threat-model-sidecar
Emit and validate the §1.19 machine-readable companions: threat-model.yaml using schema threat-model-sidecar/v2, and the flat threat-model.json export conforming to schema.json. USE WHEN an orchestrated threat model is ready for publication, automated or AI-assisted triage, dependency compatibility analysis, or companion regeneration after prose changes. Projects provenance- backed components, input obligations, contract dimensions, outputs, adversaries, dependencies, configurations, properties, misuses, non-findings, and the closed disposition enum. Prose remains canonical; authority order is prose > yaml > json. DO NOT USE FOR: writing prose or routing a finding.
alpha-omega-security · 已有静态检查记录
安装与使用
运行命令前先阅读来源与依赖说明。复制命令不会自动安装或执行。
npx skills add alpha-omega-security/threat-model --skill threat-model-sidecar技能说明
name: threat-model-sidecar description: >- Emit and validate the §1.19 machine-readable companions: threat-model.yaml using schema threat-model-sidecar/v2, and the flat threat-model.json export conforming to schema.json. USE WHEN an orchestrated threat model is ready for publication, automated or AI-assisted triage, dependency compatibility analysis, or companion regeneration after prose changes. Projects provenance- backed components, input obligations, contract dimensions, outputs, adversaries, dependencies, configurations, properties, misuses, non-findings, and the closed disposition enum. Prose remains canonical; authority order is prose > yaml > json. DO NOT USE FOR: writing prose or routing a finding. argument-hint: ''
Threat Model — Sidecar (machine-readable companions)
Owns §1.19: emit threat-model.yaml and threat-model.json alongside the
prose document so shared triage tooling can consume the model without parsing
prose. Follow the schema in
sidecar-schema.md for the YAML
and the mapping in
json-report-schema.md for
the JSON exactly — companions are only useful to tooling if they are
structurally uniform across projects. Authority order: prose > yaml >
json. The JSON is a flat, lossy export for consumers of schema.json; it is
never a triage input.
Principles
- Prose is canonical; the sidecar is a derived index. Do not put anything in the sidecar that is not already asserted in the prose. If the two disagree, the sidecar is wrong.
- Record provenance of derivation — set
prose_versionto the canonical relative prose path plus SHA-256 of its exact UTF-8 bytes, and regenerate whenever the prose changes. - Uniform shape only — use the
schema: threat-model-sidecar/v2fields as given; extend with project-specific keys only under anx-prefix. The JSON schema forbids extensions entirely; what does not fit stays in the YAML. - Never upgrade provenance. The JSON collapses four provenance kinds into
two:
documentedandmaintainerbecomedocumented;inferredandassumptionbecomeinferred. The collapse only goes down — a record whose sidecar provenance isinferredorassumptionmust never surface in the JSON asdocumented. That direction hands a JSON-only consumer a licence the model never granted.
Procedure
- Confirm the prose document is at least a complete draft (all sections substantive or N/A). If §1.7/§1.8/§1.11/§1.17 are incomplete, stop and hand back — the sidecar cannot be faithfully derived from a partial model.
- Project each prose section into its sidecar block:
- §1.2/§1.3/§1.4 →
components(scope: in|out, out-reason, and per- component reachability precondition). - §1.5 →
host_side_effects[]— explicit present/absent/conditional host effects with components, conditions, and provenance. - §1.7 →
entry_points[].parameters[]— every attacker-controllable parameter must have a non-emptycaller_must_enforceand at least one value in itscontrol_kindsarray. - §1.7-§1.12 →
contract_dimensions[]— all eight required dimensions for every in-scope component, including explicitnot-applicablerows; claimed/disclaimed rows reference stable property IDs and unresolved rows reference §1.18 question IDs. - §1.8 →
outputs[](taint: same-as-input | sanitized | constrained, in-scope component, separately provenanced invariants, and downstream must-not-assume records). - §1.10 →
adversaries[](in/out of scope, capabilities, excluded capabilities, goals, provenance). - §1.9 →
dependency_policy+dependencies[], including stablerelied_on_properties, acknowledged obligation IDs, adversary capabilities actually forwarded, and output channels/taint handling; an empty list pluszero_runtime_dependencies: trueis the explicit zero-dependency claim, not an omission. Leaveoutputs_consumed: []unless the project holds anoutput-sanitization-kind property about a dependency's output — each entry'ssupports_property_idmust reference such a property. If the project passes a dependency's output straight through and disclaims sanitization (the common case), the list stays empty; the passthrough taint is already recorded in §1.8outputs[]and the §1.12 disclaimers. Do not pointsupports_property_idat a behavioral, atomicity, or probabilistic property. - §1.6 →
build_policy+build_flags[](default,security_relevant, support stance, affected property IDs/effects, provenance). - §1.11 →
properties_claimed[](kind, components, tier, conditions, violation symptoms, provenance). - §1.12 →
properties_disclaimed[](components, conditions,false_friend: true|false, provenance). - §1.13 →
downstream_responsibilities[]linked to obligation/property IDs. - §1.14 →
known_misuses[], the structured basis forVALID-HARDENING. - §1.15 →
known_non_findings[], with component/sink, conditions, anddischarged_bystable IDs sufficient for exact (not fuzzy) matching. - §1.17 →
dispositionsplusdisposition_precedence— the fixed closed enum and first-match order, verbatim.
- §1.2/§1.3/§1.4 →
- Normalize the prose status to the schema enum (
draft,unratified-draft,under-review,accepted) using the mapping insidecar-schema.md; setconfidenceto match the §1.1 counts exactly. Project the header's triage policy to the top-leveltriage_policy(strictdefault /relaxed). Carrytier(security-critical | correctness-only) on everyproperties_disclaimed[]entry so a consumer can enforce the assumption security-critical floor. Project the §1.1 generation metadata to the top-level `generati