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api-graphql

Attack GraphQL APIs. Load on /graphql, /graphiql, /v1/graphql, a POST with {"query":"..."}, Apollo/Hasura/graphene stacks, or "query/mutation" language. Signals: introspection enabled, batched queries, deeply nested fields, __schema, aliases.

NoorQureshi · AI review on file

Installation

Read the source and dependencies before running a command. Copying does not install or execute anything.

npx skills add NoorQureshi/SploitAgent --skill api-graphql

About this skill


name: api-graphql description: > Attack GraphQL APIs. Load on /graphql, /graphiql, /v1/graphql, a POST with {"query":"..."}, Apollo/Hasura/graphene stacks, or "query/mutation" language. Signals: introspection enabled, batched queries, deeply nested fields, __schema, aliases. domain: api type: technique stability: learning modes: [pentest, bugbounty] severity: high owasp_api: [API1:2023-BOLA, API5:2023-BFLA] cwe: [CWE-639, CWE-284] tools: [graphw00f, clairvoyance, burp, inql] schema_version: 1

GraphQL abuse

When it applies

The target exposes a GraphQL endpoint. GraphQL collapses many objects behind one URL, so authorization gaps and info leaks are common and easy to miss with URL-based testing.

Why it works

One endpoint, a self-describing schema, and per-field resolvers mean access control must be enforced at every field/resolver — it frequently isn't. Introspection hands you the entire attack surface; batching/aliases turn one request into thousands.

Method

  1. Fingerprint & map: graphw00f for the engine; if introspection is on, dump the schema ({__schema{types{name fields{name}}}}) with inql/clairvoyance. If off, brute field names with clairvoyance (error messages leak valid fields).
  2. AuthZ testing (BOLA/BFLA): call queries/mutations for objects and admin operations you shouldn't reach; swap ids in arguments (same as IDOR) — resolvers often skip owner checks.
  3. Info disclosure: reach sensitive fields/types (users, tokens, internal flags) via nested relations even when the "front door" query hides them.
  4. DoS / cost: deeply nested recursive queries and aliased batching (a:login b:login ...) to bypass rate limits or brute-force — respect program rules on this.
  5. Injection: arguments feed backends — test SQLi/NoSQLi in GraphQL variable values.

Gotchas

  • Introspection off ≠ safe — field brute-forcing and suggestion errors still map the schema.
  • Rate-limit bypass via batching/aliases is a real, reportable finding on many programs.
  • Mutations are where impact lives; don't stop at read queries.

Verify success

Retrieve/modify data through a query or mutation your role shouldn't allow, or dump a schema that reveals hidden admin operations.

References

PortSwigger GraphQL labs; OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023); graphw00f/inql docs.