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Security

android-backup-extraction

Extract app data from a non-rooted device via ADB backup when allowBackup is not disabled — unpack the .ab with android-backup-extractor and inspect shared_prefs/databases/files for secrets. Tier 1. Use when the manifest leaves allowBackup enabled. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-STORAGE.

AnandJogawade · Static checks on file

Installation

Read the source and dependencies before running a command. Copying does not install or execute anything.

npx skills add AnandJogawade/Zazy-Pentest-Plugin-for-Claude --skill android-backup-extraction

About this skill


name: android-backup-extraction description: Extract app data from a non-rooted device via ADB backup when allowBackup is not disabled — unpack the .ab with android-backup-extractor and inspect shared_prefs/databases/files for secrets. Tier 1. Use when the manifest leaves allowBackup enabled. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-STORAGE.

Android Backup Extraction

If allowBackup is not explicitly false, pull the app's data off a stock device and mine it offline — no root required.

Trigger phrases

adb backup, allowbackup, backup extraction, android-backup-extractor, abe.jar, .ab file, backup.tar, offline data disclosure

Method

  1. Confirm backups are allowed — aapt dump badging app.apk / manifest shows allowBackup absent or "true" (see android-manifest-analysis).
  2. Exercise the app (login, store data) so there is sensitive state to back up.
  3. Take the backup:
    • adb backup -f backup.ab -noapk <package> (confirm the on-device prompt; leave backup password blank for easiest unpack).
  4. Unpack:
    • java -jar abe.jar unpack backup.ab backup.tar
    • tar xvf backup.tar
  5. Inspect the extracted apps/<package>/ tree — sp/ (shared_prefs), db/ (databases), f/ (files) — for plaintext credentials/tokens/PII (grep, sqlite3, strings).

Modern / rare techniques

  • Password-protected backups: if a backup password is set, abe.jar unpack prompts for it; crack weak ones offline or supply a known password.
  • fullBackupContent / dataExtractionRules gaps: even with rules, developers often forget to exclude a prefs file or DB holding tokens — diff what was excluded vs what holds secrets.
  • Auto Backup to cloud: targetSdk 23+ default cloud backup can expose the same data to the user's Google account; note it as an additional exposure path.

Escalation / chaining

Extracted tokens/session → account takeover via android-backend-api-testing; same data set as android-insecure-storage but obtained without root — use whichever path the engagement allows.

Backend & tooling

Preferred Kali path (native Kali / WSL+Kali / Kali-SSH / Kali-MCP / HexStrike). Needs the user's device/emulator (adb, physical confirm of the backup prompt) + Kali tooling (abe.jar/tar/sqlite3). Windows-local last resort. See zazy-orchestrator.

Verification (background, before reporting)

Confirm the backup is non-empty and actually contains sensitive data (open the file, verify the token is live) before reporting. Reproduce the unpack at least once independently.

Evidence

The allowBackup setting, the non-empty .ab/.tar, and the extracted sensitive file/value (redacted) with proof of sensitivity. Remediation: allowBackup=false; fullBackupContent/dataExtractionRules exclusions; encrypt sensitive data at rest.