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android-deeplink-applink-abuse

Exploit Android deep links and App Links — unvalidated params in BROWSABLE activities, custom-scheme OAuth-callback hijacking, open redirect into WebViews, and App Links verification gaps (missing/invalid assetlinks.json). Tier 1. Use when the manifest declares deep-link intent-filters. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-PLATFORM (MASTG-TEST-0028).

AnandJogawade · 已有 AI 审核记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add AnandJogawade/Zazy-Pentest-Plugin-for-Claude --skill android-deeplink-applink-abuse

技能说明


name: android-deeplink-applink-abuse description: Exploit Android deep links and App Links — unvalidated params in BROWSABLE activities, custom-scheme OAuth-callback hijacking, open redirect into WebViews, and App Links verification gaps (missing/invalid assetlinks.json). Tier 1. Use when the manifest declares deep-link intent-filters. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-PLATFORM (MASTG-TEST-0028).

Android Deep Link & App Link Abuse

Deep links are a remote, one-click entry point. Fuzz their params, hijack custom-scheme callbacks, and check whether App Links are actually verified.

Trigger phrases

deep link, applink, app link, browsable, custom scheme, assetlinks.json, autoverify, oauth callback hijack, deeplink open redirect

Method

  1. Enumerate schemes/hosts from the manifest (<data scheme/host> + BROWSABLE):
    • drozer> run app.package.manifest <package>
  2. Fire deep links & fuzz params:
    • adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d "myapp://host/path?param=value"
    • drozer> run app.activity.start --action android.intent.action.VIEW --data-uri "myapp://host/auth=sum"
    • Reach authenticated/internal screens unauthenticated; inject into params that feed a WebView or backend call.
  3. Path traversal in params: adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d "example://app/users?u=../../unwanted%3fp=v"
  4. App Links verification: curl -s https://<domain>/.well-known/assetlinks.json — missing/invalid SHA-256 fingerprint → autoVerify silently falls back to the browser / chooser (not enforced), enabling scheme hijack.

Modern / rare techniques

  • [NEW/RARE] Custom-scheme OAuth-callback hijacking — any app can register myapp://; a malicious app intercepting the OAuth redirect steals the auth code/token → one-click account takeover. PKCE mitigates — note whether it's used.
  • [NEW/RARE] Open redirect via weak startsWith/contains host checks feeding a WebView → load attacker page (chain android-webview-attacks).
  • [NEW/RARE] intent:// redirection from a BROWSABLE activity to reach non-exported components (chain android-intent-injection-redirection).
  • [NEW/RARE] Expired allowlisted domain re-registered by an attacker receives auth headers/tokens.

Bypass / evasion

Defeat startsWith/contains/suffix host allowlists with attacker.com#victim.com, victim.com.attacker.com, //attacker.com, and userinfo (victim.com@attacker.com) tricks before the WebView load.

Escalation / chaining

One-click ATO (token theft), LFI/XSS-to-native via WebView, open redirect. Chains to android-webview-attacks, android-intent-injection-redirection, oauth, and android-backend-api-testing (confirm server accepts the stolen token).

Backend & tooling

Preferred Kali path (native Kali / WSL+Kali / Kali-SSH / Kali-MCP / HexStrike). Needs the user's device/emulator (adb/drozer; a PoC app for scheme-hijack) + curl for assetlinks. Route token tests through Burp if a Burp MCP is present. Windows-local last resort. See zazy-orchestrator.

Verification (background, before reporting)

Confirm the token/session actually leaked to an attacker-controlled URI or the non-exported component truly launched — use OAST/a second app to receive the callback — before marking CONFIRMED. For "unverified" App Links, show the chooser/browser fallback actually occurs.

Evidence

The deep-link URI, the manifest intent-filter, the leaked token/reached screen, and (for App Links) the missing/invalid assetlinks.json. Remediation: validate all params; verified App Links + PKCE for OAuth; canonical host allowlists; reject nested/implicit intents.