android-biometric-bypass
Bypass Android biometric authentication — determine whether BiometricPrompt uses a keystore-bound CryptoObject or is event-only, then hook onAuthenticationSucceeded (event-only) or abuse insecure CryptoObject handling with Frida. Tier 1. Use when the app gates data/features on fingerprint/face. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-AUTH.
AnandJogawade · Static checks on file
Installation
Read the source and dependencies before running a command. Copying does not install or execute anything.
npx skills add AnandJogawade/Zazy-Pentest-Plugin-for-Claude --skill android-biometric-bypassAbout this skill
name: android-biometric-bypass description: Bypass Android biometric authentication — determine whether BiometricPrompt uses a keystore-bound CryptoObject or is event-only, then hook onAuthenticationSucceeded (event-only) or abuse insecure CryptoObject handling with Frida. Tier 1. Use when the app gates data/features on fingerprint/face. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-AUTH.
Android Biometric Authentication Bypass
Local biometric auth is only as strong as its keystore binding. If no CryptoObject gates real data, the prompt is cosmetic.
Trigger phrases
biometric bypass, fingerprint bypass, biometricprompt, cryptoobject, onauthenticationsucceeded, face unlock bypass, local auth bypass
Method
- Classify the implementation (jadx) — does
BiometricPrompt.authenticate()pass aCryptoObjecttied to an AndroidKeyStore key, and is that key actually used to decrypt/sign real data? - Event-only auth (no CryptoObject) → force success:
frida -U -f <package> --no-pause -l fingerprint-bypass.js(hookonAuthenticationSucceeded, invoke the success callback).
- Insecure CryptoObject (present but unused for real data) → exception-handling bypass:
frida -U -f <package> --no-pause -l fingerprint-bypass-via-exception-handling.js- then in the Frida console:
bypass()(calls success with an unauthenticated CryptoObject, catches the cipher exception).
- CodeShare ready-made:
frida --codeshare krapgras/android-biometric-bypass-update-android-11 -U -f <package> - Secure design check: if a keystore key (auth-required) actually decrypts the protected data, the bypass fails → that is the correct, secure pattern; report it as such.
Modern / rare techniques
- [NEW/RARE] CryptoObject-vs-event distinction is the whole game — only event-only or unused-CryptoObject designs are bypassable; document which one you found.
- Chain with
android-root-antidebug-bypassif the app detects Frida before the prompt, andandroid-crypto-keystoreto show the auth-bound key is never used.
Bypass / evasion
Spawn-gate (-f ... --no-pause) so the hook is in place before the prompt is shown; if Frida is detected, apply anti-detection hooks first.
Escalation / chaining
Local auth bypass → access to "biometric-protected" data/features; combine with android-insecure-storage/android-crypto-keystore to show the gated data was recoverable anyway. Depends on android-frida-objection-instrumentation.
Backend & tooling
Preferred Kali path (native Kali / WSL+Kali / Kali-SSH / Kali-MCP / HexStrike). Needs the user's device/emulator with biometrics enrolled (frida-server) + Frida/objection. Windows-local last resort. See zazy-orchestrator.
Verification (background, before reporting)
Confirm the protected flow unlocks after the hook despite no valid biometric, and reproduce it; ensure the "protected" data is genuinely reached (not a UI-only transition) before marking CONFIRMED.
Evidence
The implementation type (event-only / unused CryptoObject / secure), the Frida script, and the protected flow unlocking without biometric. Remediation: bind a keystore key (auth-required) to the operation and actually use it to decrypt/sign; setInvalidatedByBiometricEnrollment(true); server-side verification.