hunt-aspnet
Hunt ASP.NET-specific surface — ViewState deserialization (signed-only vs encrypted), machineKey recovery, dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern, request-validator bypass, trace.axd/elmah.axd disclosure, load-balanced ViewState cross-node failures, SafeControl enumeration via reflection, customErrors mode=Off stack-trace leaks, classic Webforms .aspx/.asmx/.svc surface. Built for ASP.NET Webforms + WCF + SharePoint farms.
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安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-aspnet技能说明
name: hunt-aspnet description: Hunt ASP.NET-specific surface — ViewState deserialization (signed-only vs encrypted), machineKey recovery, dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern, request-validator bypass, trace.axd/elmah.axd disclosure, load-balanced ViewState cross-node failures, SafeControl enumeration via reflection, customErrors mode=Off stack-trace leaks, classic Webforms .aspx/.asmx/.svc surface. Built for ASP.NET Webforms + WCF + SharePoint farms. sources: github, authorized-engagement report_count: 1
Crown Jewel Targets
ASP.NET deserialization bugs pay among the highest amounts in bug bounty when they reach RCE. Even when patched, the disclosure-tier findings (signed-only ViewState, dual-parser differential, request-validator quirks) reliably pay Low-Medium.
Highest-value targets:
- SharePoint farms (any version — 2013/2016/2019/SE) — sign-only ViewState + permissive ToolPane.aspx + anonymous FormDigest creates the CVE-2025-53770 ToolShell precondition chain
- Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX —
Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axdis a documented RCE sink when keys leak (CVE-2017-11317, CVE-2017-11357, CVE-2019-18935) - Classic ASP.NET Webforms enterprise apps — banking portals, dealer portals, HR systems left on .NET Framework 4.x
- WCF services (
*.svc?WSDL) — often forgotten admin endpoints with looser auth than the main app - Sitecore CMS — ViewState + Sitecore-specific deserialization chains (CVE-2021-42237)
- DotNetNuke (DNN) — historic ViewState RCE chains
- Umbraco CMS — ViewState + custom deserialization sinks
Asset types that pay most: internet-reachable ASP.NET Webforms apps > WCF admin services > Telerik-integrated sites > Classic ASP.NET MVC with VSF (very rare)
Attack Surface Signals
Response headers indicating ASP.NET:
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319 (classic — disclosure on its own)
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-AspNetMvc-Version: 5.2
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...
Set-Cookie: .ASPXAUTH=... (Forms auth cookie)
Set-Cookie: .ASPXFORMSAUTH=...
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...; SameSite=None (suggests cross-origin embedding)
Body signals (in form HTML):
<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE" id="__VIEWSTATE" value="..." />
<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR" id="__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR" value="..." />
<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED" id="__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED" value="" />
↑ EMPTY = signed-only, not encrypted = exploitable if key leaks
<input type="hidden" name="__EVENTVALIDATION" id="__EVENTVALIDATION" value="..." />
<input type="hidden" name="__REQUESTDIGEST" id="__REQUESTDIGEST" value="0x...,...">
↑ SharePoint CSRF token; if anon-issued, see hunt-sharepoint
URL patterns to probe:
/trace.axd (per-app trace viewer; sometimes anon-accessible)
/elmah.axd (ELMAH error log viewer)
/elmah.axd/?id=... (ELMAH RCE / stack-trace leak)
/*.svc (WCF services)
/*.svc?wsdl (WCF WSDL)
/*.svc/mex (Metadata Exchange)
/*.asmx (legacy SOAP)
/*.asmx?WSDL (legacy SOAP description)
/*.asmx?disco (legacy discovery)
/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd (Telerik AJAX components)
/ChartImg.axd (DataVisualization controls; historic deserialization)
/ScriptResource.axd (script resource handler; sometimes leaks paths)
/WebResource.axd (web resource handler)
/_vti_bin/* (SharePoint Web Service Forwarder)
/api/ (Web API 2.x is ASP.NET on classic framework)
/signin (often FedAuth / WS-Federation)
Tech-stack signals:
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0(or/8.5,/7.5) — confirmed Windows + IISX-AspNet-Versionheader — classic .NET Framework (4.x); .NET Core/5+ does NOT emit this- Cookies with
ASP.NET_SessionId,.ASPXAUTH,FedAuth— Forms or claims auth __VIEWSTATEin form bodies — Webforms (NOT MVC, NOT Razor Pages, NOT Blazor)MicrosoftSharePointTeamServicesheader (sometimes stripped by ELB but leaks instart.aspxbody) — SharePoint
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
-
Fingerprint the framework version. Trigger any 500 error (stale ViewState POST is a reliable way) and look for
Version Information: Microsoft .NET Framework Version:X.X.XXXXX; ASP.NET Version:X.X.XXXX.Xin the error body. This banner discloses both the runtime and ASP.NET-version-specific patch level. .NET 4.0.30319 + ASP.NET 4.8.x is the most common modern combination. -
Locate every form with
__VIEWSTATE. Spider the target and grep forname="__VIEWSTATE". Each is a candidate sink for deserialization attacks if MAC / encryption is bypassable. -
Check
__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTEDvalue. Empty (value="") means ViewState is signed-only via<machineKey>but NOT encrypted. Recovery of the validation key → arbitrary deserialization. Non-empty (value="something") means ViewState is BOTH signed and encrypted; both keys needed to forge. -
Test the ViewState parser-error differential (the dual-parser anti-pattern). Send 7+ ViewState shapes and classify responses:
- Trivial garbage (
AAAA) →"Validation of viewstate MAC failed" - Real prefix from current page →
"Validation of viewstate MAC failed" - Flipped-bit real ViewState →
"Validation of viewstate MAC failed" - Oversize (
A * 100000) →"Validation of viewstate MAC failed" - XML-shaped (
<xss/>) → "The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted" ← different parser path - LosFormatter-style prefix (
/wEPDwUKMTcxNzgyOTQwMmRkkz9p4lzA...) → **"The state informatio
- Trivial garbage (