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Security

network-security-audit

Audit network device security: local hardening and perimeter.

Dandi Suryadi, Hermes Agent · Static checks on file

Installation

Read the source and dependencies before running a command. Copying does not install or execute anything.

npx skills add Dandi41/ntnroute --skill network-security-audit

About this skill


name: network-security-audit description: "Audit network device security: local hardening and perimeter." version: 1.1.0 author: Dandi Suryadi, Hermes Agent license: MIT metadata: hermes: tags: [network, security, audit, cve, hardening, perimeter, compliance] related_skills: [ntnroute, network-device-cli, network-change-management, network-troubleshooting]

Network Security Audit

Security audit of a network device in two directions at once: local (is the device itself hardened) and perimeter (what can reach it from outside). Read-only for the entire run; remediation is a separate skill with its own approval gate.

This is a guided procedure, not a bundled parser. Vendors differ in syntax, output shape, and even in which controls exist — so the skill supplies the order of thinking and a control catalog, and you supply the platform-specific commands, verified against official documentation.

Core rules

  1. Audit only when the user asks. Never run one proactively — not "while we're at it", not "to be thorough". Triggers: an explicit audit request, a security check, or an incident that needs a security assessment.
  2. Read-only, start to finish. Every audit command is show / print / display / get. No set, configure, no, undo, write, save, commit. If your evidence gathering would change state, it is the wrong command.
  3. Report, never authorize or veto. The audit produces evidence, severity, and remediation advice. It never blocks, permits, delays, or decides a change the user asked for — including one that removes DHCP clients, firewall rules, services, routes, or accounts. The user decides; the change workflow handles consent, rollback, and verification.
  4. Evidence, not opinion. Every finding carries verbatim command output plus, for CVEs, an official link. No output → not checked. No link → not yet verified.
  5. Both directions. Local hardening and perimeter exposure. The perimeter is usually the more fatal side, and the combination findings ("telnet on, and reachable from the WAN") are the ones that get exploited.
  6. CVEs from research, not memory. Version comes from the device, CVEs come from the vendor PSIRT then NVD, and relevance comes from the features you actually found enabled.
  7. Unknown is not safe. An unreachable device or an unverifiable control is unknown / not checked. Never pass. Never "secure".

When to Use

  • "Audit the security of the lab RouterOS device", "check our network security", "is this device secure?"
  • Before a device enters production (initial audit)
  • After an incident: audit plus network-troubleshooting for forensics
  • Fleet review, when the user names a set of devices

Not for: changing config (→ network-change-management), diagnosing outages (→ network-troubleshooting), adding devices (→ ntnroute).

Procedure

The full step-by-step is references/audit-playbook.md — seven phases, each with its exit condition and per-platform command blocks. Read it before starting; the summary here is the shape, not the detail.

Phase 0 — Scope

One short question to the user: which devices, local or perimeter or both, and whether an active outside-in test is permitted. Record it. Don't assume.

Phase 1 — Identity and reachability

Confirm the device answers, then pin down exact vendor, model, OS train, version, and build. No device-specific phase proceeds on a guess about the platform. Version ≠ patch level.

Phase 2 — Management plane

Services, protocols, accounts, session policy. This phase comes early because exposed management is the most common real compromise path.

Phase 3 — Perimeter and forwarding

Zones first, then filters in rule order. Read reachability of what you found enabled in Phase 2. Counters tell you what the policy is doing; the config tells you what it claims.

Phase 4 — Control plane

SSH/SNMP versions, logging, NTP, routing authentication, L2 protections where the role needs them, IPv6 handled deliberately.

Phase 5 — Change trail and drift

NTN_INTERNAL=1 ntn audit pending    # no verdict at all → state UNKNOWN
NTN_INTERNAL=1 ntn audit failed
NTN_INTERNAL=1 ntn audit config 50  # device timeline

Out-of-band changes and unsettled applies are findings in their own right. Vocabulary and recovery: network-troubleshooting → references/audit-trail.md.

Phase 6 — Version, lifecycle, CVE

Follow references/threat-research.md: lifecycle status → vendor PSIRT → NVD cross-check → feature applicability → record with URL and research date.

Phase 7 — Report

templates/audit-report-template.md. Fill Not checked and Limitations honestly; they are what make the report credible. Then stop — no remediation, no suggested audit cadence.

Multi-device runs

Repeat Phases 1–6 per device, one evidence file each, aggregate at the end.

  • Never aggregate across an unknown: a fleet is not clean if one member was unreachable or one check went unverified.
  • Same finding on many devices → one entry with the device list, plus whether the cause is shared (same image, same template, same operator habit).

Division of labor across networking skills

SkillRole
ntnrouteinventory, transport, ntn config/rollback
network-device-clihow to SSH to devices directly (outside ntn)
network-troubleshootingoutage diagnosis, OSI layers, hypothesis tests
network-change-managementchange approval, rollback generation
network-security-audit (this)security findings, control catalog, CVE research, report

Complementary flow: the audit finds → the user approves remediation → network-change-management plans, gets approval, applies → network-troubleshooting verifies nothing broke.

Pitfalls

  • CVE without applicability evidence. Match product, model, build, affected-version range, and the enable
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