branded login UI (e.g. `customlogin.
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