Registry indexed

ad-delegation-abuse

Price unconfirmed★ 20 GitHub starsRegistry updated · Oct 2, 2026agent-skill

Overview

Abuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP → RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals: msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.

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Kerberos delegation abuse

When it applies

An AD engagement where enumeration (BloodHound, nxc, LDAP) shows a delegation primitive: a host trusted for unconstrained delegation, an account with constrained delegation (msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo), or — most commonly — write access over a computer object so you can set RBCD. Coercion + relay turns "can authenticate a DC" into "control a DC". This is the modern lateral-movement/DA path.

Why it works

Delegation lets a service act on behalf of a user. Kerberos implements it with S4U2Self (get a ticket to yourself as any user) and S4U2Proxy (forward it to a target service). If you control an account permitted to delegate — or can write msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity on a target (RBCD) — you can mint a service ticket as any user, including Domain Admin, to that target.

Method

Enumerate the primitive. BloodHound edges (AllowedToDelegate, AllowedToAct, GenericWrite/GenericAll on a computer), or nxc ldap ... --trusted-for-delegation / LDAP queries for the delegation attributes.
Unconstrained — on a host trusted for unconstrained delegation, capture TGTs of any user who authenticates to it (Rubeus monitor), and coerce a DC to authenticate (below) to grab the DC's TGT → DCSync.
Constrained (S4U) — with an account that has msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo <spn>: getST.py -spn <spn> -impersonate Administrator '<domain>/<svc>:<pass>' (or Rubeus s4u). altservice/SPN-substitution lets one allowed SPN pivot to others on the same host.
RBCD (the write-driven path) — when you control a computer account and can write the target's msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity:
- Set it: rbcd.py -delegate-to <TARGET$> -delegate-from <YOURMACHINE$> -action write ...
- Impersonate: getST.py -spn cifs/<target> -impersonate Administrator '<domain>/<YOURMACHINE$>:<pass>'
- Use the ticket (KRB5CCNAME=...) with psexec.py -k -no-pass, secretsdump.py -k, etc.
Coercion → relay → RBCD (no creds needed to start) — coerce a target/DC to authenticate to you (PetitPotam.py, coercer), relay that NTLM to LDAP(S) and grant yourself RBCD: ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://<dc> --delegate-access, then S4U as above. (See network-ntlm-relay.)

Gotchas

altservice only works within the same host's SPNs — you can swap cifs→host→http on the target, not jump machines.
ProtectedUsers / "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" blocks impersonating that principal — pick another admin, or a computer account.
Clock skew breaks every Kerberos step — sync to the DC (ntpdate/faketime) first.
RC4 disabled / AES-only domains need AES keys in your tooling flags; RC4 tickets get rejected.
RBCD needs write on the target computer, and creating a fake computer needs ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota > 0 (or use a machine account you already own).

Verify success

A service ticket as a privileged user to the target service, used to run a command / dump secrets (secretsdump.py -k) you could not before — e.g. local admin on the target or DCSync from a coerced DC.

References

Elad Shamir "Wagging the Dog" (RBCD); Impacket getST.py/rbcd.py/ntlmrelayx.py; Rubeus S4U docs; MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003. Coercion+relay mechanics: network-ntlm-relay.

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File metadata

name: ad-delegation-abuse
description: >
  Abuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained
  (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP →
  RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine
  account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals:
  msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.
domain: ad
type: technique
stability: learning
modes: [pentest]
severity: critical
mitre: [T1558.003, T1550.003, T1187]
cwe: [CWE-284, CWE-269]
tools: [rubeus, impacket, bloodhound, netexec, certipy]
schema_version: 1

View original text

---
name: ad-delegation-abuse
description: >
  Abuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained
  (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP →
  RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine
  account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals:
  msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.
domain: ad
type: technique
stability: learning
modes: [pentest]
severity: critical
mitre: [T1558.003, T1550.003, T1187]
cwe: [CWE-284, CWE-269]
tools: [rubeus, impacket, bloodhound, netexec, certipy]
schema_version: 1
---

# Kerberos delegation abuse

## When it applies
An AD engagement where enumeration (BloodHound, `nxc`, LDAP) shows a delegation primitive: a host
trusted for unconstrained delegation, an account with constrained delegation (`msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo`),
or — most commonly — write access over a computer object so you can set RBCD. Coercion + relay turns
"can authenticate a DC" into "control a DC". This is the modern lateral-movement/DA path.

## Why it works
Delegation lets a service act *on behalf of* a user. Kerberos implements it with S4U2Self (get a
ticket to yourself as any user) and S4U2Proxy (forward it to a target service). If you control an
account permitted to delegate — or can write `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` on a target
(RBCD) — you can mint a service ticket as *any* user, including Domain Admin, to that target.

## Method
1. **Enumerate the primitive.** BloodHound edges (`AllowedToDelegate`, `AllowedToAct`,
   `GenericWrite`/`GenericAll` on a computer), or `nxc ldap ... --trusted-for-delegation` /
   LDAP queries for the delegation attributes.
2. **Unconstrained** — on a host trusted for unconstrained delegation, capture TGTs of any user who
   authenticates to it (`Rubeus monitor`), and coerce a DC to authenticate (below) to grab the DC's
   TGT → DCSync.
3. **Constrained (S4U)** — with an account that has `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo <spn>`:
   `getST.py -spn <spn> -impersonate Administrator '<domain>/<svc>:<pass>'` (or `Rubeus s4u`).
   `altservice`/SPN-substitution lets one allowed SPN pivot to others on the same host.
4. **RBCD (the write-driven path)** — when you control a computer account and can write the target's
   `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity`:
   - Set it: `rbcd.py -delegate-to <TARGET$> -delegate-from <YOURMACHINE$> -action write ...`
   - Impersonate: `getST.py -spn cifs/<target> -impersonate Administrator '<domain>/<YOURMACHINE$>:<pass>'`
   - Use the ticket (`KRB5CCNAME=...`) with `psexec.py -k -no-pass`, `secretsdump.py -k`, etc.
5. **Coercion → relay → RBCD (no creds needed to start)** — coerce a target/DC to authenticate to
   you (`PetitPotam.py`, `coercer`), relay that NTLM to LDAP(S) and grant yourself RBCD:
   `ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://<dc> --delegate-access`, then S4U as above. (See `network-ntlm-relay`.)

## Gotchas
- **`altservice` only works within the same host's SPNs** — you can swap `cifs`→`host`→`http` on the
  target, not jump machines.
- **`ProtectedUsers` / "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated"** blocks impersonating that
  principal — pick another admin, or a computer account.
- **Clock skew** breaks every Kerberos step — sync to the DC (`ntpdate`/`faketime`) first.
- **RC4 disabled / AES-only** domains need AES keys in your tooling flags; RC4 tickets get rejected.
- **RBCD needs write on the *target* computer**, and creating a fake computer needs
  `ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota > 0` (or use a machine account you already own).

## Verify success
A service ticket as a privileged user to the target service, used to run a command / dump secrets
(`secretsdump.py -k`) you could not before — e.g. local admin on the target or DCSync from a
coerced DC.

## References
Elad Shamir "Wagging the Dog" (RBCD); Impacket `getST.py`/`rbcd.py`/`ntlmrelayx.py`; Rubeus S4U docs;
MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003. Coercion+relay mechanics: `network-ntlm-relay`.

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Review before install: Avoid automatic install

License: MIT

Permission surface may require sandboxing
Potential broker, wallet, exchange, or real-money execution surface; sandbox and explicit approval are required
Low GitHub adoption signal
AI review approval is missing
This skill may touch real-money trading, broker, wallet, or exchange operations; use only in a sandbox with explicit approval.
Quality score needs review
Permission surface needs review: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution
GitHub adoption: 20 GitHub stars
Stars/forks activity: 20 stars, 7 forks; issue activity unavailable in current metadata
Permission surface: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution
Review status: AI review approval is missing

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Source & usage notes

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Source repository: NoorQureshi/SploitAgent
License: MIT
Version: Unknown
Last GitHub push: Oct 2, 2026
Registry updated: Oct 2, 2026
Instruction path: skills/ad/ad-delegation-abuse/SKILL.md @ 7d434b222c0b

Version reported in registry metadata; check source releases before relying on it.

Quality

54/100

Needs review

Trust

59/100

Do not auto-install

Audit

72/100

Risky

Open full audit View eval report

Permission surface may require sandboxing
Potential broker, wallet, exchange, or real-money execution surface; sandbox and explicit approval are required
Low GitHub adoption signal
AI review approval is missing
This skill may touch real-money trading, broker, wallet, or exchange operations; use only in a sandbox with explicit approval.
Quality score needs review
Permission surface needs review: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution
GitHub adoption: 20 GitHub stars
Stars/forks activity: 20 stars, 7 forks; issue activity unavailable in current metadata
Permission surface: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution
Review status: AI review approval is missing

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NoorQureshi

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ad-delegation-abuse

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Price unconfirmed★ 20 GitHub starsRegistry updated · Oct 2, 2026agent-skill

Overview

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Kerberos delegation abuse

When it applies

Why it works

Method

Enumerate the primitive. BloodHound edges (AllowedToDelegate, AllowedToAct, GenericWrite/GenericAll on a computer), or nxc ldap ... --trusted-for-delegation / LDAP queries for the delegation attributes.
Unconstrained — on a host trusted for unconstrained delegation, capture TGTs of any user who authenticates to it (Rubeus monitor), and coerce a DC to authenticate (below) to grab the DC's TGT → DCSync.
Constrained (S4U) — with an account that has msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo <spn>: getST.py -spn <spn> -impersonate Administrator '<domain>/<svc>:<pass>' (or Rubeus s4u). altservice/SPN-substitution lets one allowed SPN pivot to others on the same host.
RBCD (the write-driven path) — when you control a computer account and can write the target's msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity:
- Set it: rbcd.py -delegate-to <TARGET$> -delegate-from <YOURMACHINE$> -action write ...
- Impersonate: getST.py -spn cifs/<target> -impersonate Administrator '<domain>/<YOURMACHINE$>:<pass>'
- Use the ticket (KRB5CCNAME=...) with psexec.py -k -no-pass, secretsdump.py -k, etc.
Coercion → relay → RBCD (no creds needed to start) — coerce a target/DC to authenticate to you (PetitPotam.py, coercer), relay that NTLM to LDAP(S) and grant yourself RBCD: ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://<dc> --delegate-access, then S4U as above. (See network-ntlm-relay.)

Gotchas

altservice only works within the same host's SPNs — you can swap cifs→host→http on the target, not jump machines.
ProtectedUsers / "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" blocks impersonating that principal — pick another admin, or a computer account.
Clock skew breaks every Kerberos step — sync to the DC (ntpdate/faketime) first.
RC4 disabled / AES-only domains need AES keys in your tooling flags; RC4 tickets get rejected.
RBCD needs write on the target computer, and creating a fake computer needs ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota > 0 (or use a machine account you already own).

Verify success

References

Elad Shamir "Wagging the Dog" (RBCD); Impacket getST.py/rbcd.py/ntlmrelayx.py; Rubeus S4U docs; MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003. Coercion+relay mechanics: network-ntlm-relay.

View source ↗

File metadata

name: ad-delegation-abuse
description: >
  Abuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained
  (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP →
  RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine
  account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals:
  msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.
domain: ad
type: technique
stability: learning
modes: [pentest]
severity: critical
mitre: [T1558.003, T1550.003, T1187]
cwe: [CWE-284, CWE-269]
tools: [rubeus, impacket, bloodhound, netexec, certipy]
schema_version: 1

View original text

---
name: ad-delegation-abuse
description: >
  Abuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained
  (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP →
  RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine
  account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals:
  msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.
domain: ad
type: technique
stability: learning
modes: [pentest]
severity: critical
mitre: [T1558.003, T1550.003, T1187]
cwe: [CWE-284, CWE-269]
tools: [rubeus, impacket, bloodhound, netexec, certipy]
schema_version: 1
---

# Kerberos delegation abuse

## When it applies
An AD engagement where enumeration (BloodHound, `nxc`, LDAP) shows a delegation primitive: a host
trusted for unconstrained delegation, an account with constrained delegation (`msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo`),
or — most commonly — write access over a computer object so you can set RBCD. Coercion + relay turns
"can authenticate a DC" into "control a DC". This is the modern lateral-movement/DA path.

## Why it works
Delegation lets a service act *on behalf of* a user. Kerberos implements it with S4U2Self (get a
ticket to yourself as any user) and S4U2Proxy (forward it to a target service). If you control an
account permitted to delegate — or can write `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` on a target
(RBCD) — you can mint a service ticket as *any* user, including Domain Admin, to that target.

## Method
1. **Enumerate the primitive.** BloodHound edges (`AllowedToDelegate`, `AllowedToAct`,
   `GenericWrite`/`GenericAll` on a computer), or `nxc ldap ... --trusted-for-delegation` /
   LDAP queries for the delegation attributes.
2. **Unconstrained** — on a host trusted for unconstrained delegation, capture TGTs of any user who
   authenticates to it (`Rubeus monitor`), and coerce a DC to authenticate (below) to grab the DC's
   TGT → DCSync.
3. **Constrained (S4U)** — with an account that has `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo <spn>`:
   `getST.py -spn <spn> -impersonate Administrator '<domain>/<svc>:<pass>'` (or `Rubeus s4u`).
   `altservice`/SPN-substitution lets one allowed SPN pivot to others on the same host.
4. **RBCD (the write-driven path)** — when you control a computer account and can write the target's
   `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity`:
   - Set it: `rbcd.py -delegate-to <TARGET$> -delegate-from <YOURMACHINE$> -action write ...`
   - Impersonate: `getST.py -spn cifs/<target> -impersonate Administrator '<domain>/<YOURMACHINE$>:<pass>'`
   - Use the ticket (`KRB5CCNAME=...`) with `psexec.py -k -no-pass`, `secretsdump.py -k`, etc.
5. **Coercion → relay → RBCD (no creds needed to start)** — coerce a target/DC to authenticate to
   you (`PetitPotam.py`, `coercer`), relay that NTLM to LDAP(S) and grant yourself RBCD:
   `ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://<dc> --delegate-access`, then S4U as above. (See `network-ntlm-relay`.)

## Gotchas
- **`altservice` only works within the same host's SPNs** — you can swap `cifs`→`host`→`http` on the
  target, not jump machines.
- **`ProtectedUsers` / "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated"** blocks impersonating that
  principal — pick another admin, or a computer account.
- **Clock skew** breaks every Kerberos step — sync to the DC (`ntpdate`/`faketime`) first.
- **RC4 disabled / AES-only** domains need AES keys in your tooling flags; RC4 tickets get rejected.
- **RBCD needs write on the *target* computer**, and creating a fake computer needs
  `ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota > 0` (or use a machine account you already own).

## Verify success
A service ticket as a privileged user to the target service, used to run a command / dump secrets
(`secretsdump.py -k`) you could not before — e.g. local admin on the target or DCSync from a
coerced DC.

## References
Elad Shamir "Wagging the Dog" (RBCD); Impacket `getST.py`/`rbcd.py`/`ntlmrelayx.py`; Rubeus S4U docs;
MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003. Coercion+relay mechanics: `network-ntlm-relay`.

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Review before install: Avoid automatic install

License: MIT

Permission surface may require sandboxing
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This skill may touch real-money trading, broker, wallet, or exchange operations; use only in a sandbox with explicit approval.
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Permission surface needs review: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution
GitHub adoption: 20 GitHub stars
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Source repository: NoorQureshi/SploitAgent
License: MIT
Version: Unknown
Last GitHub push: Oct 2, 2026
Registry updated: Oct 2, 2026
Instruction path: skills/ad/ad-delegation-abuse/SKILL.md @ 7d434b222c0b

Version reported in registry metadata; check source releases before relying on it.

Quality

54/100

Needs review

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59/100

Do not auto-install

Audit

72/100

Risky

Open full audit View eval report

Permission surface may require sandboxing
Potential broker, wallet, exchange, or real-money execution surface; sandbox and explicit approval are required
Low GitHub adoption signal
AI review approval is missing
This skill may touch real-money trading, broker, wallet, or exchange operations; use only in a sandbox with explicit approval.
Quality score needs review
Permission surface needs review: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution
GitHub adoption: 20 GitHub stars
Stars/forks activity: 20 stars, 7 forks; issue activity unavailable in current metadata
Permission surface: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution
Review status: AI review approval is missing

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      "risk_blocked": 0,
      "setup_required": 0,
      "avg_output_quality": null,
      "production_outcomes": 0,
      "last_outcome_at": null,
      "label": "No agent outcome data yet"
    },
    "auto_install": {
      "allowed": false,
      "sandbox_required": true,
      "reason": "Do not auto-install. Inspect the source, dependencies, and permission surface first."
    },
    "best_for": [
      "other",
      "agent-skill"
    ],
    "known_risks": [
      "AI review approval is missing",
      "This skill may touch real-money trading, broker, wallet, or exchange operations; use only in a sandbox with explicit approval.",
      "Low GitHub adoption signal",
      "Quality score needs review",
      "Permission surface needs review: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution",
      "GitHub adoption: 20 GitHub stars",
      "Stars/forks activity: 20 stars, 7 forks; issue activity unavailable in current metadata",
      "Permission surface: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution"
    ]
  },
  "agent_proven": {
    "version": "agent-proven-v1",
    "score": 0,
    "tier": "unproven",
    "label": "Needs first agent run",
    "summary": "No agent outcome reports yet. Use Resolve, run one narrow sandbox task, then report the result.",
    "metrics": {
      "totalOutcomes": 0,
      "successfulOutcomes": 0,
      "failedOutcomes": 0,
      "installAttempts": 0,
      "installSuccessRate": null,
      "successRate": null,
      "recentSuccessRate": null,
      "recentFailureRate": null,
      "riskBlocked": 0,
      "setupRequired": 0,
      "notRelevant": 0,
      "avgOutputQuality": null,
      "avgTimeToUsefulMs": null,
      "productionOutcomes": 0,
      "humanReviewRequired": 0,
      "uniqueAgents": 0,
      "lastOutcomeAt": null
    },
    "signals": [],
    "penalties": [
      "No real agent outcome evidence yet"
    ]
  },
  "audit": {
    "score": 72,
    "risk_level": "risky",
    "risk_label": "Risky",
    "warnings": [
      "Permission surface may require sandboxing",
      "Potential broker, wallet, exchange, or real-money execution surface; sandbox and explicit approval are required",
      "Low GitHub adoption signal",
      "AI review approval is missing",
      "This skill may touch real-money trading, broker, wallet, or exchange operations; use only in a sandbox with explicit approval.",
      "Quality score needs review",
      "Permission surface needs review: secrets or environment access, shell or command execution",
      "GitHub adoption: 20 GitHub stars"
    ]
  },
  "safety_gate": {
    "tier": "blocked",
    "label": "Blocked for auto-install",
    "auto_install_policy": "block",
    "auto_install_allowed": false,
    "human_review_required": true,
    "blocked": true,
    "recommended_action": "Do not auto-install. Inspect the source, dependencies, and permission surface first."
  },
  "quality": {
    "score": 54,
    "label": "Needs review"
  },
  "supply": {
    "track": "Coding and developer agents",
    "scenario": "Coding",
    "maintenance": "1d since push",
    "risk": "Risky"
  },
  "alternative_skills": [],
  "do_not_use_when": [
    "teams that need a vendor-supported SLA",
    "production agents without a repository review",
    "Low GitHub adoption signal",
    "No OpenAgentSkill engagement data yet",
    "Audit risk risky exceeds max_risk=medium",
    "High-risk permission hints: Shell or command execution, Secrets or environment access",
    "Permission surface may require sandboxing",
    "Potential broker, wallet, exchange, or real-money execution surface; sandbox and explicit approval are required"
  ],
  "agent_contract": {
    "task_input": "Use ad-delegation-abuse in an agent workflow",
    "recommended_action": "Do not auto-install. Inspect the source, dependencies, and permission surface first.",
    "install_policy": "block",
    "minimum_review_before_use": [
      "Trust: 67/100 Manual review",
      "Audit: 72/100 Risky",
      "Safety: 36/100 Avoid automatic install",
      "Review repository, license, install command, and permission surface before production use."
    ],
    "expected_agent_output": {
      "selected_skill": "noorqureshi-ad-delegation-abuse (ad-delegation-abuse)",
      "install_command": "npx skills add NoorQureshi/SploitAgent --skill ad-delegation-abuse",
      "risk_summary": "Risky; Blocked for auto-install; Review before production",
      "verification_result": "Report the smallest successful task, files touched, warnings, and any missing setup."
    }
  },
  "outcome_feedback": {
    "endpoint": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/outcome",
    "method": "POST",
    "requires_resolve_event_id": true,
    "event_id_source": "Use install_receipt.outcome_feedback.event_id or feedback.event_id returned by /api/agent/resolve for the current task.",
    "expected_outcomes": [
      "success",
      "failed",
      "not_relevant",
      "blocked_by_risk",
      "setup_required"
    ],
    "payload_template": {
      "event_id": "<install_receipt.outcome_feedback.event_id or feedback.event_id from /api/agent/resolve>",
      "skill_slug": "noorqureshi-ad-delegation-abuse",
      "task": "Use ad-delegation-abuse in an agent workflow",
      "agent": "codex",
      "outcome": "success",
      "install_used": true,
      "risk_blocked": false,
      "setup_required": false,
      "task_success": true,
      "output_quality": 4,
      "error_type": null,
      "human_review_required": false,
      "workspace": "sandbox",
      "time_to_useful_ms": 120000,
      "notes": "Report the smallest successful task, setup friction, files touched, and risk notes."
    }
  },
  "endpoints": {
    "web": "https://www.openagentskill.com/skills/noorqureshi-ad-delegation-abuse",
    "api": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/skills/noorqureshi-ad-delegation-abuse",
    "audit": "https://www.openagentskill.com/skills/noorqureshi-ad-delegation-abuse/audit",
    "eval": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/evals?slug=noorqureshi-ad-delegation-abuse&task=Use%20ad-delegation-abuse%20in%20an%20agent%20workflow&max_risk=medium",
    "resolve": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/resolve?task=Use%20ad-delegation-abuse%20in%20an%20agent%20workflow&agent=codex&max_risk=medium",
    "receipt": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/agent/receipt?task=Use%20ad-delegation-abuse%20in%20an%20agent%20workflow&agent=codex&max_risk=medium&format=text",
    "install": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/skills/noorqureshi-ad-delegation-abuse/install",
    "manifest": "https://www.openagentskill.com/api/registry/manifest/noorqureshi-ad-delegation-abuse"
  }
}

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Creator: NoorQureshi
Source: NoorQureshi/SploitAgent
Indexed by: OpenAgentSkill community index

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Overview

Kerberos delegation abuse

When it applies

Why it works

Method

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Overview

Kerberos delegation abuse

When it applies

Why it works

Method

Gotchas

Verify success

References

Review the source

Price & running costs

Start with one small task

Source & usage notes

Agent access

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