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web3-grep-arsenal
Master grep command arsenal for Web3 smart contract auditing. Use when starting a new protocol scan, before deep code review, or when hunting specific vulnerability classes.
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安装与使用
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npx skills add Awarexone/web3-bug-bounty-hunting-ai-skills --skill web3-grep-arsenal技能说明
name: web3-grep-arsenal description: Master grep command arsenal for Web3 smart contract auditing. Use when starting a new protocol scan, before deep code review, or when hunting specific vulnerability classes. Contains: 10 grep blocks for all major vuln classes, tier ranking, protocol-specific patterns, 2025 new patterns, copy-paste ready blocks.
GREP ARSENAL — MASTER REFERENCE
All grep commands in one place. Run in the first 30 minutes of any new target. Replaces: 03-grep-surface-map, 14-grep-master-patterns + grep sections from 04-13
HOW TO USE THE SURFACE MAP
Process:
- Run ALL 10 blocks below (takes ~5 min)
- Collect all results in a notes file
- Tier-rank the hits (see Tier System below)
- In pass 1: READ everything, DON'T investigate yet
- In pass 2: Deep-dive on Tier 1 + 2 items
Tier System:
- Tier 1 — Near privileged code, external calls, or state changes with no guards → Investigate first
- Tier 2 — Interesting patterns that need context before judging → Investigate after Tier 1
- Tier 3 — Informational only (documentation, test files, comments) → Skip unless Tier 1+2 exhausted
THE 10 GREP BLOCKS (Copy-Paste Each)
Block 1 — Access Control
echo "=== ACCESS CONTROL ===" && \
grep -rn "tx\.origin" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "msg\.sender == owner\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "modifier only" src/ --include="*.sol" -A5 && \
grep -rn "onlyOwner\|onlyAdmin\|onlyRole" src/ --include="*.sol" | wc -l && \
grep -rn "def admin_\|router\..*admin\|function.*[Aa]dmin" src/ --include="*.sol"
Red flags:
tx.originused for auth → Tier 1 (phishing vector)- Modifier uses
if (condition) { _; }without else → Tier 1 (silent bypass — function still executes for unauthorized callers) onlyOwnercount << total external function count → likely missing guards on siblings
Block 2 — Reentrancy
echo "=== REENTRANCY ===" && \
grep -rn "\.call{value\|\.call(" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "\.transfer(\|\.send(" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "safeTransfer\|safeTransferFrom" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "onERC721Received\|onERC1155Received\|tokensReceived" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "nonReentrant\|ReentrancyGuard" src/ --include="*.sol"
Red flags:
.call{value:}orsafeTransferBEFORE state updates in same function → Tier 1 (CEI violation)onERC721Received/onERC1155Receivedhooks present → check for reentrancy path- External calls present but
nonReentrantmissing → verify CEI is followed
Block 3 — Oracle / Price
echo "=== ORACLE / PRICE ===" && \
grep -rn "slot0\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "getReserves()" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "latestRoundData\|latestAnswer" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "updatedAt" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "block\.timestamp" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|test\|Test" | head -20
Red flags:
slot0()used for price → Tier 1 (Uniswap V3 spot, flash-loan manipulable)getReserves()used for price → Tier 1 (Uniswap V2 spot, flash-loan manipulable)latestRoundDatawithoutupdatedAtcheck → Tier 1 (stale Chainlink price)latestAnswer→ Tier 1 (deprecated, no round validation)
Block 4 — Arithmetic / Math
echo "=== ARITHMETIC ===" && \
grep -rn "unchecked {" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "/ \|/=" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|test\|Test" | head -30 && \
grep -rn "mulDiv\|FullMath\|PRBMath" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "\* 10\*\*\|* 1e18\|* WAD\|* RAY" src/ --include="*.sol"
Red flags:
unchecked {}blocks → manually verify each (Solidity 0.8+ unwraps here)- Division before multiplication (
a / b * c) → precision loss / 1e18in contract that handles 6-decimal tokens → decimal mismatch
Block 5 — Input Validation
echo "=== INPUT VALIDATION ===" && \
grep -rn "address(0)\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "require.*length\|\.length ==" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "delegatecall" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "abi\.decode\|abi\.encodePacked" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -20
Red flags:
delegatecallwith user-controlled target → Tier 1 (arbitrary code execution)abi.decodeon user-supplied calldata without length validation → Tier 1- Array params in batch functions without dedup check → Tier 1 (double-count attack)
Block 6 — Token Handling
echo "=== TOKEN HANDLING ===" && \
grep -rn "IERC20\.\|ERC20\." src/ --include="*.sol" | grep "transfer\b\|transferFrom\b" && \
grep -rn "SafeERC20\|safeTransfer\b" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -10 && \
grep -rn "balanceOf(address(this))" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "permit(" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|IERC20Permit" && \
grep -rn "try.*permit\|catch.*permit" src/ --include="*.sol"
Red flags:
token.transfer()withoutSafeERC20.safeTransfer()→ Tier 1 (return value unchecked, fails silently on old USDT)balanceOf(address(this))for pricing/shares → Tier 1 (donation attack vector)permit()without try/catch wrapper → Tier 2 (frontrun DoS possible)
Block 7 — ERC4626 / Vault
echo "=== ERC4626 / VAULT ===" && \
grep -rn "totalAssets\|convertToShares\|previewDeposit\|previewMint" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "_decimalsOffset\|decimalsOffset\|virtual_shares\|dead.*shares" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "shares.*supply\|totalSupply\|mint.*shares" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -20
Red flags:
- ERC4626 present but
_decimalsOffset()NOT present → Tier 1 (first depositor inflation) totalAssets()usesbalanceOf(address(this))→ Tier 1 (donation attack)mint()ordeposit()called without same validation path → Tier 1 (MetaPool bug: mint skipped receipt check)
Block 8 — Proxy / Upgradeable
echo "=== PROXY / UPGRADE ===" && \
grep -rn "_authorizeUpgrade\|upgradeTo\|upgradeToAndCall" src/ --includ
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