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web3-hunt-zksync-era

ZKsync Era (Immunefi) completed hunt — 0 findings after exhaustive 5-session audit. Use as a DEFENSE STUDY — learn what makes a protocol unhuntable, which patterns block all 10 bug classes, and when to abandon a target. Contains architecture breakdown, 25 tested attack vectors, and pre-dive scoring refinements for large L1 bridge protocols.

Awarexone · 已有 AI 审核记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add Awarexone/web3-bug-bounty-hunting-ai-skills --skill web3-hunt-zksync-era

技能说明


name: web3-hunt-zksync-era description: ZKsync Era (Immunefi) completed hunt — 0 findings after exhaustive 5-session audit. Use as a DEFENSE STUDY — learn what makes a protocol unhuntable, which patterns block all 10 bug classes, and when to abandon a target. Contains architecture breakdown, 25 tested attack vectors, and pre-dive scoring refinements for large L1 bridge protocols.

LIVE HUNT: ZKsync Era (Immunefi) — COMPLETED, 0 FINDINGS

Outcome: 0 submittable findings after 5+ sessions, 22+ agents, 25+ contracts, 25+ attack vectors Lesson: This file exists as a DEFENSE STUDY — what a hardened protocol looks like, and when to stop hunting.


TARGET PROFILE

FieldValue
ProtocolZKsync Era (L2 rollup)
PlatformImmunefi
TVL$322M (L2BEAT Total Value Secured)
Bounty$100K minimum Critical, $1.1M max
Codebase750K LOC (Solidity + Rust + Yul)
AuditsOpenZeppelin V29 (June 2025), multiple prior audits
VersionProtocol V29.4
Repogithub.com/matter-labs/era-contracts
PrimacyPrimacy of Impact — even out-of-scope assets qualify
Prior payouts$50K (ChainLight ZK circuit bug)

Pre-Dive Scorecard

CheckResultScore
TVL > $500K$322MPASS
Max payout > $10K$100K minimumPASS
Simple protocol?750K LOC, L1↔L2 bridge + ZK + governancePASS (complex)
< 500 lines?750K LOCPASS
Audit qualityOpenZeppelin (top-tier) on ALL critical pathsWARNING

REFINEMENT: Pre-dive should weight audit quality MORE for large protocols. A protocol passing TVL/LOC/payout checks can still be unhuntable if OZ/ToB audited the exact code you'd hunt. Add "audit firm tier" as a SOFT kill signal for 500K+ LOC protocols.


ARCHITECTURE (What Makes It Hardened)

L1 Bridge Stack

Bridgehub (router)
  ├── L1AssetRouter (token routing)
  │     ├── L1Nullifier (deposit/withdrawal state)
  │     └── L1NativeTokenVault (token custody)
  ├── ChainTypeManager (chain registration)
  └── ValidatorTimelock (RBAC execution delay)

L2 System Contracts (kernel space 0x8000-0xFFFF)

Bootloader (0x8001) → AccountCodeStorage, NonceHolder, KnownCodeStorage,
ImmutableSimulator, ContractDeployer, L1Messenger (0x8008),
MsgValueSimulator, L2BaseToken (0x800a), SystemContext (0x800b),
BootloaderUtilities, Compressor, ComplexUpgrader

L2 User Space Contracts (0x10000+)

Create2Factory, Bridgehub, AssetRouter, NativeTokenVault, MessageRoot

Diamond Proxy Pattern (EIP-2535)

  • All facets (Admin, Executor, Mailbox, Getters) share single ZKChainStorage struct
  • No storage collision possible between facets
  • Function selectors explicitly mapped in DiamondCut

ALL 25 ATTACK VECTORS TESTED

Critical Path (Vectors 1-8)

#VectorTargetWhy It Failed
1UnsafeBytes offset miscalculationL1Nullifier _parseL2WithdrawalMessageAll callers pre-validate message length before UnsafeBytes calls
2Legacy/new boundary double-withdrawalL1Nullifier_isLegacyTxDataHash try/catch returns false on decode failure; encoding prefix discriminator prevents collision
3secondBridgeAddress return value manipulationBridgehub requestL2TransactionTwoBridges>0xFFFF check blocks system contracts; L2-side msg.sender auth makes crafted returns useless
4Failed deposit claim wrong amount (legacy encoding)L1Nullifier claimFailedDepositLegacy hash uses try/catch; depositHappened correctly tracks per-encoding-version
5V29 interop root forgeryExecutoraddChainBatchRoot requires onlyChain + onlyL2; historical roots verified via Merkle
6Missing access control on sibling functionAll bridge contractsEvery external function has appropriate modifier; checked all 50+ external functions
7Fee-on-transfer token accounting desyncNativeTokenVaultL1ERC20Bridge: if (amount != _amount) revert TokensWithFeesNotSupported()
8Governance timelock bypassValidatorTimelock5-role RBAC via AccessControlEnumerable; block.timestamp >= commitTimestamp + delay

Extended Surface (Vectors 9-25)

#VectorWhy It Failed
9GatewayTransactionFilterer bypassEra mainnet: transactionFilterer == address(0), not used
10Precommitment sentinel collision_revertBatches properly resets precommitment; sentinel values don't collide
11L2→L1 message forgery via sendToL1Anyone can call sendToL1, but L1 verifies sender=0x8008 in log — can't forge system log sender
12Compressor state diff manipulationpublishCompressedBytecode called only from bootloader context
13Admin privilege escalationDiamond proxy admin is governance; no facet can self-modify
14Fee calculation overflowAll fee math uses SafeMath or checked arithmetic
15Free L2 transaction abusereservedDynamic field properly handled; bootloader validates gas
16DataEncoding L1/L2 mismatchAll 10 encode/decode pairs verified consistent across L1↔L2
17NTV token registration race_ensureTokenRegistered is idempotent; double registration returns same assetId
18Asset ID collisionkeccak256(chainId, ntvAddress, tokenAddress) — no collision possible
19Beacon proxy CREATE2 collisionStandard CREATE2; address determined by deployer+salt+bytecodeHash
20Cross-contract reentrancyEach contract has independent ReentrancyGuard AND follows CEI
21Address aliasing collisionBijective mapping (add/subtract offset mod 2^160)
22Diamond proxy selector clashExplicit selector mapping in DiamondCut; duplicates would revert
23Priority tree manipulationMerkle range proofs; unprocessedIndex only moves forward
24Chain migration state corruptionforwardedBridgeMint validates consiste
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