web3-bug-classes
Complete reference for all 10 DeFi smart contract bug classes. Use this when hunting for specific vulnerability types, need attack patterns for accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle manipulation, ERC4626 vaults, reentrancy, flash loans, signature replay, or proxy/upgrade bugs.
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name: web3-bug-classes description: Complete reference for all 10 DeFi smart contract bug classes. Use this when hunting for specific vulnerability types, need attack patterns for accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle manipulation, ERC4626 vaults, reentrancy, flash loans, signature replay, or proxy/upgrade bugs.
BUG CLASSES — DeFi Smart Contract Vulnerabilities
10 bug classes. Each one with root cause, vulnerable code, fix, grep patterns, and real paid examples.
1. ACCOUNTING STATE DESYNCHRONIZATION
#1 Critical bug class — 28% of all Criticals on Immunefi. Real protocols: Yeet, Alchemix V3, Folks Finance, ResupplyFi, MetaPool
What It Is
Two state variables are supposed to stay in sync. One code path updates variable A but forgets variable B. Later code reads both and makes decisions based on the stale B.
Real Value = A - B
If A is updated but B isn't → Real Value appears larger than it is → phantom value
Root Cause Pattern
// BEFORE (correct state):
// aToken.balanceOf(this) = 1000 (principal + yield)
// totalSupply = 1000 (only principal)
// yield = 1000 - 1000 = 0 ✓ correct
// Attacker triggers startUnstake:
totalSupply -= amount; // decremented BEFORE transfer
// totalSupply = 900 now
// aToken.balanceOf still = 1000
// yield appears = 1000 - 900 = 100 (PHANTOM)
// Now harvest():
yieldAmount = aToken.balanceOf(this) - totalSupply;
// = 1000 - 900 = 100 (phantom yield — no real yield was earned)
// Protocol harvests 100 of principal and distributes as "yield"
Variants
Variant 1: Phantom Yield — totalSupply decremented before transfer
// Yeet protocol (35 duplicate reports):
function startUnstake(uint256 amount) external {
totalSupply -= amount; // decremented here, transfer happens later
// balanceOf(this) - totalSupply now shows phantom yield
}
Variant 2: Fast Path Skips State Update — early return bypasses critical updates
// Alchemix V3 claimRedemption:
function claimRedemption(uint256 tokenId) external {
if (transmuter.balance >= amount) {
transmuter.transfer(user, amount);
_burn(tokenId);
return; // EARLY RETURN — cumulativeEarmarked, _redemptionWeight, totalDebt never updated
}
// SLOW PATH: updates all state vars correctly
alchemist.redeem(...);
}
Variant 3: Rewards Accrue to Wrong Accumulator
// Folks Finance Liquid Staking:
function addRewards(uint256 amount) external {
algoBalance += amount; // rewards go here
// MISSING: TOTAL_ACTIVE_STAKE += amount
}
function withdraw(uint256 shares) external {
uint256 myAmount = (shares * TOTAL_ACTIVE_STAKE) / totalSupply;
// TOTAL_ACTIVE_STAKE never got rewards → underflow → freeze
}
Variant 4: Update Happens in Wrong Order
// Alchemix:
function deposit(uint256 amount) external {
_shares = (amount * totalShares) / totalAssets; // calculated BEFORE deposit
totalAssets += amount; // assets added AFTER shares calculated
totalShares += _shares; // shares calculation used stale totalAssets → wrong rate
}
Grep Patterns
# List all balance/supply variables
grep -rn "totalSupply\|totalShares\|totalAssets\|totalDebt\|totalCollateral\|cumulativeReward\|rewardPerShare" contracts/ | grep -v "//\|test"
# Find ALL writes to key variables
grep -rn "totalSupply\s*[-+*]=[^=]\|totalSupply\s*=" contracts/
grep -rn "cumulativeRewardPerShare\s*[-+*]=" contracts/
# Find all early returns in claim/redeem functions
grep -rn "\breturn\b" contracts/ -B3 | grep -B3 "if\b"
# For each early return: which state updates are in the normal path but not this one?
Kill Signals
- Only one variable is involved (no pair to desync)
- Both paths update all state vars identically
- Transfer happens AFTER state update in every path (correct CEI)
- Single-transaction atomicity prevents the window (no intermediate state visible)
Real Paid Examples
| Protocol | Root Cause |
|---|---|
| Yeet | startUnstake decrements totalSupply before transfer → phantom yield |
| Alchemix V3 | claimRedemption fast path skips 3 state updates → phantom collateral |
| Folks Finance | Rewards accrue to algoBalance not TOTAL_ACTIVE_STAKE → underflow |
| ResupplyFi | ERC4626 near-empty vault exchange rate manipulation |
| MetaPool | mint() skipped receipt check from _deposit() |
2. ACCESS CONTROL
#2 Critical bug class — 19% of all Criticals. $953M lost in 2024 alone. Real protocols: Wormhole ($10M), ZeroLend, Flare FAssets, Parity ($150M frozen)
What It Is
A function that should be restricted is callable by anyone. Or a function checks the wrong condition (existence vs. ownership). Or a modifier uses if instead of require and silently does nothing for non-admins.
Root Cause Patterns
Variant 1: Missing Modifier on Sibling Function
function vote(uint256 tokenId) external onlyNewEpoch(tokenId) { // guarded
function reset(uint256 tokenId) external onlyNewEpoch(tokenId) { // guarded
function poke(uint256 tokenId) external { // NO GUARD
// Anyone calls poke() unlimited times per epoch
// poke() distributes FLUX rewards → infinite inflation
}
Variant 2: Wrong Check — Existence vs. Ownership
// ZeroLend split() — anyone can steal victim's tokens:
function split(uint256 tokenId, uint256 amount) external {
_requireOwned(tokenId); // checks if token EXISTS, not if caller OWNS it
_burn(tokenId);
_mint(msg.sender, amount); // attacker gets tokens they don't own
}
Variant 3: Tautology in Require
// Flare FAssets — proof validation always passes:
require(
sourceAddressesRoot == sourceAddressesRoot, // always true! comparing to itself
"Invalid"
);
Variant 4: Silent Modifier (if vs require)
// VULNERABLE — non-admi
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