android-crypto-keystore
Audit Android cryptography and AndroidKeyStore usage — weak algorithms (DES/RC4/ECB/MD5/SHA1), hardcoded/static keys and IVs, insecure Random, missing authenticated encryption, and keystore misuse (no auth-binding, no hardware backing). Tier 1. Use when the app does local crypto. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-CRYPTO.
AnandJogawade · Static checks on file
Installation
Read the source and dependencies before running a command. Copying does not install or execute anything.
npx skills add AnandJogawade/Zazy-Pentest-Plugin-for-Claude --skill android-crypto-keystoreAbout this skill
name: android-crypto-keystore description: Audit Android cryptography and AndroidKeyStore usage — weak algorithms (DES/RC4/ECB/MD5/SHA1), hardcoded/static keys and IVs, insecure Random, missing authenticated encryption, and keystore misuse (no auth-binding, no hardware backing). Tier 1. Use when the app does local crypto. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-CRYPTO.
Android Cryptography & Keystore Review
Find broken crypto and keystore misuse that make "encrypted" data decryptable or forgeable.
Trigger phrases
weak crypto, ecb, des, rc4, md5, hardcoded key, static iv, insecure random, securerandom, androidkeystore, keystore misuse, setuserauthenticationrequired
Method
- Static grep of decompiled code:
Flag:grep -rniE "DES|RC4|ECB|MD5|SHA1|Cipher.getInstance|IvParameterSpec|SecretKeySpec|SecureRandom|Random\(" app_java/Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/..."), DES/3DES/RC4, MD5/SHA1 for integrity, hardcoded keys/IVs, staticIvParameterSpec,java.util.Randomfor secrets. - Runtime crypto trace (recover keys/IVs/plaintext):
frida -U -f <package> -l tracer-cipher.js --no-pause— hookCipher/SecretKeySpec/IvParameterSpecto dump key material and plaintext at runtime (seeandroid-frida-objection-instrumentation).
- Keystore review:
- Are keys generated in
AndroidKeyStorevs stored in prefs/files/code? setUserAuthenticationRequired(true)for sensitive keys?setInvalidatedByBiometricEnrollment(true)? StrongBox/hardware backing?- Hook keystore APIs with Frida to see whether key material is derivable/exportable in app memory.
- Are keys generated in
Modern / rare techniques
- [RARE] Auth-bound key not actually used: a keystore key marked auth-required but the operation never uses it to decrypt real data → ties to
android-biometric-bypass(the biometric gate is cosmetic). - Static/predictable IV with CBC → identical plaintext leaks / chosen-ciphertext issues; missing GCM/HMAC → malleable ciphertext.
- Key derived in-app for EncryptedSharedPreferences/SQLCipher → recover it at runtime and decrypt the store (chain
android-insecure-storage).
Bypass / evasion
When keys live only in memory at use-time, dump them with a Frida Cipher hook or fridump rather than relying on static recovery.
Escalation / chaining
Decryptable at-rest data, forgeable tokens, broken integrity → feeds android-insecure-storage (decrypt the store) and android-biometric-bypass (unused auth-bound key); recovered keys may unlock backend data.
Backend & tooling
Preferred Kali path (native Kali / WSL+Kali / Kali-SSH / Kali-MCP / HexStrike). Needs the user's device/emulator (frida-server) + Kali tooling (jadx/Frida). Windows-local last resort. See zazy-orchestrator.
Verification (background, before reporting)
Confirm the weakness is exploitable, not merely present — recover a key/IV and actually decrypt data, or show the auth-bound key is bypassable — before marking CONFIRMED. A weak-algorithm string alone is a lower-confidence finding; prove impact where feasible.
Evidence
The crypto call site / keystore config, the recovered key/IV (redacted) or decrypted data, and impact. Remediation: AES-GCM (or AES-CBC+HMAC); random per-message IV; keys in hardware-backed AndroidKeyStore, auth-bound and invalidated on new biometric enrollment; SecureRandom for all secrets.