web3-hunt-foundation
Hunter mindset, recon setup, and target scoring for Web3 bug bounty. Use at the START of any new protocol hunt - scoring targets, setting up environment, understanding architecture.
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name: web3-hunt-foundation description: Hunter mindset, recon setup, and target scoring for Web3 bug bounty. Use at the START of any new protocol hunt - scoring targets, setting up environment, understanding architecture. Contains: attack/triage mental models, 10-point scorecard (score ≥6 to proceed), crown jewels approach, static analysis setup, recon checklist.
WEB3 HUNT FOUNDATION
Mindset + Recon + Setup. Read this before touching any new target's code. Replaces: 01-mindset, 02-recon-setup, 20-chain-complete
PART 1: THE HUNTER MINDSET
The Core Mental Shift
You are NOT looking for "vulnerabilities" in the abstract. You are looking for specific actions an attacker can take TODAY that result in profit.
Everything flows from one question: "What can I STEAL, FREEZE, or DESTROY — and what do I END UP WITH?"
The Bug Validation Template
Apply to every finding before writing a single line:
I am an attacker. I will:
1. SETUP: What do I need? (wallet, capital, any whitelisted permissions?)
2. CALL: Exact transactions, exact order, exact function names
3. RESULT: What do I end up with that I didn't start with?
4. COST: Gas + capital + flash loan fee + any other expense
5. DETECT: Can anyone stop or reverse this?
6. NET ROI: I gained X at cost of Y. Is Y << X?
If you can't fill in steps 2 and 3 with specific function calls → it's not a real bug. Stop. Move on.
10 Attacker Questions (Ask For Every External Function)
- What if
amount = 0? Does anything revert or silently pass? - What if I call this function twice in the same block?
- What if I call this before
initialize()is called? - What if I front-run this transaction?
- What if the external call fails? Does state get half-updated?
- What if the token has fee-on-transfer? Does
amount received ≠ amount sent? - What if I pass
address(0)or a malicious contract as an address param? - What if I pass
type(uint256).maxas a numeric param? - Can I combine this with a flash loan? (zero-cost capital changes the math)
- Does a sibling function lack the same modifier this function has?
Question #10 explains 19% of all Critical findings. If
vote()hasonlyRole(VOTER), checkpoke(),reset(),harvest()— the missing modifier on the sibling IS the bug.
6 Triager Counter-Questions (Disprove Your Own Finding)
Before spending time on a PoC, try to KILL the finding:
- Is there an upstream check I missed that actually prevents this?
- Is this documented intended behavior (whitepaper, NatSpec, design decision)?
- Does exploitation require admin/privileged access? (Usually invalid if yes)
- Is the economic cost to exploit greater than the gain? (Not viable if yes)
- Was this flagged in a prior audit as "acknowledged" or "risk accepted"?
- Is the "sensitive" data already publicly visible to anyone in the web UI?
One YES = KILL. Move on.
5-Minute Rule
If you've been on the same function for 5 minutes with no clear attack path → STOP. Add it to a low-priority list. Move to the next function. Top hunters: 95% fast-reject + 5% deep dives on confirmed leads.
Depth Over Breadth
Don't review 10 protocols in one week. Pick ONE. Spend 3-5 days becoming the expert. Protocol-specific knowledge compounds. The Curve expert found 5 bugs. The 10-protocol tourist found 0.
Inconsistency Is Proof
If functionA() has a security check, and functionB() doesn't — that IS the report.
You don't need to fully understand why. The inconsistency proves the developer intended the check.
PART 2: TARGET SCORING — GO / NO-GO
Before touching any code: score the target. Score < 6 → skip.
Target Scorecard
| Criterion | Points | How to Check |
|---|---|---|
| Max bounty ≥ $50K | +2 | Immunefi program page |
| TVL > $1M | +2 | DeFiLlama |
| Program launched < 30 days ago | +2 | Immunefi "new" filter |
| Custom math (AMM/vault/lending) | +1 | Read scope contracts |
| Recent code changes | +1 | git log --oneline -20 |
| Prior audits available | +1 | Program page / GitHub |
| In-scope includes smart contracts | +1 | Scope section |
| Protocol type you know well | +1 | Your specialization |
| Source code public/readable | +1 | GitHub / Etherscan verified |
< 4: Skip — too small, too audited, wrong fit 4-5: Only if nothing better available 6-8: Good — spend 1-3 days ≥ 9: Excellent — spend up to 1 week
PART 3: RECON METHODOLOGY (30-Minute Protocol)
Step 1 — Read Immunefi Page (5 min)
Note:
- All in-scope contract addresses + GitHub links
- Out-of-scope list (DO NOT report these)
- Primacy of Impact: YES/NO (YES = more forgiving on novel impacts)
- Max bounty amounts by severity
- Time on Immunefi (newer = fewer duplicates)
Step 2 — Clone + Setup (5 min)
git clone <target-repo>
cd <target-repo>
git log --oneline -20 # Recent changes = freshest bugs here
forge build # Must compile clean (fix if not)
forge test # Note failures — may indicate known issues
forge coverage # Untested code = priority review target
Step 3 — Read ALL Prior Audit Reports (15 min)
For each finding, note its status:
- Fixed: Skip
- Acknowledged / Risk Accepted: ⚡ START HERE ⚡
- Developer knows about it but chose not to fix it
- Variants, escalations, related attack paths = in-scope and uncovered
- Partially Fixed: Verify fix actually closes ALL attack paths
Find audits: GitHub repo, protocol docs, Immunefi page, Google "[protocol] audit report"
Step 4 — Crown Jewels (2 min)
Ask: "Worst thing an attacker could do to users of this protocol?"
Work backward from impact to code:
- "Steal deposits" → find: withdrawal functions, access control on transfer
- "Mint infinite tokens" → find: mint functions, who calls them, what checks
- "Freeze all funds" → find: emergency functions, time locks, role ass