fortify-exploitability-analysis
Triage whether a known CVE/GHSA vulnerability is actually exploitable in this project. Use when the user wants a reachability verdict on a specific advisory — is the project really affected, or is the advisory noise? Analysis only; for fixes, hand off to fortify-dependency-upgrade.
fortify · Static checks on file
Installation
Read the source and dependencies before running a command. Copying does not install or execute anything.
npx skills add fortify/skills --skill fortify-exploitability-analysisAbout this skill
name: fortify-exploitability-analysis description: >- Triage whether a known CVE/GHSA vulnerability is actually exploitable in this project. Use when the user wants a reachability verdict on a specific advisory — is the project really affected, or is the advisory noise? Analysis only; for fixes, hand off to fortify-dependency-upgrade. license: MIT metadata: version: "1.0.1"
Fortify CVE Exploitability Analysis
Purpose. Decide whether a CVE in a dependency is exploitable in this project. The answer is rarely "the lib is in our tree, therefore we are vulnerable." It depends on which APIs of the vulnerable library are actually reached, with what input, under what configuration. This skill walks through that analysis methodically and writes the result to
IMPACT_CVE_<id>.md.Out of scope. This skill does not fix the vulnerability. After it produces a verdict, hand off to
fortify-dependency-upgrade(or apply an upgrade manually) if the verdict isaffected.Requires shell execution. The skill assumes shell access to run package-manager commands (
mvn,npm,pip,go, etc.) and to grep the codebase. Without execution capability (read-only context, sandboxed evaluation, web-only session) the analysis degrades to lockfile / SBOM / manifest reading and most reachability questions resolve tounder_investigation— say so in Method → Limitations and pause for an environment that has execution.
The analysis runs in six steps. Do not skip the gates.
Step 0: Establish context
Collect the inputs you need before doing anything else.
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CVE identifier(s). Normalize to the canonical form
CVE-YYYY-NNNNN(orGHSA-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx). If the user gave a free-text description, ask them to confirm the ID — exploit conditions vary across CVEs in the same library and the report file name depends on it. -
Project root. Confirm the working directory contains the project to analyze. Skim the top-level for manifest files.
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Ecosystem. Detect from manifests at the project root, and load the matching reference file when running Steps 2 and 4 — one file per ecosystem, not the whole catalogue. Files in
references/prefixedeco-are per-ecosystem references; load exactly one:pom.xml→ Maven →references/eco-maven.mdbuild.gradle[.kts]→ Gradle (Java / Kotlin) →references/eco-gradle.mdbuild.sbt→ Scala (SBT) →references/eco-scala.mdWORKSPACE/MODULE.bazel/BUILD.bazel→ Bazel (cross-language: Java / Go / C/C++ / Python) →references/eco-bazel.mdpackage.json/bower.json→ JavaScript (npm / yarn / pnpm / Bower) →references/eco-npm.mdrequirements.txt/pyproject.toml/Pipfile/uv.lock→ Python (pip / Poetry / Pipenv / uv) →references/eco-python.mdgo.mod/Gopkg.lock→ Go (Modules / legacy dep) →references/eco-go.mdCargo.toml→ Rust →references/eco-rust.md*.csproj/packages.config/paket.dependencies→ .NET (NuGet / Paket) →references/eco-dotnet.mdcomposer.json→ PHP →references/eco-php.mdGemfile→ Ruby →references/eco-ruby.mdPodfile/Package.swift/Cartfile→ iOS / macOS (CocoaPods / SPM / Carthage) →references/eco-ios-macos.mdConfig.in+package/+configs/*_defconfig(Buildroot) /oe-init-build-env+meta*/conf/layer.conf(Yocto / OpenEmbedded;conf/bblayers.confappears post-init) /feeds.conf*+scripts/feeds(OpenWrt) → meta-build for embedded Linux →references/eco-buildroot.md.conanfile.txt/conanfile.py/vcpkg.json/CMakeLists.txt/configure.ac/Makefile→ C/C++ →references/eco-cpp.mdbom.json/bom.xml→ CycloneDX SBOM (input format; can substitute for live package-manager invocation) →references/cyclonedx-sbom.md
⚠ Ordering note. Detect the meta-build row before the C/C++ row. Buildroot and OpenWrt trees carry a top-level
Makefile(withBR2_*/ OpenWrt-specific variables) that would otherwise route toeco-cpp.md, missing the meta-build entirely; Yocto has no rootMakefilebut is still better analyzed at the meta-build level than via any C/C++ source it happens to contain.A monorepo can have several. Ask the user which subproject(s) to analyze.
No manifest detected? If the project has binary artifacts checked in (
lib/*.jar,WEB-INF/lib/,vendor/,third_party/, prebuilt*.dll/*.so/*.a/*.framework), or if the input is a built artifact handed over without source (firmware image, squashfs / cpio rootfs, Docker image,.deb/.rpm/.ipa/.apk), the analysis still works — loadreferences/non-manifest-projects.mdfor version-identification, image-extraction, and path-reconstruction techniques. -
Package manager available? Run a non-destructive version probe (
mvn -v,npm -v,pip --version,go version,cargo --version,bitbake --version,make --version, etc.). The skill needs the package manager (or, for meta-builds, the meta-build's own enumeration command) to enumerate transitive paths in Step 4. If it isn't installed, fall back in this order: (a) the project's lockfile if one exists (still authoritative — the relevant ecosystem reference file names it); (b) a CycloneDX SBOM if one is present in the repo (references/cyclonedx-sbom.md); (c) the bundled-binary / image workflow inreferences/non-manifest-projects.md. Record the fallback used in the report's Method → Limitations. -
Output paths. Step 6 produces two artifacts: a human-readable Markdown report and a machine-readable CycloneDX VEX JSON. Default location is a
vex/subdirectory at the project root — friendlier than scatteringIMPACT_*files in the root once a project accumulates a backlog of triaged CVEs, and a natural directory for downstream fcli / Dependency-Track / GitLab tooling to consume in bulk. Take the CVE/GHSA ID, replace-wit