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Security

android-apk-signing-integrity-janus

Test APK signing schemes and the Janus vulnerability (CVE-2017-13156) — detect v1-only signing, confirm minSdk allows install on Android 5.0–8.0, and prepend DEX without breaking the v1 signature to inject code into a signed app. Tier 2. Use to assess integrity/update-hijack risk. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-RESILIENCE (MASTG-TEST-0224).

AnandJogawade · Static checks on file

Installation

Read the source and dependencies before running a command. Copying does not install or execute anything.

npx skills add AnandJogawade/Zazy-Pentest-Plugin-for-Claude --skill android-apk-signing-integrity-janus

About this skill


name: android-apk-signing-integrity-janus description: Test APK signing schemes and the Janus vulnerability (CVE-2017-13156) — detect v1-only signing, confirm minSdk allows install on Android 5.0–8.0, and prepend DEX without breaking the v1 signature to inject code into a signed app. Tier 2. Use to assess integrity/update-hijack risk. Aligns to OWASP MASTG MASVS-RESILIENCE (MASTG-TEST-0224).

APK Signing & Integrity — Janus (CVE-2017-13156)

v1-signature-only APKs on old Android let an attacker prepend a DEX and keep the signature valid — code injection into a "signed" app and update hijack.

Trigger phrases

janus, cve-2017-13156, apk signing scheme, v1 signature, apksigner verify, dex prepend, apk integrity, update hijack

Execution gate (Tier 2 — modifies and installs a patched APK)

  1. Ask: "Lab/authorized to exploit on a test device?" → if yes, run the full Janus PoC on an in-scope Android 5.0–8.0 device. Record the answer in ./.zazy/scope.md.
  2. If no: "Run a dry scan (detection only)?" → if yes, do only the signing-scheme + minSdk checks below; do NOT build or install a patched APK.

Method

  1. Detection (always safe):
    • apksigner verify --verbose app.apk — shows which schemes verify. v1 verified, no v2/v3 = candidate.
    • apktool -s d app.apk && grep minSdk app/apktool.yml — confirm minSdkVersion allows install on a vulnerable OS (Android 5.0–8.0, unpatched).
    • Check for runtime signature/integrity enforcement in code (absence raises severity).
  2. Janus PoC (gated — authorized test devices only):
    apktool -s d source.apk && mv source/classes.dex ./classes.dex
    python janus.py classes.dex target.apk patched.apk
    adb install -r patched.apk      # installs/updates over the original
    

Modern / rare techniques

  • [NEW/RARE] v1-only on modern minSdk: some apps still ship v1-only; even where Janus install fails on patched OS, lack of v2/v3 + no runtime integrity is a finding.
  • Update hijack: a Janus-patched APK that updates over the original demonstrates the signed-update trust model is broken on vulnerable devices.

Escalation / chaining

Malicious code injection into a signed app → full app compromise / update hijack on vulnerable devices; pair with android-root-antidebug-bypass (no runtime integrity) and android-manifest-analysis (low minSdk).

Backend & tooling

Preferred Kali path (native Kali / WSL+Kali / Kali-SSH / Kali-MCP / HexStrike). Needs the user's in-scope Android 5.0–8.0 test device/emulator (adb) + Kali tooling (apksigner/apktool/janus.py). Windows-local last resort. See zazy-orchestrator.

Verification (background, before reporting)

Confirm apksigner shows v1-only AND (if exploited) the patched APK installs/updates over the original and runs the injected DEX, on an in-scope device. Reproduce before marking CONFIRMED; for dry-scan, report the signing/minSdk weakness without claiming exploitation.

Evidence

apksigner verify output, minSdkVersion, and (if gated-yes) the patched APK installing and executing injected code. Remediation: sign with v2/v3/v4; enforce minSdk >= 24 where possible; runtime signature/integrity checks + Play Integrity.