network-security-audit
Audit network device security: local hardening and perimeter.
Dandi Suryadi, Hermes Agent · 已有静态检查记录
安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add Dandi41/ntnroute --skill network-security-audit技能说明
name: network-security-audit description: "Audit network device security: local hardening and perimeter." version: 1.1.0 author: Dandi Suryadi, Hermes Agent license: MIT metadata: hermes: tags: [network, security, audit, cve, hardening, perimeter, compliance] related_skills: [ntnroute, network-device-cli, network-change-management, network-troubleshooting]
Network Security Audit
Security audit of a network device in two directions at once: local (is the device itself hardened) and perimeter (what can reach it from outside). Read-only for the entire run; remediation is a separate skill with its own approval gate.
This is a guided procedure, not a bundled parser. Vendors differ in syntax, output shape, and even in which controls exist — so the skill supplies the order of thinking and a control catalog, and you supply the platform-specific commands, verified against official documentation.
Core rules
- Audit only when the user asks. Never run one proactively — not "while we're at it", not "to be thorough". Triggers: an explicit audit request, a security check, or an incident that needs a security assessment.
- Read-only, start to finish. Every audit command is
show/print/display/get. Noset,configure,no,undo,write,save,commit. If your evidence gathering would change state, it is the wrong command. - Report, never authorize or veto. The audit produces evidence, severity, and remediation advice. It never blocks, permits, delays, or decides a change the user asked for — including one that removes DHCP clients, firewall rules, services, routes, or accounts. The user decides; the change workflow handles consent, rollback, and verification.
- Evidence, not opinion. Every finding carries verbatim command output
plus, for CVEs, an official link. No output →
not checked. No link →not yet verified. - Both directions. Local hardening and perimeter exposure. The perimeter is usually the more fatal side, and the combination findings ("telnet on, and reachable from the WAN") are the ones that get exploited.
- CVEs from research, not memory. Version comes from the device, CVEs come from the vendor PSIRT then NVD, and relevance comes from the features you actually found enabled.
- Unknown is not safe. An unreachable device or an unverifiable control is
unknown/not checked. Neverpass. Never "secure".
When to Use
- "Audit the security of the lab RouterOS device", "check our network security", "is this device secure?"
- Before a device enters production (initial audit)
- After an incident: audit plus
network-troubleshootingfor forensics - Fleet review, when the user names a set of devices
Not for: changing config (→ network-change-management), diagnosing outages
(→ network-troubleshooting), adding devices (→ ntnroute).
Procedure
The full step-by-step is references/audit-playbook.md — seven phases,
each with its exit condition and per-platform command blocks. Read it before
starting; the summary here is the shape, not the detail.
Phase 0 — Scope
One short question to the user: which devices, local or perimeter or both, and whether an active outside-in test is permitted. Record it. Don't assume.
Phase 1 — Identity and reachability
Confirm the device answers, then pin down exact vendor, model, OS train, version, and build. No device-specific phase proceeds on a guess about the platform. Version ≠ patch level.
Phase 2 — Management plane
Services, protocols, accounts, session policy. This phase comes early because exposed management is the most common real compromise path.
Phase 3 — Perimeter and forwarding
Zones first, then filters in rule order. Read reachability of what you found enabled in Phase 2. Counters tell you what the policy is doing; the config tells you what it claims.
Phase 4 — Control plane
SSH/SNMP versions, logging, NTP, routing authentication, L2 protections where the role needs them, IPv6 handled deliberately.
Phase 5 — Change trail and drift
NTN_INTERNAL=1 ntn audit pending # no verdict at all → state UNKNOWN
NTN_INTERNAL=1 ntn audit failed
NTN_INTERNAL=1 ntn audit config 50 # device timeline
Out-of-band changes and unsettled applies are findings in their own right.
Vocabulary and recovery: network-troubleshooting → references/audit-trail.md.
Phase 6 — Version, lifecycle, CVE
Follow references/threat-research.md: lifecycle status → vendor PSIRT → NVD
cross-check → feature applicability → record with URL and research date.
Phase 7 — Report
templates/audit-report-template.md. Fill Not checked and Limitations
honestly; they are what make the report credible. Then stop — no remediation,
no suggested audit cadence.
Multi-device runs
Repeat Phases 1–6 per device, one evidence file each, aggregate at the end.
- Never aggregate across an
unknown: a fleet is not clean if one member was unreachable or one check went unverified. - Same finding on many devices → one entry with the device list, plus whether the cause is shared (same image, same template, same operator habit).
Division of labor across networking skills
| Skill | Role |
|---|---|
ntnroute | inventory, transport, ntn config/rollback |
network-device-cli | how to SSH to devices directly (outside ntn) |
network-troubleshooting | outage diagnosis, OSI layers, hypothesis tests |
network-change-management | change approval, rollback generation |
network-security-audit (this) | security findings, control catalog, CVE research, report |
Complementary flow: the audit finds → the user approves remediation →
network-change-management plans, gets approval, applies →
network-troubleshooting verifies nothing broke.
Pitfalls
- CVE without applicability evidence. Match product, model, build, affected-version range, and the enable