web3-case-study-role-misconfig
Case study - role misconfiguration bug class applied to a yield aggregator protocol. Use as a template for applying all 10 bug classes to a single target.
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name: web3-case-study-role-misconfig description: Case study - role misconfiguration bug class applied to a yield aggregator protocol. Use as a template for applying all 10 bug classes to a single target. Contains: architecture walkthrough, all bug class verdicts, 2 findings (DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE never granted, dust harvest DoS), complete PoC templates, report drafts, validation steps.
CASE STUDY: ROLE MISCONFIGURATION IN A YIELD AGGREGATOR
Bug Class: Access Control | Severity: Critical/Medium | Payout Range: $10K–$50K This file shows how to apply the full 10-class methodology to a real yield aggregator target.
TARGET PROFILE (Anonymized)
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Protocol Type | Yield aggregator — stablecoin → lending protocol → harvest → DEX → reward token |
| Max Bounty | $50K (Critical) |
| TVL | Low (fresh program, under $100K) |
| Core Contracts | Vault.sol, RewardsDistributor.sol |
| Program Age | ~5 days when hunted (fresh = low competition) |
| Prior Audits | Firm A (16 findings, all Risk Accepted) + Firm B (18 findings, all Risk Accepted) |
Scorecard: Max bounty (+2) + custom math (+1) + recent code (+1) + known prior audits (+1) + public source (+1) + program new (+2) = 8/10 → HUNT
Why this scores high: Fresh program on a live bounty platform + prior audits that accepted all risk = team is aware of issues but hasn't patched them. Hunt for what auditors missed or flagged but accepted.
ARCHITECTURE + FUND FLOW
User deposits Stablecoin
↓ deposit(uint256 amount)
Vault.sol stores:
- deposits[user] += amount
- totalDeposited += amount
- depositTimestamp[user] = block.timestamp
↓ safeTransferFrom(user, address(this), amount)
↓ lendingProtocol.supply(stablecoin, amount, address(this), 0)
Interest-bearing token accrues in Vault.sol balance
↓ (periodic) _performHarvest()
aToken balance > totalDeposited + DUST_THRESHOLD
↓ lendingProtocol.withdraw(stablecoin, harvestAmount - 1, address(this))
↓ dex.exactInputSingle(stablecoin → rewardToken)
↓ RewardsDistributor.distribute(rewardToken, amount)
RewardsDistributor tracks:
- cumulativeRewardPerShare updates
- users can call claimFor(user) to collect rewardToken
User withdraws:
↓ withdraw(uint256 amount)
if block.timestamp < depositTimestamp[user] + LOCK_PERIOD:
withdrawFee applies (e.g. 0.5%)
lendingProtocol.withdraw(stablecoin, amount, user)
Key state variables:
deposits[user]— user principal (stablecoin)totalDeposited— sum of all principalsdepositTimestamp[user]— last deposit time (affects withdrawal fee)cumulativeRewardPerShare— reward index in RewardsDistributorlastClaimedReward[user]— user's last reward index
KNOWN ISSUES (Risk Accepted by Team — Do NOT Submit)
Firm A Findings (16 total, all Risk Accepted)
All standard: missing events, gas optimizations, reentrancy guards present (CEI followed), centralization risks (owner can pause), single oracle (DEX swap is operational, not security-critical).
Firm B Findings (18 total, all Risk Accepted)
Including:
- HAL-01: withdrawFee can be changed by owner (centralization)
- HAL-05: deposit() resets depositTimestamp even on partial top-ups → extends lock period for existing deposits
- HAL-08: Missing check for DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE being set (flagged but did NOT verify it was never granted)
- Various gas and event issues
Pattern: Firm B flagged "missing check" but didn't verify the role was actually ungranted. This is the gap to exploit.
BUG CLASS VERDICTS
1. Accounting Desync — 2 FINDINGS
Finding 1: The -1 Stranding Pattern
// In _performHarvest():
harvestAmount = aToken.balanceOf(address(this)) - totalDeposited - 1; // strands 1 wei
The hardcoded -1 strands 1 wei of stablecoin per harvest permanently. Over thousands of harvests, this accumulates. Severity: LOW/INFORMATIONAL (no user loss, just protocol dust accumulation).
Finding 2: Dust Harvest DoS ← VALID MEDIUM
Scenario: Accumulated harvest amount is very tiny (< DEX minimum swap)
1. harvest() calls dex.exactInputSingle(stablecoin → rewardToken)
2. DEX returns 0 (amount too small to produce any output)
3. RewardsDistributor.distribute(0) is called
4. If distribute() reverts on 0 amount → harvest is permanently frozen
5. Users can still withdraw principal but all future yield is lost
Verification: Check if distribute(0) reverts. Check DEX minimum swap threshold.
2. Access Control — 1 FINDING (CRITICAL/HIGH)
Finding: DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE Never Granted ← MAIN FINDING
// RewardsDistributor.sol
bytes32 public constant DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE = keccak256("DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE");
function claimFor(address user) external {
require(hasRole(DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE, msg.sender), "Not distributor");
// ... distribute rewardToken to user
}
Problem: DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE is defined but NEVER granted in the constructor or any initialization function. No address holds this role. claimFor() can never succeed — all reward tokens are permanently locked.
How Firm B missed it: They flagged "missing check for whether role is set" — but their fix recommendation was "add a require that checks the role exists." They didn't verify that getRoleMemberCount(DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE) == 0 on the live deployment.
Severity Assessment:
- If harvest HAS already happened: CRITICAL (funds locked forever)
- If harvest never happened yet: HIGH (permanent lock when it does happen)
- Impact × Likelihood × Exploitability: 3 × 3 × 3 = 27 → CRITICAL
Verification commands:
# Check if any address has DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE (replace with actual address)
cast call <REWARDS_DISTRIBUTOR_ADDR> \
"getRoleMemberCount(bytes32)(uint256)" \
"$(cast keccak 'DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE')"
# Expected: 0 = confirmed bug
# Alternative: Etherscan → Events → filter "RoleGranted"
# If no RoleGranted events with DISTRIBUTOR_ROLE hash = confirmed
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