hunt-fintech-graphql
Hunt fintech-specific GraphQL vulnerabilities: money-movement mutations (transfers, redemptions, withdrawals, card top-ups), ledger/balance/portfolio query IDOR, decimal-precision and rounding abuse, idempotency-key bypass enabling double-spend, KYC/PII field-level authorization gaps, and admin-override mutations reachable via mass assignment. Distinct from hunt-graphql, which owns generic GraphQL discovery and IDOR/mutation methodology — this skill owns the delta introduced when a GraphQL layer sits in front of a ledger, wallet, payments, banking, brokerage, or lending backend, where a resolver bug moves real money instead of just leaking data. Use when hunting a fintech, banking, payments, wallet, neobank, brokerage, or lending target that exposes a GraphQL API, or when a schema/response includes balance, transfer, ledger, redeem, quote, KYC, or account-linking fields.
elementalsouls · Static checks on file
Installation
Read the source and dependencies before running a command. Copying does not install or execute anything.
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-fintech-graphqlAbout this skill
name: hunt-fintech-graphql description: "Hunt fintech-specific GraphQL vulnerabilities: money-movement mutations (transfers, redemptions, withdrawals, card top-ups), ledger/balance/portfolio query IDOR, decimal-precision and rounding abuse, idempotency-key bypass enabling double-spend, KYC/PII field-level authorization gaps, and admin-override mutations reachable via mass assignment. Distinct from hunt-graphql, which owns generic GraphQL discovery and IDOR/mutation methodology — this skill owns the delta introduced when a GraphQL layer sits in front of a ledger, wallet, payments, banking, brokerage, or lending backend, where a resolver bug moves real money instead of just leaking data. Use when hunting a fintech, banking, payments, wallet, neobank, brokerage, or lending target that exposes a GraphQL API, or when a schema/response includes balance, transfer, ledger, redeem, quote, KYC, or account-linking fields." sources: owasp_api_top10_2023, public_research report_count: 0
Why Fintech GraphQL Is a Different Risk Class
Generic GraphQL bugs (IDOR, mass assignment, introspection, batching abuse — see hunt-graphql)
still apply here, but the blast radius changes completely: a resolver bug in a SaaS app leaks
data, the same class of bug in a ledger mutation moves money. Three properties make fintech
GraphQL backends a distinct hunting surface:
- Money-movement mutations are almost always resolvers over a double-entry ledger. A single
GraphQL mutation (
transferFunds,redeemRewards,withdrawToBank) can trigger multiple ledger writes (debit + credit + fee) that must be atomic. GraphQL's flexible input shape and alias batching make it easy to desynchronize those writes. - Decimals are attacker-controlled input, not display formatting. Amounts, exchange rates,
interest, and rewards points are usually passed as GraphQL scalars (
Float,String, customDecimal/Moneyscalar). How the resolver parses and rounds that value is exploitable surface in its own right — this barely exists in non-financial GraphQL APIs. - KYC/PII fields sit next to routine account fields in the same type.
UserorAccounttypes commonly exposessnLast4,routingNumber,kycStatus,governmentIdUrl, orlinkedBankAccountalongsidedisplayNameandemail— one missing field-level authorization check on a type used everywhere in the schema fans out to every query that touches it.
Attack Surface Signals
URL / schema naming patterns (in addition to hunt-graphql's generic /graphql list):
/graphql/ledger
/graphql/payments
/api/wallet/graphql
/internal/ledger-graphql
/banking/graphql
Field/type names worth grepping schema introspection or JS bundles for:
balance, availableBalance, pendingBalance, ledgerEntry, ledgerEntries
transferFunds, withdraw, redeem, topUp, reverseTransaction, adjustBalance
kycStatus, ssnLast4, routingNumber, accountNumber, governmentIdUrl
quoteExchangeRate, interestAccrued, rewardsPoints, portfolioValue
idempotencyKey, clientMutationId
Tech-stack tells specific to this vertical:
- Plaid/Stripe/Dwolla/Marqeta wrapped behind an internal GraphQL gateway (
bankLink,plaidLinkTokenmutations) - Apollo Federation with a dedicated
ledgerorpaymentssubgraph — check for the subgraph's own introspection being reachable directly, bypassing the gateway's stitched-down schema - Custom
Money/Decimal/BigDecimalGraphQL scalar in the schema (scalar Money) — the parser for this scalar is worth fuzzing directly
Run hunt-graphql's discovery + introspection methodology first to get the schema; everything
below assumes you already have (or have partially enumerated) a schema with money-movement types.
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
-
Map every mutation that touches balance, whether directly or as a side effect. Not just
transfer*/withdraw*— alsoredeemRewards,applyCoupon,upgradeTier,closeAccount(often refunds a balance),disputeTransaction(often provisionally credits). -
For each money-movement mutation, identify the ledger write shape. Does one mutation call produce one ledger entry or several (debit sender, credit receiver, fee entry)? Multi-entry writes are the ones worth racing — see Stage 4.
-
Test idempotency-key handling. Send the identical mutation (same
idempotencyKey/clientMutationId) twice, back-to-back and with a delay. A ledger write on the second call means idempotency isn't enforced server-side — replay = double-execute. -
Test decimal/precision edge cases on every amount-accepting argument — see Payload section. Confirm server-side rounding matches client-displayed rounding; a mismatch is directly monetizable.
-
Probe cross-account IDOR on account/portfolio node IDs, same as
hunt-idor/hunt-graphql, but specifically test whether atransferFunds-style mutation validates that the source account belongs to the authenticated caller — not just that some account with that ID exists. This is the fintech-specific IDOR: authz on the source of a debit is easy to forget when authz on the destination of a credit was correctly implemented (crediting an arbitrary account "looks safe" to a developer; debiting one clearly isn't, so it gets checked — but sometimes only one direction does). -
Check field-level authorization on KYC/PII fields by querying the shared
User/Accounttype from every context that returns it — not just the profile screen. Atransactiontype that embedscounterparty { ssnLast4 }is a common place for the check to be missing, because the developer authorized the top-leveltransactionquery but didn't re-check field access on the nestedcounterparty. -
Look for admin-tier mutations reachable via mass assignment, not just a missing auth check — e.g. an input object with a client-settable
statusoroverridefield t