跳至正文
OpenAgentSkill
浏览已开放 · 目录记录日期 2026-11-21 · 自动更新和账户服务暂时关闭。
安全

web3-grep-arsenal

Master grep command arsenal for Web3 smart contract auditing. Use when starting a new protocol scan, before deep code review, or when hunting specific vulnerability classes.

Awarexone · 已有 AI 审核记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add Awarexone/web3-bug-bounty-hunting-ai-skills --skill web3-grep-arsenal

技能说明


name: web3-grep-arsenal description: Master grep command arsenal for Web3 smart contract auditing. Use when starting a new protocol scan, before deep code review, or when hunting specific vulnerability classes. Contains: 10 grep blocks for all major vuln classes, tier ranking, protocol-specific patterns, 2025 new patterns, copy-paste ready blocks.

GREP ARSENAL — MASTER REFERENCE

All grep commands in one place. Run in the first 30 minutes of any new target. Replaces: 03-grep-surface-map, 14-grep-master-patterns + grep sections from 04-13


HOW TO USE THE SURFACE MAP

Process:

  1. Run ALL 10 blocks below (takes ~5 min)
  2. Collect all results in a notes file
  3. Tier-rank the hits (see Tier System below)
  4. In pass 1: READ everything, DON'T investigate yet
  5. In pass 2: Deep-dive on Tier 1 + 2 items

Tier System:

  • Tier 1 — Near privileged code, external calls, or state changes with no guards → Investigate first
  • Tier 2 — Interesting patterns that need context before judging → Investigate after Tier 1
  • Tier 3 — Informational only (documentation, test files, comments) → Skip unless Tier 1+2 exhausted

THE 10 GREP BLOCKS (Copy-Paste Each)

Block 1 — Access Control

echo "=== ACCESS CONTROL ===" && \
grep -rn "tx\.origin" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "msg\.sender == owner\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "modifier only" src/ --include="*.sol" -A5 && \
grep -rn "onlyOwner\|onlyAdmin\|onlyRole" src/ --include="*.sol" | wc -l && \
grep -rn "def admin_\|router\..*admin\|function.*[Aa]dmin" src/ --include="*.sol"

Red flags:

  • tx.origin used for auth → Tier 1 (phishing vector)
  • Modifier uses if (condition) { _; } without else → Tier 1 (silent bypass — function still executes for unauthorized callers)
  • onlyOwner count << total external function count → likely missing guards on siblings

Block 2 — Reentrancy

echo "=== REENTRANCY ===" && \
grep -rn "\.call{value\|\.call(" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "\.transfer(\|\.send(" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "safeTransfer\|safeTransferFrom" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "onERC721Received\|onERC1155Received\|tokensReceived" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "nonReentrant\|ReentrancyGuard" src/ --include="*.sol"

Red flags:

  • .call{value:} or safeTransfer BEFORE state updates in same function → Tier 1 (CEI violation)
  • onERC721Received/onERC1155Received hooks present → check for reentrancy path
  • External calls present but nonReentrant missing → verify CEI is followed

Block 3 — Oracle / Price

echo "=== ORACLE / PRICE ===" && \
grep -rn "slot0\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "getReserves()" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "latestRoundData\|latestAnswer" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "updatedAt" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "block\.timestamp" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|test\|Test" | head -20

Red flags:

  • slot0() used for price → Tier 1 (Uniswap V3 spot, flash-loan manipulable)
  • getReserves() used for price → Tier 1 (Uniswap V2 spot, flash-loan manipulable)
  • latestRoundData without updatedAt check → Tier 1 (stale Chainlink price)
  • latestAnswer → Tier 1 (deprecated, no round validation)

Block 4 — Arithmetic / Math

echo "=== ARITHMETIC ===" && \
grep -rn "unchecked {" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "/ \|/=" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|test\|Test" | head -30 && \
grep -rn "mulDiv\|FullMath\|PRBMath" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "\* 10\*\*\|* 1e18\|* WAD\|* RAY" src/ --include="*.sol"

Red flags:

  • unchecked {} blocks → manually verify each (Solidity 0.8+ unwraps here)
  • Division before multiplication (a / b * c) → precision loss
  • / 1e18 in contract that handles 6-decimal tokens → decimal mismatch

Block 5 — Input Validation

echo "=== INPUT VALIDATION ===" && \
grep -rn "address(0)\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "require.*length\|\.length ==" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "delegatecall" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "abi\.decode\|abi\.encodePacked" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -20

Red flags:

  • delegatecall with user-controlled target → Tier 1 (arbitrary code execution)
  • abi.decode on user-supplied calldata without length validation → Tier 1
  • Array params in batch functions without dedup check → Tier 1 (double-count attack)

Block 6 — Token Handling

echo "=== TOKEN HANDLING ===" && \
grep -rn "IERC20\.\|ERC20\." src/ --include="*.sol" | grep "transfer\b\|transferFrom\b" && \
grep -rn "SafeERC20\|safeTransfer\b" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -10 && \
grep -rn "balanceOf(address(this))" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "permit(" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|IERC20Permit" && \
grep -rn "try.*permit\|catch.*permit" src/ --include="*.sol"

Red flags:

  • token.transfer() without SafeERC20.safeTransfer() → Tier 1 (return value unchecked, fails silently on old USDT)
  • balanceOf(address(this)) for pricing/shares → Tier 1 (donation attack vector)
  • permit() without try/catch wrapper → Tier 2 (frontrun DoS possible)

Block 7 — ERC4626 / Vault

echo "=== ERC4626 / VAULT ===" && \
grep -rn "totalAssets\|convertToShares\|previewDeposit\|previewMint" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "_decimalsOffset\|decimalsOffset\|virtual_shares\|dead.*shares" src/ --include="*.sol" && \
grep -rn "shares.*supply\|totalSupply\|mint.*shares" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -20

Red flags:

  • ERC4626 present but _decimalsOffset() NOT present → Tier 1 (first depositor inflation)
  • totalAssets() uses balanceOf(address(this)) → Tier 1 (donation attack)
  • mint() or deposit() called without same validation path → Tier 1 (MetaPool bug: mint skipped receipt check)

Block 8 — Proxy / Upgradeable

echo "=== PROXY / UPGRADE ===" && \
grep -rn "_authorizeUpgrade\|upgradeTo\|upgradeToAndCall" src/ --includ
阅读完整来源 ↗