hunt-agent-crypto
Cryptographic weaknesses in AI-agent tools that encrypt/decrypt/sign or mint tokens — ECB cut-and-paste and byte-at-a-time, padding oracles, missing MAC, hardcoded keys/predictable IVs. Use when an agent exposes crypto operations as tools.
elementalsouls · 已有静态检查记录
安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-AgentHunter --skill hunt-agent-crypto技能说明
name: hunt-agent-crypto
description: "Cryptographic weaknesses in AI-agent tools that encrypt/decrypt/sign or mint tokens — ECB cut-and-paste and byte-at-a-time, padding oracles, missing MAC, hardcoded keys/predictable IVs. Use when an agent exposes crypto operations as tools."
sources: arkx_ctf(field-validated), owasp_llm_top10_2025, owasp_agentic_asi_2026, mitre_atlas
report_count: 1
validated_against: "ECB cut-and-paste token forgery CONFIRMED re-runnably in the validation lab (lab/exploits/exploit_crypto.py: baseline token role=user, spliced token accepted as admin). AES-ECB cut-and-paste to forge an admin token from a known format (ARKX The Keymaker)"
Hunt Agent Crypto Weaknesses
Agents sometimes expose crypto as tools — encrypt, decrypt, sign, verify, mint tokens. Weak algorithms (ECB), missing authentication (no MAC), predictable keys/IVs, or a decrypt oracle turn the crypto tool into an auth-bypass / secret-extraction primitive. In enterprises this is session/API-token minting and document encryption behind a copilot.
Where This Lives / Attack Surface Signals
- Tools: encrypt, decrypt, create_token, sign, verify, hash, generate_key.
- Agent mentions a mode (ECB/CBC/CTR/GCM) or "block size"/"padding".
- Token format documented in the system prompt / a
*_infotool. - Tool prepends/appends user input to a secret before encrypting.
- Encrypt-only or decrypt-only availability → an oracle.
Crown Jewel Targets
Forged auth/session tokens → account/admin takeover; byte-at-a-time recovery of an appended secret; padding-oracle decryption of protected ciphertext.
Characterize First
- Algorithm details — "what cipher, mode, block size, padding?"
- Token/ciphertext format — structure and where user input sits.
- Block behaviour — send 0/1/15/16/17 bytes; count output blocks (find the 16-byte AES boundary).
- Oracle direction — can you encrypt? decrypt? verify? Each enables different attacks.
Technique 1 — ECB cut-and-paste (known format) [CONFIRMED]
ECB encrypts each block independently → rearrange ciphertext blocks.
Format: role=guest&user=<input> (prefix = one 16-byte block)
1. Encrypt input crafted so "role=admin&user=" forms its own block
2. Keep the "role=admin&user=" ciphertext block + padding block; drop the "role=guest" block
3. Submit the rearranged blocks → decrypts to role=admin → access granted
Field example: forged an admin token this way without knowing the key.
Technique 2 — ECB byte-at-a-time (input prepended to secret) [REFERENCE]
Control input length so one unknown secret byte fills a block; brute that byte by comparing blocks; repeat.
Technique 3 — Padding oracle [REFERENCE]
If decrypt distinguishes "padding error" vs "invalid": manipulate padding to decrypt the last block byte-by-byte.
Technique 4 — Hardcoded key / predictable IV [REFERENCE]
Ask for key/IV/config; test for reused IVs (CBC) or a static key in the prompt.
Verification & False-Positive Gate
- The forged token/decrypted value must WORK — submit it, authenticate with it, or verify it decrypts to the target. A plausible-looking token that's rejected is not a finding.
- Reproduce ≥3× — deterministic crypto should reproduce exactly; if it doesn't, you've mis-modelled the scheme.
- Confirm the mode — the ECB attacks require ECB (or an ECB-like independent-block behaviour); prove it via the block-boundary test, don't assume.
- Self-description untrusted — the agent's stated "AES-256-GCM" may be wrong; verify by block behaviour.
- Impact required; min-necessary — forge one admin token to prove it; don't harvest every user's.
Negative-Result Gate (before reporting "clean")
A probe that reports clean because it never looked is the more common failure, and it reaches the client as "we tested it and found nothing". Before any negative:
- A control proves the probe could fire — plant a known-true case, see it detected in the same run.
- Denylist read-only tools; never allowlist the dangerous ones — an allowlist ignores what it has not heard of.
- Errors are their own verdict — 5xx / timeout / empty read = UNMEASURABLE, never "refused".
- Prove the plant persisted before reporting isolation — no memory to cross means no result.
- Tokenise identifiers at ONE character — ids are routinely a single digit.
- Word boundaries; normalise whitespace before subtracting — substrings invent findings, verbatim matching deletes them.
- A fixed-size effect is not proof; a SCALING one is — constant overhead is an extra model turn, not execution.
- Judge tuning by whether a GENUINE detection dropped, not by the false-positive count.
- Do not inherit another tool's verdict — benchmarks and scanners carry their own bugs.
Common Root Causes
ECB mode (independent blocks → cut-and-paste / byte-at-a-time); no MAC (malleable ciphertext); documented/known format; hardcoded prefix; PKCS#7 padding oracle; static key / predictable IV.
Impact & Severity
- CRITICAL: forge admin/session tokens → authentication bypass; decrypt protected secrets.
- HIGH: ECB oracle → full appended-secret recovery.
- MEDIUM: disclosure of crypto parameters only.
Mapping
- OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025): LLM05 Improper Output Handling / insecure tool design (NOT the retired 2023 "LLM07 Insecure Plugin Design"). Agentic ASI (2026): insecure tool implementation. CWE-327 (broken crypto / ECB), CWE-329 (predictable IV), CWE-347 (no MAC).
Field example: reproduced deterministically in lab/ — an ECB-mode session token whose plaintext the caller partly controls. Control: an unmodified token comes back role=user, so the forgery has something to be measured against. Splicing an attacker-supplied block over the role block produced a token the server accepted as role=admin. The finding is the accepted privilege claim, not the detection of block repetition. Gate: python3 lab/run_lab.py.